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24 January 1984

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

COMPANIES BOYCOTTED--Doha, 27 Dec (QNA)--The Israel boycott office has added seven more foreign companies on its list of companies which are boycotted by the Arab world. In a statement to QNA, a responsible source at the Israel boycott office in Doha said these companies are: three American companies: Intertechnology Incorporated, Concept International and Chromally American Corporation; two Japanese companies: (Koko) and (Kren Sanjio); one Italian company: (Dekaliti) Europe; and one British company: (Mole T. Lock). [Excerpts] [GF281858 Doha QNA in Arabic 1940 GMT 27 Dec 83 GF]

CSO: 4400/111

MAGHREB ECONOMIC UNION ADVANTAGES ASSESSED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 1031, 25 Oct-1 Dec 83 pp 16-18

[Article by Y. Sassi: "An Initial Comment on a Maghreb Economic Integration"]

[Text] The Maghreb industrial integration tops the bill. This topical issue, intellectually new and tempting, will be the subject of discussion during a forthcoming symposium jointly sponsored by the Union of Algerian Economists (UEA) and the Ministry of Planning and National Development. The 2-day meeting, restricted to the initiated, will be held on 28 and 29 November in Algiers, specifically at the Aurassi Hotel. Some 60 nationals of the Maghreb countries, university graduates, managers and officials of government departments concerned will have an opportunity, the first ever, to pool their respective experiences in the industrial sphere.

Three major topics are already included in the agenda of this symposium which promises to be of a very high scientific level. It is not a fact that the foremost purpose of the UAE is to initiate, promote and stimulate in Algeria ideas and thoughts on economic issues? In this sense the meeting proposes to study regional economic groupings (in theory and in practice, with specific reference to the Maghreb), the long and medium-term prospects of planning in the Maghreb economies and the integration of the existing and future Maghreb industries.

As noted by Abdallah Nadir Benmatti, the UEA secretary general, the main hope behind that scientific meeting is "to work towards creating an entity that will give, as a sound body, maximum protection against erosion." This is, in fact, a further step in the efforts to strengthen and consolidate the Maghreb, something which the political leadership of our country has always tried to achieve. The many messages, visits, trips and working sessions between two or more partners indicate well enough the efforts made on all sides.

The idea of economic integration within the Maghreb is nothing new, at least as an idea. The Conference of Tangiers in 1958 proposed the creation of a Permanent Secretariat and a Consultative Assembly for the Arab Maghreb and it was suggested that the leaders of these countries meet at regular intervals. Back in 1963, Algeria and Tunisia signed an economic agreement dealing with policies in the areas of energy and trade with the big economic blocs.

A year later, in February 1964, an industrial coordination mission representing Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya issued a report which recommended the adoption of coordinated measures in various key sectors such as energy, mining industry, fertilizers, iron and steel industry, metal manufactures, mechanical engineering, other chemical products and the glass industry. A few months later, that same year, their ministers of economic affairs and of agriculture met in Tunis and decided to create a Permanent Consultative Committee to study ways of ensuring that economic coordination.

Claude Gaillard¹ was quite right when he wrote that the Maghreb institutions were created "little by little according to the evolution of the political situation and according to immediate needs." In 1967, the Conference of Ministers of Economy, the chief Maghreb institution, asked the Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee (CPCM) to prepare an inter-governmental draft agreement for the main purpose of setting up a free trade zone. But the CPCM went even further and offered to prepare instead a "report on the various approaches to the problem of achieving economic unity in the Maghreb." It was then decided to hold a conference in July 1970 in Rabat. Its agenda: to define what is to be described as a Maghreb product.

Some differences of opinion arose. Was it a product entirely produced in the Maghreb? Was it a product manufactured by industries approved by the Maghreb plan? Or was it a product in which the last processing stage takes place in the Maghreb? In other words, what should be the minimum integration rate for a product said to come from the Maghreb? Behind these seemingly trivial questions lies, in fact, the entire scope of ideological options and economic choices. That was, it seems, the "stumbling block" of Maghreb integration. The problem of Western Sahara did the rest. What happened later is unfortunately well known.

But one must not forget to point out that several agencies owe their existence to the fact that the Maghreb economic integration was set in motion. The Center for Maghreb Industrial Studies (CEIN), the Maghreb Alfa Agency (COMALFA), the Maghreb Central Compensation Board (BCBM)--an agency dealing with issues of compensation in the context of the Maghreb trade relations--are some of the permanent institutions of a consultative nature which were created. Among the non-permanent and informal groups of representatives of the public administration, one could mention the Maghreb commissions for transport and communications, for industries, for commercial relations, for statistics and national accounting, for tourism, for employment and manpower, for pharmaceutical products....²

ALGERIA

	<u>Population</u> <u>(in millions)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(in billions of dollars)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(per capita)</u>
1976	16.8	13.1	780
1977	17	19	1,110
1980	18.92	36.41	1,920

TUNISIA

	<u>Population</u> <u>(in millions)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(in billions of dollars)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(per capita)</u>
1976	5.8	4.4	760
1977	5.9	5.1	860
1980	6.35	8.34	1,310

MOROCCO

	<u>Population</u> <u>(in millions)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(in billions of dollars)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(per capita)</u>
1976	17.3	8.4	470
1977	17.7	10.1	570
1980	20.18	17.44	860

LIBYA

	<u>Population</u> <u>(in millions)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(in billions of dollars)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(per capita)</u>
1976	2.4	11.5	4,270
1977	2.6	17.6	6,680
1980	2.98	25.73	8,640

MAURITANIA

	<u>Population</u> <u>(in millions)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(in billions of dollars)</u>	<u>GNP</u> <u>(per capita)</u>
1976	1.3	0.45	310
1977	1.5	0.4	270
1980	1.63	0.53	320

Political Obstacles, That Needs To Be Proved

It is therefore very difficult to clear assess all the exchanges of views of the subject of the Maghreb economic integration. Could and should they have done more? It is difficult to answer that question objectively. That kind of judgment would not take into consideration the fact that "when any type of regional entity is created, time cannot be measured in terms of a generational span but in terms of history where years are counted at the much slower pace of mankind's evolution."³

In any event, the Maghreb's economic integration has become an imperative in today's strategy and a basic need given the latest economic developments in the world. The common ties of the Islamic faith, geography and history, the similar population problems, the advantage of their coasts and their determination to become developed, their exports--to mention only a few factors--are all points in favor of an economic integration among the countries of a region which has a vast wealth of mineral resources, phosphates, petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, manganese, coal, lead, zinc not to mention its fishing resources and agricultural potential.

The argument about there being political and ideological obstacles is not as unbiased as it appears. Quite the contrary. The same people who use that argument are quick to set it aside when their own interests are involved. Although France and Germany fought one another in 1870, 1914 and 1940--three times in less than a century--that did not prevent these countries from sitting side by side as full members of the European Economic Community (EEC). Did the EEC suffer when socialist governments came to power in Europe?

The example of the EEC is very enlightening in this context. Integration does not require as a precondition the negation of governments and the necessary establishment of a supranational high authority. In fact the economic theory behind integration is based on the principle that any "modern" economy operates with some discriminatory measures. For instance, the various stages of economic integration are accompanied by the listing of discriminatory measures (free trade zone, customs unit, common market, economic union). On the other hand, one must also realize that the ultimate purpose of integration is the economic growth of the partners since "the liberation" of trade and of the movement of factors is not an end in itself but rather a stage, a tool that one must know how to utilize.

Short-Term Advantages

Among the advantages of integration--it also creates limitations which must be detected early to be better protected against them--the most often mentioned is the advantage of economies of scale, that is to say economies derived from the size of production and from getting the best market. The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), a United Nations agency, issued figures (in 1962) for the paper pulp industry showing that the average total cost dropped from about \$250 per ton, when the production capacity stood at 50 tons per day, down to about \$150 per ton when the production capacity increased to 200 tons per day. Another study (in 1966) conducted by the same agency reveals the importance of

the economies of scale in the steel industry. As the production capacity increases from 100,000 tons to 1.5 million tons, production costs drop from \$55 to \$40 per ton for cast iron; from \$97 to \$65 for steel in ingot shape; from \$235 to \$121 for laminated sheet. Generally economies of scale occur in most investments and more particularly in capital intensive investments.

How can one make sure that the Maghreb economies complement each other? What heavy industry is there in the Maghreb? What could be the threshold of returns on investments in the petrochemical industry in an economically integrated Maghreb? What has been tried in the sphere of inter-Maghreb economic collaboration? What would be the ways and means of achieving industrial integration? These questions and many others remain to be answered. The future of the Maghreb heavily hangs on these answers. "The Maghreb has been and remains a great hope which we must protect now and account for in the future."⁴

FOOTNOTES

1. Claude Gaillard: European Communities, African Organizations and the Birth of a New International Order, SNED [National Publishing and Distribution Association], 1980.
2. All of them called Maghreb Commission....
3. Claude Gaillard, European Communities, African Organizations and the Birth of a New International Order, SNED, 1980.
4. Mr Masmoudi, REVUE MAGHREB No 19 (January-February 1967).

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DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN TIZI OUZOU PROVINCE DESCRIBED

Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 21, 22 Nov 83

[Article by Saad Bouaqaba: "The National Liberation Front Party, Leader of the Struggle for Development: Tizi Ouzou, the Province of Rapid Transformations in the Context of the 5-Year Plan"]

[21 Nov 83 p 5]

[Text] Mountains Framed by Achievements!

My mission in this province has been to get a feel for the achievements that have been made in the 5-year plan. After a week of going about in the garden of these achievements, I would have wished to express the effort that has been exerted there in the form of a poem. In every hamlet and on the peak of every mountain I could smell the formulation of the achievements, the manifestations of the new life which figures cannot portray!

The starting point in this tour was the road connecting the province to the capital, which in turn is assuming a new form; without curves, most gently, it welcomed us as one of the achievements of the 5-year plan in the province, safely delivering us to the heart of the city, which is modern in every way.

The time was 0730 in the morning, and the army of male and female workers was hastening to the sites of the struggle against backwardness before time could pass! I paused to sip a cup of coffee from the coffee house "Mulk Allah," with a thousand questions in my mind. Where would I start? With this city, the province whose true nature has created achievements? With things, proceeding to people, or with people, toward things? Should I arrive at the policy of development through figures, or should I arrive at the figures through policy?

In the midst of a stack of questions, I found myself raising my hands to read out the opening verse of the Koran, along with the people performing the recitation before the monument to the martyrs in the midst of the city. A degree of loyalty to the martyrs had brought the governor, the deputy governor, the commander of the military sector, the chairman of the provincial people's assembly and all the local authorities to my presence!

I quickly considered that one of the projects in the daily program should be carried promptly, without delay, as customary, and I started an enjoyable journey among figures and achievements through the departments, municipalities and bureaus of the province, with its administrative and political agencies.

There a group of harmonious, enthusiastic and competent young people were running 2,000 operations throughout the province, fighting against backwardness with a rare ferocity! The arenas of the struggle thus could be numbered in the thousands. Each project consisted of a small struggle against backwardness and an achievement consolidating the well-being and progress that had been attained, adding to the solidarity of conviction and providing the workers with an additional experience of benefit in the coming struggles!

Thus there are 2,000 operations that are registered in the context of the 5-year plan. In the battles of the previous years, 666 operations have been won and the same number is being waged now; the plans for the rest are being prepared on paper. They are struggles which require effort and sacrifice on the part of all sincere workers, but they are battles which are being won without martyrs!

The Province of Tizi Ouzou is in fourth place in terms of population in the country, but it devours money which is equal to the treasury of the Republic of Algeria in 1967!

The Vigor of Development

The financial resources allocated to the province in the context of the 5-year plan in all sectors total 1.2 billion francs.

This figure is equal to 20 times the special program that was set out for the province at the end of the sixties, and it is five times greater than what was provided on the province's behalf in the context of the 4-year plan!

1,400 of the 2,000 projects have been put under the jurisdiction of the municipalities in the context of the second stage of regional balance, that is, balance within the province itself.

These projects are essentially oriented toward the following vital sectors:

Health units, the youth and sports sector, vocational training, rural housing and electricity, potable water, transportation and culture. In brief, the orientation is almost entirely toward the execution of the directives of the fourth and exceptional conferences of the party, which means that the Province of Tizi Ouzou is not only carrying the projects out rapidly, it is also carrying them out in the context of general national directives and in accordance with local requirements and the demands of the population. This leads us to deduce another fact, which is that the conception of the projects prepared in the context of the 5-year plan has been more responsive to the actual conditions of the province and its resources for construction.

In the Province of Tizi Ouzou there is not a single municipality which does not have construction resources.

The province is carrying out 60 percent of all the studies bearing on the programs set out for the province, including centralized projects. In the context of the province's special projects for municipalities, 80 percent are being carried out by local resources while just 20 percent are being carried out by national or regional companies.

The result is that the province has won the battle for the creation of construction resources and now has more than 77 general construction organizations on the local level. Some of these organizations such as the Tizi Ouzou Municipal Contracting Firm, which is now constructing projects of a national character, such as the sports complex for the Tizi Ouzou university village, are at the regional or national level in terms of construction capability and the caliber of technical resources.

This figure supports the general construction facilities in the local context with an additional large number of private contracting firms, which exceed 400, specializing in various branches of activity.

The other result is that the vigor of development in the Province of Tizi Ouzou has led to vitality in the private sector, in terms of contributing to and benefiting from development in the province.

Every year the Province of Tizi Ouzou devours a whole mountain of cement which would be as high as one of the peaks in this province (about 400,000 tons of cement). This is another measure of the speed of development in this province.

In the context of personnel, the Province of Tizi Ouzou possesses a group of personnel with high qualifications, and it has means for studies, design and followup which might not be available in some other provinces with greater population, problems and money. In addition to that, this province helps supply national agencies with highly qualified personnel which have been professionally trained in the field.

Another positive phenomenon which a person visiting the Province of Tizi Ouzou can observe most clearly is the dissolution of the differences between the political and administrative apparatuses. Everyone considers development to be an issue which concerns him in the first place, and this issue is no longer just one of people but now has become a matter of firmly established traditions in the activity of the political and administrative agencies of the province. Adequate money, necessary construction equipment, competent personnel, a sense for the people's causes at the time the projects are being prepared, that is, sound, balanced planning, and coordination among the supervision and followup agencies all are elements which have been a fundamental basis for interaction among the projects of the 5-year plan throughout this province in the course of the past 4 years. What are the results that have been obtained, in detail?

That is a question we have tried to answer by reading the figures bearing on accomplishments among various interacting elements and by ascertaining the pearls of the 5-year plan which have been spread about the peaks and valleys of the lofty Djurdjura!

The Other Dimension of Housing

One can say without exaggeration that there is no area of life in Tizi Ouzou that has not been touched by the accomplishments of the 5-year plan and that attention has been focussed in particular on the sectors of housing, irrigation, electricity, roads, commerce, culture, sports, youth, traditional industry and agriculture.

The Province of Tizi Ouzou contains 1,500 villages or population accumulations with a population of more than 7,000; and these villages and schools [sic] have chosen the spurs of noble mountains on which to establish themselves in most cases.

The distribution of the population in this manner has posed an additional problem for development and construction activity; nonetheless, this distribution has been advantageous throughout the province as a whole, because development of the mountains has been a vital matter as far as the area went.

For this reason, the effort exerted in the area of roads, water, housing, education and electricity has been great and difficult in some cases, but has been a tax that was required of the government for the development of these areas on the part of the inhabitants.

Throughout the Province of Tizi Ouzou, east, west, north and south, you will fail to catch sight of huts, or tin shacks. This is not just attributable to the harsh nature of the area but also to the traditions of the inhabitants in the first place and the government's efforts, which have furnished these inhabitants the building materials and construction equipment with which to build their homes and improve their living conditions.

The figures state that the government has been building 4,000 apartments a year throughout the province in the form of rural and urban housing in the course of the past 4 years of the 5-year plan. That figure is close to that on the work the provincial capital has carried out in the context of urban housing.

However, the private sector throughout the Province of Tizi Ouzou has been constructing nearly four times this amount, thanks to the facilities the government has provided.

Four hundred private contracting firms are active in the Province of Tizi Ouzou, but this number devotes its activity in particular to the construction and private sectors.

When the government started to think about having the private sector [illegible] the problems of housing, while it took charge of the matter of

providing building materials, the Province of Tizi Ouzou had already entered that stage.

Of the total of 400,000 tons of cement, the private sector consumes about two thirds of the amount, and its activity is essentially directed toward the construction sector.

In the Province of Tizi Ouzou, about 10,000 construction permits are issued annually, but most builders do not need permits, because they build their dwellings far away from inhabited areas, in the midst of the forests and peaks of the Djurdjura. Therefore, the construction permits do not reflect the true state of the citizens' activity in the area of housing construction.

In Tizi Ouzou, the hurdle of studies bearing on construction has been shortened in the case of private parties, and the citizen can get a modern construction plan for his dwelling for an amount that does not exceed [missing].0 Algerian [dinars] from the province's studies offices. This is included in the context of encouragement of the citizens to build their own housing themselves. There still are other provinces which [illegible] the roads and means which make it possible to apply this approach, approved by the fourth conference, which the central committee has referred to and the president has insisted on on more than one occasion. Meanwhile, the Province of Tizi Ouzou has actually entered the stage of carrying out these directives. This is the vitality which construction in this area is endowed with, the vitality of responding to the present stage and making rapid use of the resources which the decree gives it in a timely manner, before the stage has been superseded.

The results the province has obtained have turned its mountains into a white and red [missing] on green, and rural housing has become a sign of manliness as far as the inhabitants of the area go. People who do not own their own housing do not own their own lives! When "stubborn" customs and habits are put to use in positive ways the impossible becomes normal and within everyone's grasp!

[22 Nov 83 p 5]

[Text] Water and the Struggle with Nature!

I will present figures here only insofar as they provide the honorable reader with the picture. From independence to 1979, 420 villages were supplied with potable water, while from 1979 to this moment, the moment the report is being prepared, water pipes had come to 409 new villages. That is, the achievements made in 4 years equal those that had been made from independence to 1979. No national company constructed any of these projects within the province, and this alone is adequate proof of the magnitude of effort exerted and the degree of vitality that development in this province has reached.

The matter here does not concern the piping of water to villages -- it also concerns the laying out and renovation of complete distribution systems

which will take the dimensions of 2000 into consideration. The province has reached this result thanks to the organizations that have been established in the framework of the province, the departments and the municipalities.

The activities of laying the pipe of life in the villages and schools [sic] have paralleled the laying of water sewage and drainage pipes.

The total figure is that water is now accessible to about 75 percent of the inhabitants of Tizi Ouzou, which is a superb fact at a time when most areas are suffering from this serious problem.

Most modern centers of development in the province, such as the towns of Tizi Ouzou, Bordj Manayel, Dellys and other departments and municipalities, have determined their own water systems and also sewer systems.

Local organizations have provided the water and irrigation that national organizations have failed to do. There are projects such as some dams, one of which the president dedicated during his tour of the province; this was constructed by an organization in the province.

There are irrigation and water projects that vacillated without progressing for 10 whole years before local groups intervened, and these projects were re-evaluated more than five times over the decades. This may be ascribed to mediocrity of design and slow construction, factors which have been reduced by the process of assigning this matter to local groups.

The local organizations have begun to enter the stage of manufacturing irrigation equipment; the water purification plant to be used in Tizi Ouzou has been manufactured and is now installed and waiting to be put in operation.

Alongside efforts related to the construction of projects, attention has been given to the matters of maintaining and improving the administration of facilities; this factor was one of the basic obstacles in this sector.

In the context of the coming 5-year plan, the province may turn toward major work which is embodied in the establishment of permanent catch basins for tremendous amounts of water that go straight into the sea and are estimated at billions of cubic meters.

The construction of dams is not a negligible matter; rather, it is the issue of the entire future:

In terms of farming, industry and the population.

The water sector in the Province of Tizi Ouzou is to be considered the sector of the challenge with nature. The snows of the Djurdjura surge violently toward the sea and the need of sites that are suspended on the spurs of mountains requires that this water be pumped back to an elevation of 900 meters above sea level in the best of cases. It takes a pressure of 12,000 tons to bring water from the bottom of the channel to the peak of the mountain so people can drink. This requires that energy be provided so that

the equipment can be operated, and this raises the cost of the water. A liter of water that is brought back up to the top of the mountain in the direction contrary to that of nature could come to the price of a liter of fuel coming from Hassi Messaoud. Nonetheless there is no alternative option!

Electricity, or the Stars That Are Planted in the Ground!

Electricity is the second preoccupation of the inhabitants, after housing. Every building in the rural areas of the province requires electricity first of all. Someone who looks at the valleys of the Djurdjura at night will feel that the stars in the sky and all the solar systems have been planted there. All the mountains glitter, and nature at night is no longer dead. The effort that has been exerted in this sector speaks for itself to everyone who looks out at night. The figures state that 70 percent of the mountains in these areas have been supplied with electricity. The live wires pursue the citizen in the mountains and the schools [sic], in the place of barbed wire.

These wires have illuminated 200,000 homes and the light of the revolution has reached 335 villages.

More important than all this is the orientation toward the establishment of local organizations specializing in this sort of development activity. The foundations of this organization have now been set out, and the coming 5-year plan will witness most important developments in this sector, once the foundations have been laid.

Expansion in other areas such as culture and the development of home life has been engendered by the expansion in the provision of electricity. The entry of the second channel into homes in the rural areas has been a major reason for the entry of the four remaining channels.

By means of electricity, water has been pumped from wells into houses.

By means of electricity, current has been brought to the telephones.

By means of electricity, the fifth channel, or television, has come in, and all the electric appliances have been put in operation, imparting movement to stagnant life in the rural areas and creating the desired development and improvement. Traditional industries and other local activities have been put into operation.

The Road Follows the Citizens' Tracks!

Water pipes and electric wires, along with paved roads, are three elements which pursue the citizen in the mountains and on the peaks.

The director of public works and roads says that the citizen here is contributing to the construction of the roads, especially the stretches that link dwellings to public roads. Work in the area of roads has been oriented toward three basic focal points in the 5-year plan:

The first focal point: this is the paving of the roads between the villages and the municipality. A total of 1,500 kilometers have been paved and most of the construction was done by local organizations. This represents about two-thirds of the total program listed in the context of the 5-year plan bearing on the development of municipal roads.

The second focal point: the improvement of existing national and provincial roads by constructing bridges, expanding roads, or in the case of the large towns constructing roads outside built-up areas.

The third focal point: this is the construction of new national and provincial roads and unpaved thoroughfares to the hamlets and population accumulations.

Basic Supplementary Facilities

The four elements of rural life -- housing, electricity, water and roads -- have been bolstered by other supplementary elements which are embodied in the establishment of a belt of social and cultural services.

More than 50 commercial units have been established throughout the municipalities in the context of the 5-year plan. Thirty units have started offering services to the population, thus substantially strengthening the distribution sector. This accomplishment has been backed up by about 44 warehouses for the various commodities the citizens require.

Sixty-eight post offices have been established throughout the province to offer services to the citizens.

For the first time since independence, treatment is being extended to the most remote areas in the province, with the construction of 72 treatment facilities in the context of the 5-year plan.

For the first time, special attention is being given to young people and in this context 48 small sports fields are being set up throughout all the villages and hamlets of the province.

In addition to this, more than 82 various activities have been carried out which involve the fundamental base organizations, such as the establishment of municipalities, administrative branches and other activities.

With the 5-year plan, serious attention began to be devoted to the cultural sector throughout the province.

After the construction of the house of culture in the seventies in the provincial capital, the 5-year plan established more than 30 cultural centers throughout the governorates, and 17 cultural centers started offering their activities in these municipalities; the others are now in the process of being constructed.

All these projects were carried out by local construction facilities, which is the nice thing about this entire process.

In addition to these new approaches in the administration of development in the context of the 5-year plan, there also are the continued development efforts in the context of the sectors which are still receiving priority, including the sectors of education, agriculture and industry.

Education

The population of the Province of Tizi Ouzou is one-20th that of the country, but in the context of intermediary education it has constructed one-10th of the total intermediate schools built throughout the country. However, it is not content with what has been achieved.

Nineteen intermediate schools, 1,600 primary departments and 3,215 teachers' apartments have been built. These achievements exceed the volume of the construction in the Province of Algiers, whose population is more than double that of the Province of Tizi Ouzou. The other provinces boast that intermediate schools are available at the municipality level, but the Province of Tizi Ouzou has brought intermediary schools down to the level of the hamlet. Still, officials are talking about backwardness in this sector!

The director of the education department in the Province of Tizi Ouzou talks about the focal points of work in the sector, stating, "Following the general application of education, we will have to devote ourselves to quality. Quality means bringing Algerian schools up to the level of recognized international standards of schoolwork, which means attention to quality in the schools. The era of the construction of schools without administrative offices has ended, and it is necessary to end the system of shifts in schools throughout the province and reduce concentration in classes to reasonable levels which are academically acceptable. We have accomplished much in this area throughout the province, but much still also remains before us. The system of shifts is declining every year in the face of the work done, and admissions into the schools have become almost stable. This allows us to review construction and to emphasize management affairs and attention to the quality of personnel. These are all factors which fall into the category of improved quality."

In other governorates, the people boast of modest accomplishments; in the Province of Tizi Ouzou I had a feeling that the modesty in the presentation of accomplishments had reached the point of concealment!

Tizi Ouzou is exposed to migration from other provinces because of the availability of greater educational opportunities, especially in the case of the stages which are considered permanent areas for attracting pupils, such as the first year of intermediate school and first year secondary.

Industry Supports Construction Facilities

Another trend in the industrial sector as mirrored in the local context lies in the framework of municipality development projects. Twenty-two industrial units have been set aside in the framework of the 5-year plan, including 16 which are concerned with the manufacture of building materials. Twelve units have entered the construction stage and these have provided 40 percent of

the province's requirements for construction material in the form of bricks, tile, wood and various other materials. This is a necessary activity for advancing the construction of the projects.

Thus industry throughout the province has been placed at the service of initiatives toward development: this is another picture of the integration which constitutes one of the basic elements in the vitality of the development in the province.

The central public sector is concerned with such strategic areas as electricity, metals industry, heavy industry and so forth.

However, the local public sector is concerned with the construction of building materials which local development requires.

The private sector's industrial activity is intensively oriented toward the foodstuff and textile industries and other activities which offer a rapid profit.

Agriculture Is Directed toward the Needs of the Inhabitants

All provinces are concerned with workshops more than with farms. This fact caused me to put this sector at the end of my concerns as I was investigating the elements of this investigation; however, I was surprised to see that the situation is the other way around in this province.

Agriculture is one of the main concerns of the administration and the party alike. The results that have been achieved in this sector, in the scope of the 5-year plan, support this claim. Production over the 4 years has increased by 90 percent, covering 79 percent of the inhabitants' needs for foodstuffs, whereas 4 years ago the proportion did not exceed 30 percent. This was due to the establishment of 4,000 chicken growing units throughout the province, the planting of 3 million fruit trees, 3,000 beekeeping units, the irrigation of 1,000 new hectares, and the planting of 17,000 hectares with fruit and vegetables. Three years ago that did not exceed 9,000 hectares.

The list is long, and I will not impose a burden on the reader; I will leave it to him to contemplate these figures, so that he can realize the magnitude of the efforts that have been exerted most sincerely and truthfully.

However, what is certain is that the province has realized these results by concentrating on two basic points:

Attention to the public sector and intelligent use of the resources in it.

Attention to the private sector and provision of the sector with the wherewithal for advancement and development.

After this, the governor of the province was asked "If these are the concerns and the achievements of the current 5-year plan, what in your opinion will be the preoccupations of the coming 5-year plan?"

He answered without hesitation, as if he had been waiting for this question:

"The current 5-year plan is to be considered a decisive turning point in the development of the province, because it has permitted us to solve a large number of the problems which had been obstructing the course of development and the everyday life of the citizen. It has provided all the conditions for the development of backward sectors and set out the bases for developing them rapidly in the future.

"The coming 5-year plan will of course concentrate on the completion of this effort and at the same time will be more deeply oriented toward focussing on means of construction and their costs. The coming battlefields will be management, construction and cost control."

Development Is the Policy

However, the great lesson that can be drawn from the experience of Tizi Ouzou Province in the area of development is the harmony between the officials in the political and administrative systems. Development in this province, as far as all officials are concerned, is a policy, and the policy, to them, is development. For this reason, the branches have disappeared, the points of dispute have disappeared with them, and understanding has taken the place of infighting. The province, and development in particular, have benefited from this atmosphere, which has become a firmly-rooted tradition.

The party engages in its activity in the shops and among the workers. The persons elected on a province-wide and municipality basis feel the demands of the inhabitants and reflect these in their daily preoccupations. The executive system is struggling through the daily results that have been achieved in the field, and the caravan of development continues to advance with each new dawn. National effort enriches the sheaves of welfare and prosperity in this province, which was once deprived and now has come to ward the evil eye from its achievements!

11887

CSO: 4504/111

MANPOWER MINISTRY SPECIFIES REGULATIONS FOR EXPATRIATE CONTRACTS

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 13 Nov 83 p 5

[Article: "Egyptian Ministry of Manpower Specifies for Arab Employers the Steps and Conditions for Contracting for Egyptian Technical Labor"]

[Text] The size of the Egyptian technical labor force, with which Saudi Arabian employers have contracted during the past 10 months through the Egyptian Manpower Ministry, totaled some 7,000 workers, representing the largest number of the 13,700 Egyptians who signed contracts with 4 Arab nations through official means during the last months of 1983. That was stated by a responsible source in the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Training. He said that it has been decided to convene during the next few days a committee at the highest level, chaired by Sa'd Muhammad Ahmad, the minister of manpower, and composed of representatives of the ministries of Interior, Tourism and Emigration Affairs, to study several new proposals, aimed at rules to implement Law No 119 of 1982, which regulates the work of Egyptian labor offices abroad.

The responsible source said that there are 133 offices wanting to operate in this area that have submitted applications to the Bureau of Foreign Employment in the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower for licensing. However, licenses have been issued to only 51 offices so far.

The responsible source specified two legal courses that an Arab employer could select when desiring to have recourse to Egyptian technical labor.

The first way is the basic and fundamental way. It is to get into direct contact with the Ministry of Manpower and Training. There are specific steps which regulate this sure course of action.

1. The Arab employer begins by submitting to the Egyptian labor attache in his country a detailed statement about the Egyptian labor required, in terms of numbers, types of technical specialization, wages and contract stipulations with respect to rights and duties. It is worth noting that Egypt currently has labor attaches in Jiddah, Khartoum, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Baghdad. Preparations are underway to re-open the Egyptian labor attache office in Riyadh, and to send an Egyptian labor attache to Oman.

2. In the next step, the Egyptian labor attache informs the Bureau of Foreign Employment in the Ministry of Manpower in Cairo of the Arab employer's application and conditions. It is stipulated that the employer must allow the ministry a minimum of 2 weeks to study his requirements.

3. In the next step, the Bureau of Foreign Employment looks for the required needs from among those whose names are on the waiting lists. Annually, these include about 20,000 Egyptian technical workers, most of whom are in construction and vehicle-driving specialties. These are the specialties that are most in demand. Selection is made after personal examinations.

4. At the time the Arab employer comes to Cairo, in accordance with previous telegraphic communication, the Bureau of Foreign Employment of the Ministry of Manpower reviews with him its selections for compliance with his requirements. If they are not satisfactory as to number or type, the ministry will advertise for him, at his expense, in the Egyptian press and specify a date for personal interviews. The Arab employer has the right to attend and to bring along whatever experts he wishes in the desired specialty.

5. After the required workers have been selected, the Bureau of Foreign Employment offers, without charge, a number of its employees to the Arab employer for the task of editing contracts. They make three copies of the contract: one for the employer, the second for the worker and the ministry sends the third copy to the Egyptian labor attache for follow-up on the implementation of the contractual conditions. The important point here is the consideration that the contract be as simple as possible, in order to economize on the stamps that are affixed to each page.

The responsible source in the Ministry of Manpower added that it was very important that the wages stipulated in the contract be on the same level as the wages that are reported to Cairo each year by the Egyptian labor attaches in the Arab states. They should also be the minimum wages that can be changed every 6 months, in accordance with changes in economic conditions, with no provision for increase. The Egyptian worker's wage in Saudi Arabia was 1000 riyals per month last year. This year, because of certain changes, a reduction to 900 riyals was accepted.

In any case, he said that guaranteed housing must be provided, along with the opportunity to travel and return at least once each year at the employer's expense and guaranteed leave every 15 days. Some provisions may vary, but there is a concern for the right of vacation. Qatar, for example, allows the longest vacation (3 weeks), in addition to compensation at end of service.

The responsible source in the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower emphasized that the wage of the Egyptian worker currently ranks ahead of Pakistani, Indian and Omani workers. He said that from the beginning of this year, up to the present time, 13,700 Egyptian technical workers had concluded contracts with Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which has the largest number, some 7000 Egyptian workers.

As for the second way, it is to conclude a contract with an Egyptian labor employment office abroad. Their owners have so far submitted 133 applications, of which 51 offices have been licensed. However, actual work has only begun in 3 offices, to which about 100 applications have been recently submitted by Arab employers. This way is also governed by specific steps.

1. A detailed statement in duplicate is submitted to the employment office, concerning numbers, work specialties desired and conditions of employment.
2. The office sends one of the copies to the Bureau of Foreign Employment in the Ministry of Manpower for a review of the conditions and their soundness.

In a recent case, the bureau rejected an Arab employer's provision which stipulated the worker's obligation to pay the equivalent of 3 months wages, if he left his job and returned to his country. The thinking was that the condition was unfair and that it was unjust to compel him to return at his own expense.

3. The Bureau of Foreign Employment makes its decision on the contract in terms of soundness and sends it to the employment office. Without this, it is not considered legally valid and would not be accepted by all other official authorities.

7005

CSO: 4504/98

ELECTROLYSIS USED IN LAND RECLAMATION PROJECTS

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 14 Nov 83 p 6

[Article: "Egyptian Agricultural Experts Use Electricity To Reclaim a Million Feddans of Saline Land"]

[Text] After 3.5 years of continuous study and scientific research in the laboratories and fields, Egyptian agricultural experts have announced an important discovery, which will probably help the problems of food shortfalls not just in Egypt alone, but also in Third World nations. For the first time, experts have been able to use electrolysis to create an ionization process for agricultural soil salts, in order to reclaim vast areas of land with saline soil.

Economic feasibility has been confirmed for this Egyptian scientific discovery, in which professors from the Colleges of Agriculture and Engineering of Cairo University participated in the field experiments, which included the land around Tel al-Kabir, Kafr al-Shaykh and other areas in the Nile River's northern delta.

Economic and field studies have confirmed that reclaiming a field, no matter what its size, takes between 10 and 30 days, or between 200 and 600 hours of operation of the electrolysis equipment. After that, the land is completely suitable for production. It is possible that the profit from its production will cover the reclamation costs within a period of no more than 3 years.

The concept of the Egyptian scientific discovery is based on using electrical energy to create the ionization process for the saline soil. The area of the field is divided into basins, with each basin having a special drainage canal. The electrical reclamation device consists of two poles, one of which is positive and placed inside the basin, while the other is negative and is installed in the mouth of the irrigation water drainage canal. The two poles are connected to one machine, in order to obtain fixed polarity current, instead of oscillating current. The device and the two poles are finally connected to a source of electrical current. With the flow of electric current, an attraction is created between the positive pole and the chemical particles which represent the basic food for plants, such as nitrates, sulphates and phosphates. Because this pole is located in the midst of the field, these food particles will remain, or rather they will be drawn up from the depth of the soil to its surface, so as to be available for the plants later. As regards the elements that

harm agricultural soil, such as sodium and magnesium salts, they are directed with the water current to the negative pole, as a result of differing electrical charges. This is the pole that was placed in the mouth of the drainage ditch, where it is freed of them.

In the larger fields, more than one machine is placed in one field. However, they are all connected to a single source of current. The device is operated for a period of 20 hours a day, with 4 hours of rest. The reclamation of the field, no matter how different it may be in size, fluctuates between 10 and 30 days, and the hours of operation vary between 200 and 600 for the complete reclamation period. After that, the land is completely suitable for agriculture and production. In this way, the reclaimed land offers a return from its production that can cover the costs of reclamation within 3 years. This is a relatively short period of time, when compared with the traditional methods of reclamation. The land department of the College of Agriculture in Cairo University announced that, after 3.5 years constant research, an original method of land reclamation had been created, the use of electrical energy for the reclamation of lands affected by salt.

Dr. Ibrahim Husayn, the supervisor of this research, considered to be the first of its kind in the area of applied and field research, says that the idea for the research was established in view of world interest in the availability of food, and the progress in modern agriculture as one of the means of producing food through increased productivity per feddan, the reclamation of new lands and the addition of new acreage that can be cultivated along side the green lands.

After the success of the field tests of the scientific study, experts say that there are more than one million feddans of saline land in the governorates of al-Sharqiyah, al-Buhayrah, al-Fayyum, Kafr al-Shaykh, Suez, Ismailia and Port Sa'id. This land is easier to reclaim than sandy land, because saline land originally was fertile, but it has temporarily lost its fertility as a result of poor drainage and accumulated salts.

This stage of the research, on the applied side, is aimed at reducing costs. After that, the research will be offered to the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture for its application.

Khalil Shafi'i, the applied researcher in the Agricultural Research Station in area "six" in northern Upper Egypt, said that with the application of the research, it will be possible to add one million feddans of saline land to the agricultural acreage in Egypt, and that it will be possible to continue research to discover new varieties of traditional crops, vegetables and fruit, which will be suitable for this soil, along with continuing to strengthen them by using appropriate fertilizing agents.

7005

CSO: 4504/98

BRIEFS

ARAB INVESTMENTS--The Arab nations' participation in investment projects in Egypt, during fiscal year 82-83, amounted to 522 million pounds, while the United States' share was 3 million pounds, the European Common Market nations 14 million, other nations 38 million pounds and Egypt 303 million pounds. There were 163 projects involved. The report of the Egyptian Ministry of International Cooperation and Investment indicated that the total capital for these projects was 910 million pounds, while their investment costs were 1.233 billion pounds. There were 48 industrial projects, 35 financing projects, 13 agricultural projects, 22 construction projects, 23 handicraft projects and 23 storage projects. The report stressed that the industrial projects occupied first place, in terms of number of authorizations which, up to 30 June, totaled 564 industrial projects, with a total capital of about 1.734 billion pounds, whose investment costs total 4.71 billion pounds. Moreover, there were 77 authorizing banks, with a capital of 638 million pounds. There were 64 banks that actually pursued their activities, of which 23 were branches of foreign banks, 21 were joint banks, 11 were Egyptian banks and 22 were development banks. The Investment Board's report made it clear that international cooperation made positive progress during fiscal year 1982-83, since the total loan contracts and grants increased to 80 percent, whereas it was 72 percent in 1981-82. The percentage of allocated loan contracts increased to 84 percent as compared with last year's 78 percent. The percentage of loan contracts obtained from the United States was 98 percent, whereas during 1981-82, it was 83 percent, i.e., an increase of 15 percent. [Text] [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 14 Nov 83 p 6] 7005

CSO: 4504/98

OUTLOOK ON SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN CASABLANCA

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 25-29 Nov 83

[25 Nov 83 pp 1, 3]

[Text] It is a sprawling city with explosive growth. How many other deliberately spectacular images have been applied to Casablanca!

And yet, with 2.3 million inhabitants, it has only 12 percent of Morocco's population. Its growth rate of 3.3 percent annually is lower than that of the rest of urban Morocco (3.6 percent). Natural growth is still high, but it is dropping more rapidly than one could have hoped. Rural immigration does not affect Casablanca in higher proportions than other Moroccan cities.

Compared with other countries, Casablanca's weight among all Moroccan cities is far from alarming. With only 26 percent of the urban population, it lags far behind cities such as Bangkok (69 percent), Dakar (63 percent), and is substantially at the same level as Paris (23 percent), Tokyo (32 percent) and Oslo (32 percent).

Morocco has a network of large cities (five now have over 500,000 inhabitants) which contribute to its regional balance. Casablanca's share of the gross national product is greater than its proportion of population, which bears witness to a vigor that can only be maintained if the expansion of the city continues at a sufficient pace. Morocco's economic development is to a certain extent linked to that of Casablanca. Actually, a hub of international trade, it has added certain highly technical industries to its traditional industrial activity.

Organizing Casablanca's expansion must therefore be the goal of the Master Plan rather than a policy of drastically limiting growth.

Expansion of the urban area has not followed population growth. The per capita urbanized area has not ceased dwindling in recent decades, going from 46 square meters per person in 1960 to 39 square meters in 1982. This progressive density tends above all to delay construction of roads and sanitation systems. Since areas with roads and public services have become far too rare, a whole string of consequences ensues:

The scarcity of land results in higher property values, which makes it increasingly expensive to purchase land for the construction of public facilities. Such facilities are consequently delayed, which only increases the imbalance between the supply and demand for developed lots. This cumulative process benefits only landowners.

This shortage of developed land is unfortunate, but scarcities do not affect all domains. Water is regularly supplied, despite the major projects that had to be completed. There is an adequate amount of electric power and investment programs are planned.

Building projects have been the object of considerable efforts, especially with respect to schools. School attendance has grown spectacularly in the past 20 years. Between 1971 and 1982, it doubled in primary schools and quadrupled in secondary schools. At the present time, 80 percent of all children over the age of 7 are in school and by 1990, the rate should be 100 percent.

Housing Construction

Construction of housing in all sectors combined is not keeping up with needs and the lag has been building for years. There are several reasons for the delay:

The scarcity of land results in a scarcity of housing. Family income prevents 50 percent of the people from having access to the so-called "low-cost" housing.

Existing urbanization plans propose to divide up urban areas based on the types of housing, whose scheduling fails to take real requirements into account.

The failure of construction to keep up with needs has three consequences: a somewhat concealed density as the result of overbuilding or construction in courtyards or on vacant lots; the crowding of several families into housing too small for them, resulting in a steady increase in the number of persons per household, which now exceeds 5.5; the expansion, although slowing down in recent years, of shantytowns.

Major public construction programs are inadequate in number and quality. They are located based on the availability of land, without any deliberate orientation of urban development.

Feasibility studies are conducted too quickly and the stereotyped plans fail to take local conditions into account: topography, suitability of geological features. Consequently, the cost of providing equipment is high, although the quality of systems may often be poor.

Preliminary financial estimates do not correspond to the facts, meaning that final costs far exceed estimates. Certain operations are simply blocked because the government has to find additional financing not originally planned.

Until recently, aid to housing came in the form of interest rate allowances, but loans were only granted to households which proved minimum resources. The minimum excluded from the "social" financing most very low-income families. Measures have been taken to remedy the situation, but the financially solvent demand presumes a very low-cost housing market, leaving a large share to self-construction. While the normal price of low-cost housing is around 130,000 dirhams, nearly 50 percent of the population does not have over 60,000 dirhams.

Although 65 percent of all inhabitants are renters, the rental sector is inadequate, particularly in the area of social housing. Rent on the free market is high because of the scarcity of housing. On the other hand, rent in the public sector (whose available housing is very limited) has been frozen. This measure, by depriving public organizations of their essential resources, has prevented them from reinvesting. This also results in a kind of black market in subleasing with no economic justification.

Urban Activities

The number of daily trips per person is only 2, giving evidence of the low average income and the difficulty of moving about in Casablanca. Some 75 percent of all trips are unavoidable, meaning for reasons of school or work. With 38 percent of the total, going to and from school represents the most important reason. More than half of all trips are on foot and even more (60 percent) with respect to school children. On the other hand, only 25 percent of all trips from home to work are on foot because of the average distance involved. Automobiles provide only 17 percent of all mobility, on an even footing with mass transport.

The number of automobiles is still quite low (1 car for every 20 persons on the average) and the increase is very slow because of economic difficulties and the high cost of imported automobiles in foreign currency.

Mass transport accounts for 17 percent of all trips, with a very old and very small pool of vehicles. Casablanca has only 1 bus for every 4,000 inhabitants, half of what it should be compared with cities of the same size.

The organization of the city is not adapted to the low mobility of its inhabitants. Trips of over 2 kilometers on foot are practically impossible. However, the excessive zoning of urbanization plans to date has had the effect of making residential areas very far from places of work, forcing the active population to make commutes that are too far on foot.

Despite the small number of cars, the downtown area is already congested because of the high concentration of tertiary jobs, the concentric structure of the first city plan and the little parking available.

Most investments devoted to travel have helped the automobile: construction of Highway 35, development of Zerktouni Blvd., and the traffic plan. In contrast, mass transport has received little aid. Since 1978, the average number of buses bought new has not exceeded some 20 per year, which is far from enough to meet needs.

The possibility of setting up one or several light underground rail lines is being studied.

The amount of traffic on certain roads, especially the Mediouna highway, apparently justifies the project. However, one can make the following objections:

It would increase the attraction of a road already overloaded and result in future urbanization in a direction not included in the Master Plan.

It would absorb all available credits for mass transport, which would have the effect of preventing or delaying the indispensable modernization and expansion of the pool of traditional vehicles.

It would create disturbances on certain routes, with the "on site" route encroaching on the road system to the detriment of other means of transportation, including traditional buses.

Postponing construction of an underground railroad will make it possible to extend priority to two points: expanding and modernizing the traditional bus system; and turning the existing railroad into an urban transportation line. In the Master Plan, it is to become the main axis serving future urbanized areas. This presupposes its modernization, improved signals and traffic signs and the transfer of freight traffic.

At the present time, the line is mainly devoted to shipping from the phosphate and coal areas. Use of the Jorf Lasfar infrastructure could reduce the amount of this traffic.

Ineffective, Uncoordinated Management

At least five administrative and political entities share responsibilities for urban development: the communes; the urban community; the prefectures; the Ministry of Housing and Development of the Territory; and the wilaya [governorate] of Greater Casablanca.

The responsibilities of each are in principle completely defined in the communal charter, but in practice, many decisions are poorly coordinated and these entities do not always play the precise role given to them.

In the absence of a common, planned will, emergencies give rise to hasty choices whose consequences are poorly measured: Relocation of a shantytown, the establishment of a tract, the search for land to set up an industry are undertaken without preliminary studies, without concern for city planning documents, left to the chance of real estate opportunities or political and economic pressures.

Ill-Adapted Land Policy

The ill-adapted land system is the source of many difficulties. To date, some 85 percent of all housing construction is made up of public development operations, land bought by the community (generally the MHAT [Ministry of Housing and Development of the Territory]), developed and sold.

But these operations have been based on a patrimony of property now disappearing. Still in the hands of the public is the "recovered land" scattered around Casablanca.

Some industrialists are offered random plots of land, far from facilities and housing areas, for the simple reason that they belong to the government and do not require costly expropriation.

The way in which land prices are set illustrates the disorganization of the market. Theoretically speaking, the value of undeveloped rural land does not exceed 2 to 3 dirhams per square meter and the cost of development is about 130 dirhams. The total price of developed land should therefore not exceed 150 to 200 dirhams per square meter. This is about the price of some land sold by the MHAT. On the free market, the price may go as high as 1,500 dirhams per square meter.

The formation of costs is linked to two factors: the solvency of families, which determines the maximum price of a lot on which one (or several housing) unit(s) may be built and the minimum regulation area acceptable. The ratio between the two gives the value of a square meter of land.

Where demand is the greatest and minimum areas the fewest -- that is, for low-cost housing -- the prices are the highest. The increase in land costs reduces the number of households able to have access to ownership.

Gradual Densification

The trend toward gradual densification, whose effects we have seen on the consumption of urban space per person, is a mechanism in which, at first sight, everyone finds something of benefit: landowners whose property goes up in value; the owners of lots who increase the built-upon area and rent part of their housing; the community, which sees the possibility of housing a growing population, without being limited to the construction of always costly roads.

But this short-sighted policy, followed on too broad a scale, engenders the situation with which we are familiar: the gradual deterioration in the standard of living of inhabitants; higher land values, which makes the purchase of land necessary for development and facilities difficult.

Obsolescence of City Planning

City planning does exist in principle and its role is to control building upon the land. Unfortunately, in Casablanca, there is a whole series of divergent regulations. In addition to this incoherence is a total absence of control over what is actually done.

The only development plan theoretically applicable -- because it is legally approved -- is the "8,225," whose latest revision goes back to 1974, but which sets an urban perimeter now too small and whose zoning is too strict and too segregational.

Along with these documents are development plans, most of which are illegal because they are not approved. When they are, the fact that they are previous to Plan 8,225 makes them more or less expired.

In addition, they are conceived as development plans based on a generally plethoric living system poorly adapted to topographical and geological limitations.

The zoning set up in them exists independently of any overall planning and it is not known whether the distribution of the different types of housing is in keeping with demand, whether the size of the areas of activity is sufficient and whether facilities are correctly planned. Apart from that, they are poorly coordinated and even the continuity of roads is not always assured.

In order to reunify regulations, the Master Plan must be made immediately operational. To do so, a zoning plan is attached to it to be applied to all urban areas that are already developed and that clearly determines the rights of third parties. Valid for two years, more precise development plans will then be substituted for it.

Development plans will gradually cover the urban areas included in the Master Plan. They will be one of the preconditions for any urbanization.

26-27 Nov 83 p 2]

[Text] II. Population Growth

The urban population went from 1,005,900 inhabitants in 1960 to 1,585,450 in 1971, an average annual growth rate of 4.2 percent. In the last census in September 1982, it totaled 2,263,470, with an annual intercensus growth rate of 3.3 percent.

Urban growth is high but nevertheless lower than all projections.

It is erroneous to believe that Casablanca has the largest share of the Moroccan urban movement.

From 1971 to 1972, the urbanization rate of the Moroccan population was 42.7 percent of the total population, or 8,730,390 inhabitants and an annual rate of increase of 4.45 percent, clearly higher than that of Casablanca, with 3.3 percent.

Evolution of Urban Population

1960, 1,005,000 inhabitants; 1971, 1,583,400; 1982, 2,263,500. Annual rate of growth: from 1960 to 1971, 4.2 percent; from 1971 to 1982, 3.3 percent.

Urban Structure

The trend of Morocco's urbanization as seen in the results of the latest census shows a net slowdown in the growth of all large cities located on the Kenitra-

Casablanca "Atlantic axis." The drop in annual growth rates during the period between census takings is nearly 2 percent in Casablanca, 1.5 percent in Rabat, 1 percent in Sale and 1.6 percent in Kenitra.

Movement of Population in Morocco

<u>Population</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>60/71*</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>71/82*</u>
Urban	3,411,671	5,409,725	4.27	8,730,399	4.45
Rural	8,214,561	9,969,534	1.77	11,689,156	1.45
Total	11,626,232	15,379,259	2.57	20,419,555	2.6

* Gross annual rate of growth

Source: Directorate of Statistics

During the same period, there are four major areas of urban growth: 1) in the south, the Souss plain with Agadir and Taroudant; 2) in the central-west, Chaouia, with Berrechid and Settat, Doukkala, between Safi and El Jadida, the phosphate plain with Youssoufia, and finally, Tadla, with Beni-Mellal; 3) in the central-north, the Sebou basin and the Gharb plain, with Sidi Slimane, Sidi Kacem and Souk El Arbs; and 4) the east, the Mediterranean side of Morocco, with Tangiers and Tatouan, on the one hand, and, on the other, Nador, whose port is being developed.

The expansion of urban areas and their re-balancing are closely linked to: the development of agriculture and irrigated areas; new administrative structures; and measures taken to decentralize industrial investments with respect to Casablanca and the establishment of 26 industrial zones equipped to receive them.

Finally, this new urban organization must be supported by measures aimed at reducing the rural exodus. This is one of the prime objectives of the 1981-1985 Development Plan, which consists of intensifying "the development of dry-farming areas," on which 85 percent of the rural population depends.

Natural Growth

Based on the initial results of the 1982 census and previous studies by the Ministry of Housing and Development of the Territory and the Directorate of Statistics, the annual natural growth rate, meaning the number of deaths subtracted from the number of births, should evolve from 2.45 percent in 1982 to 1.8 percent by the year 2000.



A number of socioeconomic changes are taken into consideration: the rise in the marriage age from 17.3 years in 1960 to 19.1 in 1971; the use of contraceptives and attitudes toward them (the effects of family planning are probably greater than anticipated, especially in urban areas); economic problems, in particular, the extreme difficulty of finding housing in Casablanca; overall school attendance of boys and girls; and the higher standard of living in urban areas than rural areas.

Population Growth

(1) EVOLUTION DE LA POPULATION - PROJECTION - X 1000

		% ann (2)		% ann		% ann		% ann	
		1982	82/85	1985	85/90	1990	90/95	1995	95/000
(3)	Natalité	-	3,55	-	3,30	-	3,15	-	2,60
(4)	Mortalité	-	1,10	-	1,10	-	1,05	-	0,80
(5)	Croissance Naturelle	2.300	2,45	2.473	2,20	2.757	2,10	3.058	1,80
(6)	Croissance Globale	2.300	3,30	2.535	3,20	2.967	3,10	3.456	3,00

(7) Tableau n° 3



Année (13)

Année

Key:

1. Evolution of Population, Projection for Year 2000
2. Percent annually
3. Birth
4. Death
5. Natural Growth
6. Overall Growth
7. Table 3
8. Urban Casablanca
9. Morocco
10. Total Morocco
11. Rural Morocco
12. Urban Morocco
13. Year

Migrations

While Casablanca has experienced a very high rate of migration during its history, immigration is not currently the preponderant factor of growth. It continues to grow in absolute terms but decline in relative terms.

In 1971, the migratory balance (immigrant-emigrant) was estimated at 3 percent of the population, or about 40,000 persons a year.

Between 1971 and 1982, with the number of births exceeding the number of deaths by 2.45 percent, the migratory balance may be put at 15,000 persons a year, or under 1 percent for the total population.

Several explanations are possible: 1) Many Moroccan workers leave Casablanca for foreign countries. 2) Since 1978, there has been a decline in economic activities and a large drop in building authorizations. The problem of housing in Casablanca is probably a major check on migration. 3) Finally, all demographic projections made in recent years were based on the 1971 and 1960 censuses. While the 1971 census is not questioned, the 1960 figures were probably underestimated, leading to an overestimation of some indicators.

[28 Nov 83 pp 1, 4]

[Text] Urban Expansion

The metropolitan area of Casablanca (five municipalities) included: in 1960, 4,490 hectares for 965,200 inhabitants; in 1971, 6,400 hectares for 1,506,300 inhabitants; in 1982, 8,500 hectares for 2,139,200 inhabitants.

From 1960 to 1982, the urbanized area per person went from 46 square meters to 39 square meters.

The drop in area per person is all the more serious because it only affects the poorer population groups.

The development of the metropolitan area is characterized by the following features: 1) its bipolarization around Casablanca and Mohammedia, even if their populations are very different; 2) its growth in a limited space and the absence of any suburban ring because of transportation difficulties; and 3) the absence of major empty spaces that can be developed within the 1982 urban perimeter.

Typology

Several types of housing are easily discernable. They are relatively unmixed and show very marked socioeconomic differences.

We would distinguish seven housing sectors: medinas or native quarters of the old and modern type; districts with buildings; districts with so-called "planned buildings"; residential areas with houses or "villas"; areas of low-cost housing; industrial areas; and shantytowns.

Old and Modern-Type Medinas

The medinas or native quarters are of several types in Casablanca. That of the "Old Town," the historical core of the city, is the only one organized in a traditional fashion inside a protective wall.

Without displaying the same qualities as those in Fes or Marrakech, it exhibits the same evils: overpopulation with the resulting hovels.

The medina outside the walls, Derb Ghalef, the district of the Habous and the New Medina are highly varied in appearance and are very different from the traditional form of the Old Town.

It is in the Old and New Medinas that one finds the greatest densities, with over 1,000 inhabitants per hectare. Old Town, its areas beyond the walls and Derb Ghalief have the worst sanitary conditions in Casablanca. Any rehabilitation of these districts would first require a thinning out of the population, which itself depends on transportation, for these are the only low-cost districts near the downtown area.

District With Building Lines

The downtown area of Casablanca, planned by Prost at a time when Morocco opened up to international industrial and commercial trade, reveals a very rich concept of urban space. Despite changes and some deterioration, the architecture is unique, marked by a mixture of the European style of the 1930's with Moroccan architecture. The upgrading of this district, following the original plan, should be one of the goals of the Master Plan.

While the downtown area remains the center of tertiary activities, the population density remains low, despite a slight increase, at about 200 persons per hectare.

District of Planned Buildings

The typology of these sectors has evolved with time.

1 -- The operations involving the so-called "planned buildings" were carried out, starting in the 1950's, under the rationalist influence of the "modern" movement. Among the largest are El Hank, El Mansour, Bournazel. As time goes on, the failure of these urban arrangements is obvious.

2 -- Without the same starkness, current operations generally remain of the great complex type, isolated from the urban context. One might cite certain programs such as Andaloussia, Dakhla, Dar Lamane, without questioning the quality of their completion.

Sectors of Residential Housing or Villas

The residential areas of Casablanca with houses or villas covers 2,450 hectares for 176,300 inhabitants. Population density varies but remains very low.

The area of the lots now tends to diminish and yards or gardens lose their usage value, becoming a kind of protective buffer zone. Despite this fact, owning a villa remains the sign of relatively high income.

Low-Cost Housing

Low-cost housing now covers over one-third of the area of the urban zone and includes 46 percent of the population. The relative importance of this type of housing will continue to grow.

Low-cost housing in principle has minimum facilities, but is the object of operations that are too vast, too uniform and too dense. In addition, it is still too costly for families with very low incomes (about 40 percent of the total) and the architectural solutions proposed today are far from satisfactory.

The law on low-cost housing encourages the same models repeated over and over and certain requirements should be modified.

Finally, planners should have a plan and cultural model reflecting something other than an outmoded bureaucracy.

Shantytowns

This is probably the best known problem and the one most studied. Its development can be measured by the surveys conducted by the different prefectures. The shantytowns shelter 54,000 families and a population of 306,410 persons or 13.6 percent of the total population of Casablanca.

The abandonment of reconstruction projects for the big shantytowns is to be regretted, for they allow for intervention in a less brutal fashion. By bringing in the inhabitants from the very first phase of construction, one

reduces social tensions in an environment in which all residents are very united. In this connection, the experience of Meknes and Kenitra are very positive and appear to be less costly than the major relocation operations.

Classification of Shantytowns by Household Size (1982-1983)

A = number of shantytowns

B = number of households

	0/100		100/200		200/500		500/1000		1-5000		5000+		Popula.
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	
Ben M'Sick	35	913	10	1,496	2	776	-	-	3	5,685	1	12,025	147,810
Ain Chock	67	1,819	12	1,668	5	1,715	4	2,447	-	-	-	-	43,087
Cas/Anfa	66	1,508	4	568	2	528	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,000*
Ain/Sebaa	40	1,538	7	1,036	8	2,287	1	622	-	-	1	6,262	62,885
Mohammedia	19	574	2	269	5	1,687	1	537	3	8,355	-	-	37,630
Total	227	6,352	35	5,037	22	6,993	6	3,606	6	14,040	2	18,287	306,412

* Estimated

Source: Prefecture census

Urban Typology

	Casablanca				Mohammedia			
	Pop. X 1000		Areas		Pop. X 1000		Areas	
	No.	%	Hec.	%	No.	%	Hec.	%
Villas	176.3	8.5	2,449	28.4	6.7	6.2	20.5	2.7
Old Town ¹	153.2	7.4	663	7.7	-	-	-	-
New Medina	234.1	11.3	872	10.1	-	-	-	-
Mixed zones (downtown)	189.3	9.1	872	10.1	-	-	-	-
Industrial zones	119.3	5.7	1,659	19.3	6.6	6.0	431	56.7
Building sectors	66.0	3.2	190	2.2	14.6	13.5	5	.6
Low-cost housing	984.5	47.5	2,516	29.2	49.8	45.8	250	33
Large shantytowns	142.2	6.9	206	2.4	31.0	28.5	53	7
Unregulated housing ²	8.0	.4	60	.7	-	-	-	-
Total	2,072.9	100.0	8,615.5	100.0	108.7	100.0	759.5	100.0

¹ Old Town/Medina/Medina expansion and Derb Chalef

² Southern developments of Ben M'Sick and coastal strips, Ain Sebaa

In 1971, 64 percent of all households rented their housing. However, systems of financing do not allow the construction of moderate-rent housing, except for government employees.

The public and private sectors share the rental real estate market.

Housing Occupation (in percent of occupation)

	Of All Types				Masonry 84.9 Percent			
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Priv.</u>	<u>Rental</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Priv.</u>	<u>Rental</u>	<u>Other</u>
Casablanca	100	29.3	64.0	6.7	100	24.5	69.1	6.4
Urban Morocco	100	37.5	53.5	9.4	100	32.2	59.5	8.3

One notes the juxtaposition of two contrasting types of rental property:

1) a mainly parapublic sector made up of relatively old housing, managed by organizations such as the CIFM [expansion unknown]. Rents, which are very difficult to modify, are very low. On the other hand, access to housing is compensated for by a "pass" unknown to the management. A "key" in Bournazel is worth from 20,000 to 30,000 dirhams.

2) a private sector, mainly represented by purchasers of lots within the framework of low-cost housing, who rent one or two floors of their homes. Rent in this sector is high and out of all proportion with the parapublic sector.

Outdated Equipment and Facilities

In 1971, housing in Casablanca and Rabat was the best equipped in terms of comfort. Some 88.4 percent of all households had toilets, while 78.4 percent had electricity and 67.4 percent had running water.

In general, it is not necessary to plan to replace old or unhealthy buildings. Only the disappearance of shantytowns requires the construction of new housing.

Maintenance of existing housing and buildings or their rehabilitation costs less than the construction of new housing. Two objectives should be set:

1) rehabilitation of Old Town, its outlying areas and Derb Ghalef, involving some 30,000 households; 2) rehabilitation of part of the low-cost housing, following a survey to define the scope of such an operation.

Cohabitation

The size of a household in Casablanca was: in 1960, 4.8 persons; in 1971, 5.5 persons; and in 1982, 5.64 persons.

Depending on the type of housing, these rates are generally very high for the entire city.

There are several explanations for the problem: 1) the young age of the population; 2) the housing shortage; and 3) the only way to share rent, whose burden is especially heavy because incomes are so low.

Cohabitation of households may be deliberate and somewhat desirable, but the situation is difficult to tolerate in urban areas when it becomes excessive.

Based on normal standards, we estimated the number of housing units needed to reduce the size of households to normal dimensions for Casablanca: The result is 121,000 units, or 30 percent of all households.

Overpopulation

Based on standards of occupation for each room (less stringent than those of the Ministry of Housing), the shortage of housing in Casablanca in terms of total rooms is an estimated 700,000.

It is in the smallest homes that the situation is the most serious. In 1971, 89.1 percent of all families lived in three rooms or less, 33.2 percent in one room, 37.6 percent in two rooms and 18.2 percent in [illegible] rooms.

Number of Rooms Critically Overcrowded

Shortage by Number of Rooms	Percent	Number of Households	Shortage by Number of Rooms	Total
1	12.33	49,500	1	49,500
2	12.32	49,500	2	99,000
3	13.41	53,900	3	161,700
4	10.18	40,900	4	163,600
5	8.65	34,700	5	173,500
6	2.51	10,100	6	60,600
Total	59.40	238,600	Total	707,900

Base 100 - 401,900 households in 1982.

Housing Needs

The notion of housing needs is not always easy to define.

1 -- There are needs that must be satisfied in order to maintain the increased number of households with the population expansion and rural migrations to the cities. That is the quantitative aspect.

2 -- Other elements are of increasing importance, including needs linked to: eliminating housing cohabitation; relieving crowding within households; and renewing the housing available. This is the qualitative aspect.

The need for housing in order to do away with unhealthy units, 40,000 units, reduction in cohabitation by different families in a single household, 121,000 units, and the elimination of overpopulation, requiring 200,000 units, are often lumped together and difficult to separate.

We estimate the housing shortage at 45 percent of the current housing available, or about 200,000 units, to which one must add the rehabilitation of some 60,000 units (native quarters, Derb Ghalef, and so on).

Faced with the major burden of housing in Morocco, it nevertheless seems totally unrealistic to consider the entire shortage, especially since at the present time, housing production does not even meet the needs of the expanding population. In addition, one must remember the efforts being made to absorb the big shantytowns, for which purpose some 50,000 units are planned in short- and medium-range terms.

That is why, in figuring needs, in addition to the increase in population, the shortage will be met partially by lowering the rate of occupancy of existing housing from 5.50 to 5.35, which represents an additional effort of some 1,000 units a year.

If the current economic conditions should improve, that effort could be increased.

It will therefore be necessary to build some 330,000 housing units between now and the year 2000, an annual rate of 18,000 units a year.

Estimated Theoretical Housing Predictions (in thousands)

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1982-1985</u>	<u>1986-1990</u>	<u>1991-1995</u>	<u>1996-2000</u>
Total population	2,300	2,535	2,967	3,456	4,000
No. persons/household	5.5	5.5	5.47	5.41	5.35
Total avail. housing	418	460.9	542.5	638.2	746.7
No. housing units					
(needs per period)		42.9	81.6	95.7	108.5
No. housing units					
(cumulative needs)		42.9	124.5	220.2	328.7

Rate of Construction

The average rate of 18,000 units a year is far above what was achieved between 1971 and 1982. During that period, the average number of building authorizations a year was 97,00 [sic]. At the same time, the number of households went from 284,000 to 401,900, an annual average of 17,700 units.

These statistics must be interpreted with caution. First of all, not all building permits necessarily ended in construction. On the other hand, units were built without permits (adding storeys to houses, shantytowns, and so on).

Finally, while the increase in the number of households between two censuses corresponds, by definition, to an increase in housing, such housing is not necessarily new and may signify denser construction on existing areas.

On the basis of these observations, it will be necessary, following a catch-up period adapted to current means, gradually increase the number of housing

units to be built each year until the year 2000. At the beginning of the 1983 period, the annual rate of construction was 10,750 units. By the end of the year 2000 period, the number should be 26,700.

Solvable Demand

It seems essential to know what measures are to be adopted in order to meet overall solvable demands for housing, without excluding households with the lowest incomes. The breakdown up until the year 2000 of household incomes was drawn up based on plan predictions, considering a moderate increase and a certain reduction in equalities.

These needs result from choices between the desires of families and their financial possibilities for a given government policy. In Casablanca, for most households, choices will long remain very few in number given the general income level. In order to expand the number of choices, we shall first of all seek to evaluate the solvable needs of households in order to best adapt construction and finance systems.

Based on that table of income, we adopted the following rules:

1 -- Monthly payments demanded of each household correspond to the amortization of a sum of capital according to loan conditions set by the CIH for the allocation of housing, either within the framework of the General System or that of the categories of housing eligible for financing from the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] (23 projects underway for 1981-1984-1985, financed by the CIH within the framework of an IBRD loan).

2 -- The portion of income devoted to housing is set at 35 percent for the lowest incomes, then at 30 and 25 percent.

3 -- The personal contribution is set in all cases at 30 percent of the real value [text unclear and illegible].

On this basis, the monthly payments demanded of each household correspond to the amortization of a sum of capital making it possible to define the categories of housing that can be offered.

Based on these estimates, some 10 to 15 percent of current needs can be met within the framework of refinancing of the General System and some 45 percent within the framework of the Special System.

All the rest, some 40 to 45 percent of needs, require special housing conditions: planned housing, development housing or housing with reduced standards.

Considering the objectives we have set: an increase in the rate of equality and an annual increase in income of 2.5 percent, this category of needs should drop from 45 to 25 percent.

Estimated Housing Needs by Category

(1) Catégorie de constructions	(2) V.I.T.* maximum	Capital disponible					
		1982-1985 Nb logts (3)	1986-1990 Nb logts	1991-1995 Nb logts	1996-2000 Nr logt		
0 Trame assainie + prêt matériaux (4)	-	11 3.712	6 4.368	0 -	0		
1 Logements embryonnaires (5)	32.000	11 3.712	9 6.552	7 6.881	0		
2 Logements évolutifs (6)	48.000	10 3.375	7,5 5.420	9 8.847	5 6.11		
3 Logements individuels moy. (7)	62.000	13 4.388	12,5 9.100	14 13.762	20 24.76		
4A Logements collectifs (8)	80.000	20 6.750	25 18.200	25 24.575	29 30.91		
4B Logements multi-familiaux (9)							
5 Régime spécial (10)	130.000	25 8.438	26 18.928	27,5 27.032	29 35.91		
6 Régime général (11)	200.000	5 1.688	8 5.824	10 9.830	12,5 15.4		
7 Villas (12)	-	5 1.687	6 4.368	7,5 7.373	8,5 10.1		
		100		100 98.300	100 123.6		

Key:

1. Category of construction
2. [text illegible] (price of land plus construction)
3. Number of housing units
4. Lot with sewer connections, plus materials loan
5. Planned housing
6. Development housing
7. Individual housing units
8. Collective housing
9. Multi-family housing
10. Special System
11. General System
12. Villas [text illegible]

Proposed financing corresponds to a range of housing, preferably R + 1 and R + 2, whose cost prices range between 32,000 and 80,000 dirhams (June 1982 value). The first three categories correspond to housing to be completed in the future.

The bases for mortgage loans have been reviewed and accompanied by insurance on the security and life of the borrower.

This new setup is still experimental because it is applied only to the financing of 36 projects chosen by the CIH and for a total construction cost of some 1.25 billion dirhams.

Estimated Financing Capabilities

EVALUATIONS DES CAPACITES DE FINANCEMENT

(1)	81/85					86/90					(4)	
	Tr.de	Revenu	Part revenu	Capital	(x1000)	Tr.de	Revenu	Part revenu	Capital	(x1000)	Conditions	
	revenu	mensuel	logement			revenu	mensuel	logement			du prêt	
	%	DH (5)	%	DH	DH	%	DH	%	DH	DH	%	Ans (6)
	0/ 20	433	35	151	20,8	0/ 20	572	35	200	27,6	6	20
	20/ 40	853	35	298	41,1	20/ 40	995	33	348	47,9	6	20
	40/ 60	1.471	30	441	60,8	40/ 60	1.718	30	515	70,9	6	20
	60/ 80	2.398	30	719	99,0	60/ 80	2.834	30	850	17,0	6	20
										77,6	10	15
	80/100	5.499	25	1.374	125,4	80/100	5.938	25	1.484	135,5	10	15
	91/95					96/2000						
	0/ 20	757	35	265	36,5	0/ 20	995	35	348	47,9	6	20
	20/ 40	1.179	35	412	56,8	20/ 40	1.427	30	428	58,9	6	20
	40/ 60	1.984	30	595	81,9	40/ 60	2.291	30	687	94,6	6	20
	60/ 80	3.307	25	826	113,8	60/ 80	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	75,4		3.811	25	952	86,9	10	15
	80/100	6.410	25	1.602	146,8	80/100	6.897	25	1.724	157,4	10	15

Key:

1. Income breakdown in percent
2. Monthly income
3. Share of income for housing in percent
4. Loan conditions
5. Dirhams
6. Years

Financing of Housing

With the solvable demand for housing already defined, the fundamental problem existing is that of financing. Credit institutions specializing in the financing of housing are represented by the Real Estate and Hotel Loan Bank (CIH) and the People's Central Bank (BCP).

The financing of construction is based on two mortgage loan systems: the Special System for households with an income of under 2,500 dirhams a month and the General System for those with higher income.

For all of Morocco in 1981, the amount of loans issued under the General System was 307 million dirhams, while the total of the Special System was 9 times lower.

In order to improve this performance of the Special System, the CIH outlined a system within the framework of an IBRD loan that was much better adapted to the solvable demand.

The CIH plans a strong growth in activities, but confronted with the scope of needs, its own resources and those of the national market remain low. In order to increase its activities, the CIH therefore has to negotiate loans on the international market. Given the current crisis, this type of foreign financing is necessarily limited.

Naturally, the simplification of loan eligibility approval procedures, efforts to mobilize private savings, measures to encourage real estate investments, and the requirement that commercial banks reserve 1.5 percent of their deposits for financing housing are certainly good measures, but the means available still remain below needs.

These inadequate means of financing must therefore be compensated for by a radical transformation of housing production modes by: reducing purchase prices and accelerating the production of land to be built upon; saving on development costs by a reduction in road standards, adaptation of systems, and so on; reviewing regulations and simplifying procedures; developing self-construction, increasing its productivity and encouraging self-financing; and building less expensively by setting up a market of simple elements of construction and reducing unit costs and controlling prices of materials.

[29 Nov 83 p 4]

[Text] The Master Plan must show: the number and breakdown of jobs over the next 20 years, based on the major classifications of primary, secondary and tertiary; and the location of these jobs, whether in precisely located industrial zones, centers of tertiary employment or scattered jobs mingled with housing.

In order for it to do so, one must know the rate of activity and its foreseeable evolution, the structure of activities, the current location of main sources of jobs, the areas necessary for employment and the total area to be reserved for activities, based on current data on Casablanca, and the preferential location and distribution of activities in space.

Rates of Activity

The most recent data are based on two series of polls made in 1977 and 1979:

Rates of Activities

<u>Year</u>	<u>Activities Men</u>	<u>Activities Women</u>	<u>Total</u>
1977	42.8%	16.4%	29.1%
1979	44.9%	13.7%	29.0%

The rates of activity shown above are quite close to prospects for 1975:

<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>2000</u>
27.5	27.9	28.2	28.6	29.1	29.5

The growth in rates of activity has therefore been more rapid than predicted by the 1975 study.

The rate of male activities is slightly higher than that for all of urban Morocco, while the rate of women's activities is slightly lower. This may be explained by the relative impreciseness of the definition of work for women in rural area.

Not all active workers have a steady job: 87.7 percent have stable jobs, while 1.25 percent have marginal jobs and 10.9 percent are unemployed. Some 43 percent of the latter group have never worked.

The rate of activity will tend to increase: For male activities, two factors will have the opposite effect:

The relative aging of the population (currently, 53 percent are under the age of 20) will result in a larger proportion of active persons on the job market.

Extension of school attendance will reduce the number of active workers among young people under the age of 25.

For women's activities, several factors will have a contradictory effect: School attendance and professional training should bring about an increase in women's activities. However, the birth rate will remain high in the coming decades and will still keep many women at home.

Finally, the economic crisis is particularly unfavorable to the expansion of women working.

For all these reasons, it is likely that the overall rate of activity will stabilize at around 30 percent between now and the end of the Master Plan.

The breakdown between the two sexes is: 45 percent for men's activities and 15 percent for women's activities.

Structure of Jobs

In the traditional breakdown into the three primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, the primary is poorly represented, as one would have expected.

The most strongly represented secondary activities are: textiles and the garment industry (31 percent of all secondary jobs); building and public works (17.7 percent); processing industries and metals (16.8 percent); and the food industries (10.7 percent).

The other industrial and handicrafts activities divide up the rest of the secondary jobs.

The breakdown of tertiary activities is as follows: commerce, 34.5 percent; office workers, 18.4 percent; transportation, 14.3 percent; education, 9.9 percent and domestic services, 8.8 percent.

Domestic services are still rather numerous but represent only 4.5 percent of all jobs.

Secondary activities express the persistence of an old industry: textiles and garment making, which alone occupy 31 percent of the secondary sector. Industries processing metals for capital goods are only in third position, behind building and public works, which is explained by the strong development of the city.

Given future needs, this latter sector will still have to develop, either by increasing its productivity or by occupying a larger share of the active population.

The unemployment rate of 11 percent is high and it is to be feared that it may have further increased since 1979. It is nevertheless under the level of underemployment of rural sectors, which explains the strong attraction of the large cities and Casablanca in particular.

Evolution of Activities Between 1960, 1971 and 1979

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1979</u>
Primary	2.1%	2.45%	2.28%
Secondary	34.6%	40.08%	46.5%
Tertiary	63.08%	57.46%	51.2%

Secondary activities developed between 1960 and 1971 at an average rate of 1.34 percent, and between 1971 and 1979 at a rate of 1.87 percent.

In contrast, tertiary activities declined between 1971 and 1979 at a rate of .8 percent a year and between 1971 and 1979 at a rate of 1.43 percent.

The trend toward a substitution of tertiary jobs by jobs in the secondary sector therefore increased. But one must not conclude that this will last and for the following reasons: 1) the determination to develop Morocco's industrial activities outside of Casablanca, with the establishment of 26 industrial areas to which reference has already been made; 2) the natural trend observed in industrial countries, which is manifested by an expansion of service activities to the detriment of increasingly automatized production activities. It therefore appears reasonable to think that industrial activities will stabilize in the years to come at around 45 percent of all jobs.

Concentration of Activities

While awaiting the results of an analysis of the 1982 census, the precise concentration of activities with the weight of the different types of jobs is not accessible from recent sources that are either exhaustive or reliable.

A localization by commune was done by comparing two sources: the latest poll of activities in 1979, which gives the structure by type of activity, and analysis of the Kompass, which gives an idea of the breakdown of activities

among the six communes, which until 1982 constituted the entire metropolitan population of Casablanca and Mohammedia.

To these figures, one must add some 30,000 "floating" jobs from the building and public works sector, which cannot be pinned down.

It will be noted that most industrial jobs are found in Ain Sebaa (65 percent). Despite the size of the industrial area, Mohammedia has only 6.5 percent of the secondary jobs and 3.4 percent of all jobs, although it represents 10 percent of the population. Mohammedia's industries, the refineries and electric power plant, take up great areas and provide few jobs.

Ben M'Sick has no activity, which proves the inadequacy of sources available to us, for small business is represented there as elsewhere, as are office jobs, public services and education in particular, even if there is an inadequate number of such jobs.

The high-level private tertiary sector mainly exists in Ain Diab (67 percent of the tertiary sector), but also in Ain Sebaa, with 30 percent of the jobs.

Ain Chok is far behind Ain Diab and Ain Sebaa in job potential, but remains clearly above Mohammedia and Mers Sultan.

This has something to do with the large area of Ain Chock, while Mers Sultan has a very small territory.

The localization of trade defines the center and hypercenter. The latter essentially corresponds to trade in group 2, mainly irregular trade.

Area Occupied by Activities

The ODI [Office for Industrial Development] study on industrial facilities in Morocco took as the norm as 145 square meters per job. An estimate made based on data for Casablanca yields a much lower figure of some 50 square meters per job. Which should be retained? Several elements are involved: The trend toward automation will increase the area of industrial enterprises for the same number of jobs in years to come. The policy of decentralization should not encourage the establishment in Casablanca of industries taking up the most space: chemistry, cement works, and so on. The current facilities of the Lafarge Company should be transferred in the near future. The cost of land in Casablanca will necessarily result in a relative concentration of needs, which will have the effect of reducing areas.

For all these reasons, it seems wise not to exceed an average area of 60 square meters per job.

For tertiary jobs, no statistic is now relevant. This is of lesser importance than for the secondary sector because the areas involved are much smaller and an absolute error has only a relatively minor effect on the final result.

We shall use European data valid for Casablanca: 5 square meters of land for every tertiary job.

Area Needs of Tertiary Sector

	<u>Additional Active Workers Tertiary</u>	<u>Area in Hectares (5 m²/job)</u>
82-85	43,200	21.6 hectares
85-90	68,700	34.3 hectares
90-95	77,804	38.9 hectares
95-2000	86,496	43.2 hectares
Total		138.0 hectares

Active Population by Sector and Prefecture

<u>Communes</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Tertiary</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Ain Diab	8,400.00	16,900.00	171,000.00	196,300.00	35
Ain Chock	950.00	33,400.00	21,600.00	55,950.00	10
Mers Sultan	400.00	16,214.00	10,500.00	27,114.00	5
Ben M'Sick	270.00	2,400.00	--	2,670.00	.4
Ain Sebaa	3,200.00	157,300.00	92,100.00	252,000.00	45
Mohammedia	130.0	15,700.00	3,000.00	18,830.00	3.4
Total	13,080.00	141,914.00	299,200.00	553,000.00	100.0

Programming of Activities

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Active %</u>	<u>Primary 2%</u>	<u>Secondary 45%</u>	<u>Tertiary 53%</u>
1982	2,263,000	678,900	13,578	305,500	359,800
1985	2,535,000	760,500	15,210	342,225	403,000
1990	2,967,000	890,100	17,802	400,545	471,700
1995	3,456,000	1,036,800	20,736	466,560	549,504
2000	4,000,000	1,200,000	24,000	540,000	636,000

Programming of Activities

The rate of activity used [is] 30 percent and the breakdown of jobs by major category makes it possible to obtain a distribution of jobs summed up as shown above.

We have assumed that any newly active worker could find a job. which means a gradual reduction in unemployment for almost double the population. This therefore amounts to reducing the current rate of unemployment by nearly half between now and the year 2000. The rate of unemployment of [line deleted] be considered as a normal value, based on the minimum necessary just to renew jobs.

Area Needs for Secondary Activities

<u>Year</u>	<u>82-85</u>	<u>85-90</u>	<u>90-95</u>	<u>95-2000</u>
Additional active workers in secondary sector	36,700	58,320	66,000	73,440
40% in new unit	14,620	23,328	26,400	
60% in existing industries	22,020	34,992	39,600	44,060
New units: 60% outside of industrial zone	8,800	14,000	15,840	17,625
New units: 40% in indus- trial zone	5,870	9,330	10,560	11,750
Existing industry: 70% outside ind. zone	15,414	24,500	27,720	30,840
Existing industry: 30% in industrial zone	6,600	10,500	11,880	13,220
Total in industrial zone	12,470	19,830	22,440	24,970
Total outside ind. zone	24,214	38,500	43,560	48,465
Area: in industrial zone (100 m ² /job)	125 hec.	198 hec.	224 hec.	250 hec. 797 hec.
Area: outside ind. zone (30 m ² /job)	77.5 hec.	123 hec.	139 hec.	155 hec. 494.5 hec.

Calculating areas needed for secondary activities takes two factors into account: on the one hand, on the one hand, the breakdown between industrial areas and scattered urban areas and, on the other hand, between expansions of existing activities and new facilities.

It is accepted that 60 percent of all new jobs are expansions, with the rest being new establishments.

Of these expansions, 30 percent are in industrial zones and 70 percent outside. For new establishments, the proportion is 40 percent in industrial zones, compared with 60 percent outside.

These calculations are summed up in the table above. To the results given in the number of jobs, one should apply area standards which correspond to the average value of 60 square meters retained above: 100 square meters for secondary activities in industrial areas; and 33 square meters for secondary activities outside industrial zones.

For the tertiary sector, calculations are based on numbers of jobs held and the standard area retained per job: 5 square meters.

11,464

CSO: 4519/56

BAGHDAD PERSIAN ON STRUGGLE AGAINST KHOMEYNI

NC061049 Baghdad in Persian to Iran 0600 GMT 6 Jan 84

["Answers to Letters" feature from undated MOJAHED publication No 184]

[Text] We have carried many articles on Khomeyni's reactionary and expansionist war in which we have discussed and revealed the damaging, antipopular, and antinational aspects and effects of this war from various points of view. During this period, the people of our country have thoroughly felt the destructive effects and inhuman objectives of Khomeyni's regime in the treacherous continuation of this war and have voiced, by various means, their protest against its continuation.

Our alert compatriots are well aware of the fact that this reactionary war, for the continuation of which Khomeyni is treacherously insisting, is intended to perpetuate his rotten rule, to hide the regime's internal crises, to crush popular opposition and protests, and to confront the revolutionary resistance throughout the country. Some 500,000 deaths, hundreds of thousands of disabled people, millions of refugees, and, in addition, numerous destruction, unemployment, high prices, inflation and many other difficulties, economic and social bottlenecks, and crises are among the results of this reactionary and destructive war, the price for all of which must be paid, and foremost, by our homeland's oppressed people.

Oh alert and combatant sisters and brothers; oh resistance cells throughout the country! Now that the imposter Khomeyni, by playing with the human, material, and moral resources of our people and our homeland Iran, is striving to forward his warmongering policies, the revelation of and the [word indistinct] struggles against these policies, as well as the further consolidation and expansion of the peace-seeking movement is a revolutionary, national, and patriotic duty for all of us. We should, in any way we can, make the popular opposition and protests against Khomeyni's warmongering nature as strong as possible. Resistance cells throughout the country shoulder a heavier responsibility in view of all of this. They should try to form the people's peace-seeking movement and to thus impede, as best as they can, the reactionary and warmongering objectives of Khomeyni's regime. Our sisters and brothers should, through specific and detailed plans and by putting to use all their organizational and combatant skills, carry out this duty and by putting forth specific and suitable slogans against war and warmongering, make the people's protests more vocal.

The more than 2 million war refugees, who lost everything they had as well as people close and dear to them, in Khomeyni's antipopular war have--in addition to their general duty of opposing Khomeyni's warmongering policy--other specific duties which, for example, differ with the duties of students who are sent to the fronts through deceit and force. The war refugees, wherever they are, should rouse the sympathies and solidarity of the rest of our compatriots by revealing the crimes and reactionary acts of Khomeyni's regime and the extent of the damages and destruction that are the direct outcome of Khomeyni's treacherous insistence on continuing the war. At the same time students should refuse to go to the fronts and through informative acts influence other students from doing so. These students' parents, too, should naturally resist the inhuman threats by the regime's hirelings and not allow their dear children to be sacrificed in a war that has brought nothing but destruction to our homeland.

At this point it is necessary to point to the sensitive role of the national and patriotic army personnel. The national role of the militant and alert personnel of the armed forces dictates that they do everything they can to refuse any form of cooperation with Khomeyni's regime. They should refuse to go to the fronts and, if they are forcibly sent to areas like Kordestan, they should go to popular resistance forces and in this way act according to their national and patriotic duty. Also, at any possible opportunity, they should--like other Mojahed military personnel--strive to punish the criminal commanders and hirelings of the antipopular regime.

The alert workers and toilers of our homeland should also take into consideration the war's rile--not only the people being killed especially toilers and their children, but also the effect it has on increased unemployment, high prices, and inflation. In doing so they will realize how this reactionary war directly and destructively affects their daily life, both in factories and in homes, and it will enable them to make other workers more alert too. They should actively resist the demagoguery of Khomeyni's hirelings by listing the number of deaths, the astronomic war expenditures, and the number of destroyed factories and closed-down production units. The imposter Khomeyni should not be allowed to use a war, which is the reason for the difficulties that the toilers face, as a means for justifying these difficulties.

Thus, the peaceseking and opposition movement to Khomeyni's destructive and reactionary war should be further expanded with the participation of all the country's strata. In this struggle, especially the resistance cells throughout the country, in addition to revealing as best as possible the astronomic war expenditures, should also propagate on a big scale reliable news on defeats and deaths caused by the war and on the regime's antipopular methods for the mobilization of forces, and disclose the regime's various war crimes--all of which appear in the various copies of Mojahed publication. Among the masses they should also propagandize the National Resistance Council's peace plan because the fulfillment of peace and freedom in our dear homeland Iran can only occur through the downfall and destruction of Khomeyni's antipopular and warmongering regime and when the only democratic alternative--the National Resistance Council--is established within the framework of the council's peace plan which guarantees all our rights and national and patriotic interests.

O combatant and alert sisters and brothers, O resistance cells throughout the country: Struggles for peace and resistance against Khomeyni's warmongering and treacherous policies are among our national and patriotic duties and, as we have stated, in this respect the revolutionary activities of resistance cells are of special importance. Therefore, we once again point out:

1. Expand the people's peace-seeking movement as much as possible and--through your informative and publicity efforts--obstruct any kind of demagoguery by Khomeyni and his hirelings. Meanwhile, explain the duties of the various social forces and groups, through which you are connected by social activities, to these forces and groups and make each one of them more active in voicing opposition to Khomeyni's warmongering policies.
2. Consider among your duties the publication of reliable reports on the war, on the number of people killed and wounded, on the astronomical war expenditures, on the relation of inflation, high prices and unemployment to this destructive war, and convey these reports, through any means--from revelations made to people queuing for provisions to (the preparation of slogans) and other means.
3. Refrain from going to the fronts, in whatever situation you may be. If sent forcibly, flee the front and join the resistance ranks and thus make Khomeyni's regime face a rising pressure due to a lack of forces.
4. Send any information or documents in connection with the war to which you may gain access to the Mojahedin-e Khalq of Iran Organization so that they can be effectively used to take further steps in revealing the regime's warmongering policies.
5. Parallel with the expansion of revelations on the warmongering policies of Khomeyni's regime, propagandize the National Resistance Council's peace plan among the vast masses.

CSO: 4400/111

POLL SHOWS MAJORITY FOR SETTLEMENT BUDGET CUTS

TA030811 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 3 Jan 84 p 1

[JERUSALEM POST poll]

[Text] Seventy-two percent of Israelis think that in the framework of a national austerity programme the first budget to be cut should be the one for settlements in Judaea and Samaria, a JERUSALEM POST poll reveals.

More than half of those questioned (51.6 percent) were still prepared to forego part of the cost-of-living allowances, although the proportion is less than it was last April. Half of the respondents said that strike action was unjustified.

In the poll, which was carried out by the Modi'in Ezrahi Research Institute late last month, respondents were asked which three sectors should have their budgets trimmed. After the settlements came development projects such as the Lavie and the Med-Dead Canal (52 percent), higher education (29 percent) and absorption of new immigrants (27 percent).

Modi'in Ezrahi analysts said both Likud and labour voters placed settlements at the top of the list for cuts.

Another question, which was also put last April, asked salaried respondents whether they were willing to forego part of their cost-of-living bonuses to slow inflation.

While 62.6 percent were willing to forego part of their compensation in April, only 51.6 percent were willing to do so last month. Furthermore, 41.8 percent said in December they were unwilling to forego part of their compensation, while only 23 percent had been unwilling to do so in April.

Analysts pointed out that while a majority of salaried workers are willing to forego part of the cost-of-living bonuses, the percentage is down from last spring.

A third question asked in the poll was, "do you think it is justified or unjustified for workers to strike because of the erosion in wages?" While 28.7 percent considered strike action justified, 50 percent felt it was unjustified. Of Likud voters answering this question, 25.9 percent felt strike action was justified and 50.7 percent did not. Forty-five percent of labour voters thought strike action unjustified, while 36.6 percent considered it justified.

HARIF ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION

TA061550 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 6 Jan 84 p 19

[Commentary by Yosef Harif: "The Russians Warned Syria: 'Do not go and Fight Against the United States'"]

[Excerpts] When reports about the possibility of a meeting between Reagan and al-Asad were heard--which were received with restraint in Jerusalem--the impression was given that something was, perhaps, being worked out in covert contacts between Washington and Damascus.

According to information available in Israel, there is no evidence of any change in the Syrian position--for the moment--that would make a meeting between Reagan and al-Asad possible. Israel is well informed in these matters. This could be realized this week from remarks by Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, in consultations in Jerusalem, when he said: "We have a considerable share in any trend that is taking shape in Lebanon!"

The removal of Israeli forces from Lebanon will not be influenced by unilateral decisions made in Washington. Shamir thinks that if the Americans pull their forces out, this would lead to al-Jumayyil's downfall, and that would be a danger not only for Lebanon, but also for the status of the United States. We do not need them. [Anu lo tzrikhim otam]

Therefore the prime minister thinks that Reagan will not decide on the future of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon "in the near future." Even if this does happen, the Syrians will not solve their problem; Israel is the only one who will decide on the timetable for the departure of its forces. If the remarks by a "senior security force" this week can be interpreted to the effect that Israel is no longer making the removal of its forces dependent on the simultaneous removal of the Syrian forces, then there is a dispute over this between the prime minister and the "senior security source," whom several papers have tried to identify as Defense Minister Moshe Arens.

The prime minister believes that what is needed--not only by Israel but also by the United States, if not more so--is the ability to stand firm despite the criticism being heard in Washington and Israel, in order to prove to the Syrians that U.S. support for al-Jumayyil cannot be undermined and they will not be able to impose a solution on Lebanon that is solely in their interests,

by using the military option. If the Syrians have security interests in Lebanon--as Israel does--this can be discussed, but only "at the table," as Reagan phrased it this week in his letter to al-Asad.

Shamir believes that nothing has happened over the past few days that should arouse concern in Israel. The understandings that have been achieved between us and Reagan are real and valid. When he took his leave of President Reagan in the White House, Shamir felt, as he himself has testified, that "this time it is serious. Reagan is not making statements he does not intend to keep!"

At the same time, in consultations in his office, Shamir recalled that when he returned to Israel from his visit to the United States he decided that--despite his belief that everything that had been agreed upon would be kept--"everything, in actual fact, will be put to the test within the coming months." Two months have passed since this remark was made. To be more precise, when the U.S. and Israel teams meet on 23 January within the framework of the joint political-military group "to examine ways to increase the cooperation between Israel and the United States," according to President Reagan's directive, matters will be put to the test.

This week Shamir and Arens sat down and expressed their views on what is happening in Lebanon, against the background of Rumsfeld's activity and what might happen. At the same time the Israeli Embassy in Washington (not the highest echelon) submitted an evaluation to Jerusalem which noted that voices are being heard that provide clues to U.S. intentions regarding their directions of activity in the military-political group scheduled to discuss the details of the strategic cooperation. The evaluation was not encouraging, since it mentioned the possibility of the Americans prolonging matters. Because of repeated calculations in the wake of echoes in the Arab world in general and Egypt in particular about Washington's decision to enter into strategic cooperation with Israel, the Americans will make every effort to lower its profile.

Shamir and Arens do not think this evaluation accurately reflects the positions of such people as Reagan, Shultz and National Security Council Chairman Robert McFarlane, who is fervently in favor of cooperation with Israel. At best, the evaluation reflects "Defense Secretary Weinberger's circles." From the very beginning these circles were opposed to the idea and to everything agreed upon to date. They also opposed the expression contained in the unusual public announcement by President Reagan himself, which mentioned political-military cooperation and "the firm decision to strengthen and develop these ties for the sake of interests common to both our nations." The idea was imposed on Weinberger and the Pentagon leaders.

If these circles are the source upon which the embassy staffer based his report, it does not prove anything. However, as the prime minister himself has already said, "the test will come within the next few months."

After the prime minister's departure from Washington, Reagan sent him a personal letter. Inter alia, he wrote: "I strongly believe that the steps we have taken will add to the strengthening of the relations between Israel and the United States and will place our cooperation on a firmer, and more complete basis."

What is "firm and complete" strategic cooperation?

The Americans, of course, can think that by virtue of this cooperation they are entitled to encourage the establishment of a "Jordanian deployment force," with all that implies with regard to equipping the Jordanians with modern weapons.

This is not what Israel thinks. It may be that under certain conditions understanding could also be reached on this issue, but what Israel understands by the term "strategic cooperation" is something quite different. As Jerusalem sees it, the intention ought to be to create understanding on purely military issues, such as how to forestall the danger of conflagration in the Persian Gulf area. Of course, Israel does not intend to put its forces at the disposal of the Americans, but it is important to know what force the Americans have in the area and what the U.S. strategic assets in it are. If the Sixth Fleet has to spend a certain amount of time just to reach the conflagration, what must be done to put out the fire and how can Israel help?

Israel can help the U.S. Army to rush flights of equipment to the site of the conflagration. How? This can be accomplished, for example, if the required equipment is stored in depots in Israel, in which case it can always be in a state of combat readiness.

Another question that has been considered in Jerusalem, is: If Syria invades Jordan, what should our course of action be against the background of the experience gained in the Lebanon war, to guarantee a combined operation--at sea, in the air and on land--to contain the "common enemy?"

There was a great deal of talk at the White House discussions on the "need for coordination." Just how will this work?

As far as is known, the U.S. team is considering the questions due to be discussed at the political-military group meeting. It has already been decided that immediately after the talks in this framework, the Americans intend to hold a meeting of the military committee, which will discuss the details of every topic to be agreed upon in principle by the joint committee.

Israel has some suggestions for cooperation, but we would prefer to hear the U.S. ideas first. It may be that after that Israel will be able to really know, finally, what the United States means when it speaks of strategic cooperation.

What is occupying the policy-makers in Israel more than anything else right now are security arrangements in Lebanon, arrangements that will be able to satisfy Israel and enable it to begin to pull its forces out. In this field, joint strategic understanding, if not strategic cooperation, has been illustrated in the full practical meaning of the term.

Israel's repeated aerial bombardments have been welcomed by the United States. According to one administration staffer, "this is the most serious asset that Israel is contributing to the strategic cooperation."

As far as the U.S. share is concerned, it must be admitted that so far it has kept its word. According to knowledgeable U.S. sources, President al-Jumayyil, at the beginning of his talks in Washington (after Shamir's visit) announced that he was even prepared to "go to Tel Aviv" and negotiate with the Israelis, on condition that the United States guarantees the support of the moderate Arab countries for such a move, as well as defense against the Syrians.

It is not clear whether the Americans are capable of this, but it would be enough for them to persist in their vigorous moves against the Syrians for al-Asad to come to the conclusion--in the end--that he has no other way to reach his objectives than to sit down at the negotiating table.

Backing out by the United States would not achieve this goal. Such a move would be superfluous because Damascus is also beginning to understand that it is incapable of standing firm on two fronts, under any circumstances--against the United States and Israel--with Moscow making it clear that it will not be able to rush to its aid in Lebanon.

In these circumstances it is, perhaps, natural that the prime minister is pinning his hopes on the man in the White House: "As I have already said, Reagan says what he means, and means what he says!"

CSO: 4400/114

BRIEFS

JEWISH-ARAB JOINT PROJECTS--Arabs from Hebron and Jews from Qiryat Arba' are examining various plans to conduct joint projects in the region. The idea was raised in a meeting between Jews and Arabs held about 2 months ago to discuss the question of whether it was enough just to talk in order to understand each other. Various plans for joint projects are being contemplated with the encouragement of the coordinator of activities in the territories, Binyamin Ban-Eli'ezer. It has been learned that there is great willingness on the part of both Jews and Arabs in the area to work together. A proposal has already been raised to include Arabs in an existing project in the area. There are proposals to establish joint enterprises, such as a quarry, a plant for building materials, a gas station with a restaurant and, perhaps, a small hostel nearby. According to civilian administration officials, the rate of success that will be achieved in Hebron will bring Arabs and Jews in other areas to get together and establish joint enterprises. [Report by Yosef Tzuri'el and Ilan Bakhar] [Text] [TA011023 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Jan 84 p 7]

HOW TO FOIL TERRORIST ACTS--The military government in Hebron has instructed guards in the mosques on ways to foil terrorist attacks in their area. This is the first time that Israeli security forces have instructed Muslim circles on the precautions they should take regarding booby-trapped handgrenades and explosives. This comes in the wake of the large number of incidents of harassment of religious institutions and the two acts of sabotage at the entrance to mosques in the city which happened early on Friday. Muslim preachers were also told on Friday morning that the Israeli authorities condemn the harassment of religious institutions and are trying to apprehend those responsible. The preachers were asked to do everything they could to calm down tempers. Indeed, sermons in the mosques on Friday did not contain harsh utterances or a tone of instigation against the Israeli administration. Worshipers entered and left the mosques quietly and in an orderly manner and the security forces in Hebron were left idle. The cautiousness of the clerics of Hebron was also reflected in their appeal to the Supreme Muslim Council not to attribute the two attacks on Friday to the Israeli administration. Also public figures in Hebron refrained from making statements on this issue. However, below the surface, there was tension coupled with fears and rumors about other attacks by extremist Israeli circles. [Report by Yosef Tzuri'el] [Excerpt] [TA011030 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Jan 84 p 3]

CSO: 4400/114

ISRAEL TIGHTENS GRIP ON SOUTH LEBANON

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 15 Nov 83 p 19

[Article: "Israel Brings Haddad Back From His 'Convalescence' to the South and Sets Up Two Radio and Television Stations Near Sidon"]

[Text] The reverberations of the rejection of the fate represented by the Lebanese agreement with the Zionist enemy have reached the region of the south. The reactions have taken the form of hurried Zionist measures which are calculated to nullify the agreement and seem to indicate the Israel will stay in the south for good. Following the political and military statements, which have taken on a threatening tone and even reached the level of warnings issued to those participating in the Lebanese dialogue in Geneva, the occupation forces have taken certain measures in the field. These have been embodied in a strengthening of the positions along the entire length of the new deployment line on the al-Awwali river. The crossing points have been reinforced and measures have been taken at them which make it seem as if the decision finally to open the bridges was appended to these measures.

Radio and Television

Orders were given to the Zionist work units which are employed at al-Khayyam airport to speed up their operations, so that it would be ready to receive aircraft as soon as possible. While these hurried field activities were going on, the government of the enemy sent an engineering unit to the vicinity of the city of Sayda in order to study the possibility of setting up two neighboring stations for radio and television transmission, each one of which has received the name of the 17 May Station for Radio or Television Transmission. After the appropriate location, which lies between the cities of Jazzin and Sayda was chosen, Zionist trucks began to transport the necessary equipment and machinery. They reached the site under the protection of the occupation forces.

Four Civil Administration Districts

This Zionist media activity, which corresponds to the worst possibilities, is being accompanied by other activities undertaken by the leadership of the occupation forces in the area of organizing a civilian administration in the southern region. They have summoned a number of officials, mayors and

village heads and informed them that they have decided to set up four civil administration districts in the south which will be distributed in the following fashion:

The civil administration district of Sayda.

A joint civil administration in Jazzin and al-Zahrani.

A joint civil administration in Sur and Bint Jubayl.

A joint civil administration in al-Nabatiyah and Marj 'Uyun.

On the military level, the occupation forces have made use of the military organizations which work with them. They have summoned officials from these organizations and informed them that they must subordinate themselves to the leadership of the border militias. This happened after the occupation leadership had sent for the collaborating officer known as Sa'd Haddad and requested that he resume his military and security duties and end the period of compulsory convalescence which the occupation authorities had imposed on him. Haddad actually did return to his headquarters at Marj 'Uyun. A high-ranking officer from Zionist intelligence took part in a meeting chaired by Haddad. It was also attended by military officials from the armed organizations which work with the occupation forces.

Dissolving the Rightist Organizations

However, a problem was raised which the high-ranking Zionist officer promised would be solved. It was the problem of the armed organizations attached to the right-wing parties--the Phalange, the Guardians of the Cedars, and the Sham'un party. The Zionist officer informed those in attendance that the Zionists had decided to dissolve these military organizations and place them under the leadership of Sa'd Haddad. He said they had been informed of that and had evinced their readiness to join the unified militias in the south. The question would be resolved in a matter of days.

Surrounding Certain Villages

This race the Zionists are running with the postponed dialogue conference is not merely limited to these measures. Rather, it goes beyond them to other, more oppressive measures being taken by the occupation forces. These forces have encircled certain villages known for their resistance to the occupation and the way they use all forms of struggle against it--from maintaining unity to striking, cutting the roads, demonstrating, and embracing the heroes of the armed, national resistance. As a result of the encirclement of these villages, hundreds of citizens have been arrested in the townships of al-Sarfand, al-'Aqibiyah, al-Duwayr, Sur, al-Bazuriyah, and al-Nabatiyah. In addition, certain quarters in the cities of Sur and Sayda have been raided and contact and movement between the Palestinian camps and the two cities have been forbidden.

A Warning of Cancellation

The central Zionist position, which warns that the agreement may be canceled, has been taken up by the Zionist officers in the south. They have begun to go through the cities and villages, warning that the 17 May agreement will be canceled and that popular support exists for such action, since it would close the open bridges which connect the south with the other areas of the country and allow the Zionist forces to stay in this region for good. The region could be annexed to the Zionist entity. The occupation forces have begun to issue warnings to those who obey the calls for civil resistance and respond to appeals for popular uprisings, maintaining unity, and other manifestations of passive resistance. The Zionist position vis-a-vis the armed, national resistance is well known and needs no warnings or anything of that kind. Arrests are made on the basis of suspicion. The oppression knows no bounds, even for those suspected of merely sympathizing with the armed, national resistance.

From now until the results of the Lebanese dialogue in Geneva are disclosed, the Zionist measures will grow even harsher.

12224

CSO: 4404/184

'ALAYH'S MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT DISCUSSES POLITICAL, MILITARY SITUATION

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 26 Nov 83 p 21

[Interview with Munir Abu Fadil, member of the Chamber of Deputies from 'Alayh, by AL-SIYASAH: "Abu Fadil: 'The War in Lebanon Is Not Sectarian. Rather, It Is a Plot Carried Out by Israel'"; in Beirut, date not specified]

[Text] Munir Abu Fadil is a member of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies from the 'Alaya region. He has been the deputy speaker of the chamber since his election. In addition, he held numerous ministerial portfolios during the previous administrations. He has turned down the prime ministership twice during the last 3 years.

Deputy Abu Fadil is considered one of the most prominent Lebanese deputies who oppose the 17 May agreement with Israel. In this regard, he says that he has not voted once for this agreement. Rather, he considers it to have been born dead.

This is what Deputy Abu Fadil has been known for during his recent political life. As for his history, few people know that he commanded a military unit which took part in the incursion into Palestine and fought the Israeli gangs in 1948. He is proud of his past, and he keeps numerous souvenirs, medals and pictures from it.

AL-SIYASAH met with Deputy Abu Fadil in his office in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies and asked him several questions dealing with urgent issues which uncovered numerous facts concerning the situation of the Christians in Lebanon and, consequently, the Lebanese situation in general.

The following is the text of the conversation with the deputy speaker of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies.

[Question] Some people give one the impression that the Christians belong to the Lebanese Forces and so are responsible in one way or another for the situation the country has reached. What do you think about that?

[Answer] This sort of impression is mistaken and not at all based on reality. It is spread about and disseminated in order to distract attention from the real causes of the Lebanese crisis.

It is an attempt to dupe international and world public opinion into thinking that the fighting going on in Lebanon is due to local sectarian conflicts. This is refuted by the evidence, the course of events in Lebanon, developments, and the ramifications and interactions of events.

From the beginning, the war in Lebanon has never been a sectarian or civil war. Rather, it is the result of an evil plot which is intended to advance expansionist ambitions at the expense of this country. It is also the product of the regional and international struggles being conducted in the country.

It was natural for the plotters to turn to the weapon of sectarian conflict, thinking it was the best and most effective weapon for achieving their goals and plans. However, it soon became clear to them that it was impossible to attack and shatter the unity of the nation. They saw it was therefore impossible to shake the faith and commitment the Lebanese felt for the formula of coexistence, brotherhood and solidarity among their various allegiances and sects. In this regard, we do not deny that some regrettable incidents have occurred in a number of areas in Lebanon. They have taken on a limited sectarian dimension. Israel and those in its orbit helped to sow the seeds of this sectarianism. It used all its evil means and capabilities in order to consecrate sectarianism. However, these seeds have not and will not find favorable ground for growth in Lebanon, thanks to the awareness of the Lebanese, their iron will to live together, and their absolute conviction that their strength and the cultural, humane and intellectual position of their country are grounded in the unique, ideal coexistence of all the sects. Thanks to that coexistence, Lebanon has become a wonderful symbol of the unity of religions and sects and an example which inspires its children to cling and cleave to it as an ageless, eternal homeland for which they have no substitute. No power on earth can shake their faith in Lebanon or make them grow feeble in the defense of its holy things, its values, and every atom of its soil.

As for the statement that all the Christians belong to the Lebanese Forces, this is contradicted by reality, as is shown by the existence of Christian leaders who enjoy broad popular support. Just by way of example, let me mention former President Sulayman Franjiyah and Col Raymond Iddih.

The things said about the position of the Christians and their relationship with the Lebanese Forces apply as well to the position of the Muslims and their ties to the various Muslim militias. In this regard, we strongly reject the accusation that the Christians "are responsible in one way or another for the situation the country has reached," just as we would reject any such charge against our brothers of the noble Muslim faith, were it made. This kind of accusation, no matter if it is directed against Christians, Muslims or Druze, is a product and a fabrication produced by the brains of the Zionists :. for reasons known to all.

The truly strange and saddening thing is that such accusations find acceptance among some of our brothers and friends. They have come to see the Lebanese crisis as the result of sectarian disputes and conflicts. Only the passing of time will disclose to them the fact that their calculations are mistaken.

They will realize in one way or another that they have fallen into the snare of Israel's lies, which have been poured out in a steady stream of disinformation in an obvious attempt to absolve Israel of all blame for what is happening in Lebanon and for the destruction, carnage, displacement, and terror which have befallen the country.

Neither the Christians nor the Muslims are responsible for what has happened to their country. The war was imposed on them. The plot was aimed at them all, without exception. Indeed, its target was their existence and the course of their country. It is no longer permissible to point the finger of blame for what the country has experienced and suffered at any Lebanese faction or sect, for the logic of history definitively rejects the notion that any people could permit itself to destroy its country or participate in the elimination of its foundations in this horrible manner, especially if this people is on the same level as the Lebanese people in terms of culture, progress, values and patriotism.

The finger of accusation must be pointed at Israel, since it is the cause of the trial and tribulations of Lebanon and all the other parts of the Arab region.

[Question] What position does the Orthodox sect take on what recently happened in the war in the mountain?

[Answer] The position of the Orthodox sect on the war in the Shuf and at 'Alayh does not differ from its position on fighting and acts of violence in any region of Lebanon, no matter what the denominational and sectarian considerations might be. We are against fighting among brothers, and we reject everything which tends to distort or disturb the formula of coexistence. We condemn every act which harms or detracts from the humanity and dignity of the people of Lebanon. Within this context and on the basis of all these concepts, we have been and still are working to unite opinion, put out the fire of conflict, bring together the various points of view, and deal with the disputes. We have always been among those who call for mutual understanding and cooperation in order to promote and aid the country and preserve its sovereignty and independence.

In the continuous actions and contacts we undertake in order to deal with the aftermath of the events in the mountain and the human and social tragedies they brought forth, of which the people of our sect have suffered the lion's share, we make no distinction between one sect and another or one town and another within the context of the efforts we undertake with the officials and concerned agencies in order to ameliorate the severity of this cruel trial. The people of 'Alayh, the Shuf and other parts of Lebanon are living in the shadow of this horrible nightmare.

It is true that I represent the people of my sect in 'Alayh, and that their trust in me imposes on me sacred duties toward them. Nevertheless, I consider myself a representative of all Lebanon. This imposes on me the need to expand the extent of my concerns, in accordance with the authority I possess, in order to serve all the groups in Lebanon, respond to the call of anyone

who asks for aid, and stand by anyone with a valid claim, no matter what sect or region he comes from. Thus, when we consider or pursue the cases of people from 'Alayh, al-Matn al-A'la, the Shuf, and the rest of Lebanon who have been made refugees or suffered damage, we make no distinction between those belonging to one sect and those from another, or between those coming from one area and those from another. We do this because of our faith in the idea that the Lebanese are brothers. Thus, there can be no distinction among them on the basis of religion or denomination. We believe that all are equal in terms of rights and responsibilities.

Question Do you believe that the National Dialogue Commission will produce fit solutions for the entire Lebanese crisis? Why?

Answer This is what all Lebanese who have tasted the calamities and disasters of war desire. They have been yearnings and longing for the day when peace, security, stability and tranquility would return to their country and the cycle of killing, expulsion, terror and destruction would end.

Salvation from this tragic trial is what the Lebanese aspire to and yearn to see achieved. Because of the severity of the calamities and disasters which they have experienced, which no people on earth could bear and stand up to, the Lebanese have not reached agreement on who will achieve salvation for them, how they shall be saved, and by whose hand they will be delivered. The important thing to them is salvation.

Therefore, people are placing their hopes today in the dialogue commission. It bears great, historic responsibilities which are extremely delicate and serious, in view of the fact that the results of its meetings will directly affect the destiny and future of the country. Perhaps those engaged in the dialogue fully realize the magnitude of the task which they are charged to undertake and know already what it will mean if they fail and are unable to work out the foundations, principles, and underpinnings on which the structure of Lebanon must rest. Before all else, it must be provided with the prerequisites of firmness and steadfastness against attempts to weaken or attack it. Lebanon's people must be assured equality and justice under a strong, just government whose gaze, care and concern embrace the entire country, without distinction or discrimination.

We trust that the dialogue commission will arrive at basic solutions to all the problems which exist on Lebanese territory. This trust is strengthened by what we know about the sincere desire for constructive, selfless cooperation on behalf of the country's best interest which the participants in the dialogue feel.

We have always been among those who say that dialogue among the Lebanese is what is needed to deal with all their problems, and that these matters cannot be resolved through violence and fighting. I do not doubt that those engaged in the dialogue understand this truth, and that they will be conscious of it during their meetings. We trust that these meetings will achieve their desired goal. Perhaps God will realize our hopes and wishes and rid us of the nightmare of this destructive tribulation.

Question What steps will the Orthodox sect take following the announcement of its recent decisions?

Answer Our sect believes in democratic dialogue as a means whereby problems can be dealt with and demands realized. It rejects, as I have already said, the ways of violence and fighting.

On the basis of this faith, the Roman Orthodox sect, which is ancient with regard to both its Lebanese character and its Arab character, and which has been seen to take purely patriotic positions and to distance itself from sectarian logic, will try to use its deputies and its prominent lay and clerical personalities to pursue its just and proper demands, with recourse to all the competent authorities in the various fields within the parliamentary, democratic framework.

We demand equality with respect to rights and duties. We do not want to have privileges at the expense of the rights of other sects. Rather, we insist that the people of our sect be given what the members of the other sects get, in terms of both career opportunities and public services.

Naturally, all this falls within the context of the justice and equality which the state must assure in all fields among the various sects and areas, without discrimination or distinction.

Question Do you not believe that the Arab solution to the Lebanese question is still sounder than the international solutions?

Answer That is correct, but where are the Arab solutions?

The absence of any Arab solution to the Lebanese crisis is what has pushed it toward internationalization, after the number of parties involved and its complexity had increased.

We really did not want the solution to come from outside the Arab framework. However, the truly saddening fact is that many aspects of our crisis have sprung from Arab conflicts being waged on our land and from the conflict which broke out among the Arab states. Therefore, the Arabs had no role to play in treating the Lebanese problem and saving the country from its trial. Some Arab initiatives were tried, but they were timid, hesitant affairs lacking in the ability to risk the desired solution. This was the result of the disputes and alignments witnessed by the Arab scene. They deprived the suggested solution of its effectiveness, since the necessary Arab consensus was not behind it.

This does not mean that Lebanon hesitated to turn to its brothers in order to ask for their help and assistance. It knocked on the door and asked for the assistance of every Arab country. It received diplomatic replies devoid of the seriousness needed to confront the kind of situation Lebanon was struggling with.

Yes, some Arab states did make attempts and take initiatives for which we are grateful. The latest of these was the Saudi Initiative, which contributed to a large extent to the cease-fire in the mountain and paved the way for the dialogue among the Lebanese. In this area, Saudi Arabia brought all its political and diplomatic energy to bear, without neglecting to provide material assistance to those who were harmed by the events in the south, Beirut, 'Alayh, and the Shuf.

We feel bitterness and regret when we review the Arab positions on the Lebanese crisis and the way in which these positions, or at least most of them, violated the covenants of brotherhood and the Arab League.

Lebanon takes great pride in the fact that despite all this, it gave up neither its Arab character nor its pioneering Arab role, even during the worst days of its ordeal. In this way, it made losers out of those who bet that its Arab character would be torn from it, or even that its Arab role would be diminished.

We advise those who say that Lebanon has failed to live up to any of its duties vis-a-vis its Arab brothers and the defense of their causes to examine history, be it ancient or modern, so that they can recall the noble positions this country has taken on each Arab issue.

Question How do you see the required confrontation with Israel's plans in Lebanon?

Answer The methods used by any people to confront those who occupy their land and subdue their will are well known. They are many, and they take numerous forms, but they all have the aim of forcing the occupiers to evacuate.

These days, we are seeing the people in the villages of the south resist, confront, rebel against and obstruct the Israeli occupation by various ways and means. This is the high point of resistance. Immediately, it will compel the occupation forces to reconsider their plans and ambitions in Lebanon. We trust that our people in the south will become an erupting volcano which will send its lava against the Israeli occupiers and compel them to withdraw, sooner or later.

However, military and civilian resistance operations against the Israeli army must move in concert with active diplomatic maneuvering conducted in various areas and directions via international bodies and organizations and the great powers with the goal of convincing them to put political and material pressure on Israel in order to force it to withdraw from Lebanon. Such maneuvering must not be limited to Lebanon alone. Rather, all the Arab states and all the states which love peace must take part, for the danger posed by Israel is not limited to its occupation of parts of Lebanon. Instead, it takes in all the countries of the region.

All the Arabs must prepare themselves and redouble their military strength in order to confront Israel's expansionist plans and ambitions, which are aimed at all sections of the Arab homeland.

12114

CSO: 4404/181

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN FRANCE ON PALESTINIAN-FRENCH RELATIONS

PM091734 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 7-13 Jan 84 pp 24-25

[Interview with PLO Representative in France Ibrahim al-Sus by Jamal al-Rawi in Paris--date not given]

[Excerpt] Question: How do you assess the French position on the Palestinian problem 2 and 1/2 years after the French Socialists assumed power?

Answer: We had hoped that France would be among the first West European states to come out in support of the Palestinian cause and to persuade the other West European states to pursue a policy independent of that of the United States, a policy committed to recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to an independent national state. The French silence, however, sometimes gives us the impression that Paris has abandoned that pioneering role and does not much abide by it.

Question: What is the French attitude toward the various crises in the Middle East at this stage?

Answer: The French attitude in the region is influenced by the global and Middle Eastern balances of power. France has different attitudes toward Palestine, Lebanon, Israel, the Gulf war, etcetera. These attitudes are amended from time to time, but it can be said that the general feature of the French attitude in the region at this juncture denotes that France is abandoning the idea of playing a major and special role because it has discovered how difficult it is to play such a role. It is, nonetheless, still interested in maintaining a direct diplomatic and military presence. I believe that the French diplomacy in the region is still reluctant and unsure whether to toe the U.S. line in the search for a settlement in the Middle East or follow another line advocating participation by the two superpowers in a settlement through the United Nations.

Question: What are the obstacles preventing the growth of Palestinian-French relations, and how can these obstacles be eliminated?

Answer: I do not think that there are any obstacles on our side. However, France, like the rest of the European states, began to show less interest in the Palestinian cause when it realized it could have good relations with certain Arab states regardless of its attitude toward the Palestinian question.

Question: Is there a possibility of Yasir 'Arafat visiting Paris in the near future?

Answer: Under the present circumstances, there is no possibility of a visit to Paris by the commander in chief. Such a visit should reflect a tangible improvement in bilateral relations. France should show an interest in and work for such an improvement. Until that happens such a visit cannot, in principle, be contemplated.

Question: What do you want from France at this stage?

Answer: We want clear French support for our cause as we meet the challenge posed by the U.S. policy in the region. We also call on France to increase its support for the Palestinian people in the occupied territory and to revive its daring and pioneering role by having Europe play an independent part in promoting a settlement in the region and by not abandoning the scene to the Americans.

CSO: 4400/112

PNC MEMBER ON EGYPTIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS

NC021637 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1430 GMT 2 Jan 84

[Text] Cairo, 2 Jan (MENA)--Sa'id Kamal, member of the Palestine National Council [PNC], has stated that the Mubarak-'Arafat meeting which culminated Arab events in 1983 was an important turning point in Arab relations in general and in Egyptian-Palestinian relations in particular. He added that the consequences of this historic meeting on Egyptian-Palestinian relations will in the course of 1984 open the door for the other Arab states to reconsider their calculations as quickly as possible toward Egypt's return to the Arab fold and toward the restoration of effective Arab solidarity.

The Palestinian official expressed the belief that during the Arab summit conference in March, Yasir 'Arafat will submit to the Arab leaders the outcome of his meeting with President Husni Mubarak in his capacity as a member of the three-man committee formed by the Fes summit to discuss the restoration of relations with Egypt.

In his statement to MENA, the PNC member affirmed that all justifications and excuses that led to the estrangement between Egypt and the Arab states have now been invalidated.

Sa'id Kamal explained that through its attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and its invasion of Lebanon Israel deliberately wanted to embarrass Egypt and place it in a situation in which it would seem opposed to the Palestinian people's legitimate rights, including their right to self-determination. This prompted Egypt to freeze the autonomy talks. He added that Egypt has not only taken this stand, but has expressed its rejection of several Israeli policies and adopted measures embodying this rejection, such as its recall of the Egyptian ambassador from Israel, its declaration of a clear stand toward the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the sieges of Beirut and Tripoli, in addition to President Mubarak's constant call on the United States to initiate a dialogue with, and recognize, the PLO.

The PNC member explained that some Arab states' mistaken belief that they could lead the Arab world alone was one of the reasons of the estrangement between the Arabs and Egypt. This reason also lost all its justification

after it became clear to all that Arab solidarity--based on frankness and clarity--prevents Arab division, and also after it became clear to all that Egypt is the cornerstone of peace and of the Arabs.

Sa'id Kamal called on some Arab parties not to misinterpret the Palestinian leadership's effort to restore a political balance to the Palestinian cause through Egypt. He affirmed that the Palestinian-Egyptian relations do not harm anyone, not even Palestinian-Syrian relations. The clarity of the political vision at this stage is the basis for the Palestinian leadership's behavior. He said "Syria's encouragement, or sponsorship of Palestinian division, was and still is a mistake that harms Syria more than the Palestinians."

The Palestinian official added: Those who call on us to unite with their stand create contradiction and ambiguity. Syria has not abandoned its acceptance of UN Security Resolution 338, and yet it asks us to unite with its stand on another basis. Naturally, we don't call on Syria to abandon its commitments, but we ask it to realize that it is a state, and that the Palestinian revolution is struggling to establish a state through all the legal means specified in the UN resolutions.

Sa'id Kamal affirmed that the Palestinian leadership rejects the policy of axes on the Arab and international levels. It defines its relations with the states and political forces in the world according to their declared political stands on Palestinian national rights, above all the right to establish a Palestinian state.

He said we will carry on our political and diplomatic struggle to wrest recognition from the states which have not yet recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This objective will be achieved only through the establishment of relations with the Arab states based on nonintervention in their internal affairs and on the Arab states' mobilization of their resources and capabilities, and their international relations in support of the Palestinian cause.

Discussing Jordanian-Palestinian relations, the Palestinian official affirmed that dialogue with Jordan will constantly remain our aim, whether on the level of the unity of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, or through the adoption of principles for a just peace that makes use of all current peace initiatives.

Concerning his prediction of internal developments within the PLO during 1984, the Palestinian official expressed the belief that the popular majority will settle the situation in favor of popular leadership under Yasir 'Arafat. He, however, expressed apprehension that there will be a resort to the "Israeli weapon," which depends on the physical liquidation of leaders. He expressed the hope that the Palestinian leaders--known for their insight and responsibility--will display patience, accept opinion and counteropinion, and place the Palestinian cause above any other consideration.

CSO: 4400/112

ARTICLE ANALYZES YASIR 'ARAFAT'S FUTURE

LD221334 Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Dec 83 pp 1, 2

[Eric Rouleau article: "Time for Assessment"]

[Text] This is not the "end" of Yasir 'Arafat or the "liquidation" of the PLO. From exodus to exodus--the leader of the fedayeen federation has been forced to leave Jordan, Egypt, southern Lebanon and Beirut, Libya, and Syria since 1970--the stature of the "defeated man" has constantly grown. In any case his forced departure from Tripoli under the UN flag bears witness to the international influence of the PLO, which is recognized by more than 110 states as "the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative."

"The PLO is indestructible because it is not really an organization: It embodies an identity and an entity, our people's dual aspiration to survival and a homeland," Khalid al-Hasan, chairman of the Palestine National Council (the resistance's parliament) foreign affairs commission, explained. It is true that, over and above their very real differences, almost all the Palestinians have closed ranks behind the man who symbolizes their unity in face of Syria and its friends, the Fatah dissidents.

Thus the organizations which share the rebels' main options, including their desire to adhere to Damascus' strategy--especially Georges Habash's PFLP and Nayif Hawatimah's FDLP--have shown solidarity with Yasir 'Arafat throughout the crisis despite the fact that they criticize his policy and behavior on other occasions.

Thus it is not surprising that the PLO chairman should have enjoyed the feigned or real sympathy and many interventions in his favor from the EC, the USSR, such different Arab states as the Saudi Kingdom and the (Marxist) Republic of South Yemen, and many Third World countries, whether Islamic or not.

Military defeats have not belittled Yasir 'Arafat in his people's eyes. Quite the reverse: His image has improved, in a way, as a result of resisting the assaults of daunting armies for weeks in Beirut and then in Tripoli. In addition the Palestinians are convinced that he is the victim--as was Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir in the past--of a sinister "imperialist conspiracy" hatched by the United States, Israel and their Arab "allies."

Nonetheless the PLO is passing through the toughest crisis in its history. It no longer has any "sanctuary" in the Arab world or access to Israel's borders to wage any guerrilla warfare. Even though its military dimension has most often been merely an illusion, there are rumblings of discontent among the thousands of fedayeen scattered among eight Arab countries and doomed to vegetate in barracks which bear a strong resemblance to internment camps.

After the rout in southern Lebanon and Beirut last year Yasir 'Arafat was able to dodge the self-criticism which many people wanted or even a reassessment of the strategy and tactics of Fatah, his own organization, which contains more than 80 percent of the fedayeen. At the Palestine National Council meeting last February he secured the adoption of eminently ambiguous resolutions which certainly had the two-fold merit of preserving the resistance's cohesion and leaving him plenty of room to maneuver, but which nonetheless contributed to increasing the disarray of a people in great distress. Even though it was controlled from a distance by Damascus, the opposition formed by a group of dissident officers within Fatah was made possible by the deep malaise which is eating into the fedayeen federation.

The time for assessments has come. Some Palestinian leaders--and not unimportant ones--such as Faruq Qaddumi, Abu Lyad, and Khalid al-Hasan are no longer refraining from publicly criticizing the PLO chairman. The first two, like Mr Habash and Mr Hawatimah, have frequently stated that the Fatah dissidents' criticisms were not completely unfounded. Khalid al-Hasan told us recently that the PLO had been wrong to claim responsibility for the recent attack on an Israeli bus, especially since, according to him, that attack was perpetrated by a tiny group of "uncontrolled desperados."

Like other officials, Mr Al-Hasan thinks that Yasir 'Arafat "made a great mistake in going to Tripoli when he should have stayed out of Lebanon to fulfill his functions as political leader." The PLO chairman, who was expelled from Damascus in June, secretly returned to Lebanon's northern capital in September with the praiseworthy intention of "sharing," he said, "the fate of the fighters threatened by foreign agents and powers." However, his behavior was felt by President al-Asad to be intolerable provocation. Not only was Mr 'Arafat comparing Syria with Israel, implicitly accusing the Syrian president of "wishing to finish off the task of liquidation started by Begin and Sharon," but he had joined forces with Shaykh Sha'ban's "Muslim Brotherhood," the Ba'thist Republic's worst enemies, in order to "defend Tripoli against Damascus' occupation army."

Doomed To Stagnation

While sharing his concern to preserve the resistance's autonomy with regard to the Arab "brothers," Yasir 'Arafat's critics accuse him of inconsistency. If it is true, they say, that Syria is, despite everything, why did he defy it to the point of causing a breach which seems impossible to heal? [As received]

Yasir 'Arafat's enemies, but also his rivals in his entourage, intend to take advantage of his "mistakes" to demand both "reorganization and democratization of the institutions" and the establishment of a "clear democratic line"--demands which are particularly imperative since they are broadly shared within Palestinian opinion. A series of meetings in the Fatah leadership and among the leaders of the various PLO organizations will be held to this end in the next few weeks. They will precede the convening of the Palestine National Council, scheduled for next spring, which would be asked to adopt the proposed reforms.

Although the organizational changes ought not to pose problems, the definition of a specific strategy and tactics would remain impossible as long as the Palestine National Council applies the unanimity rule. To end the "paralyzing consensus" some leadership members like Khalid al-Hasan are proposing that decisions henceforth be taken by a majority of the votes. However, such a procedure--which "would institutionalize the dictatorship of 'Arafat and his moderate friends" in the eyes of the "radical" opposition--would be bound to bring about the collapse of the PLO.

Yasir 'Arafat is said to be prepared to take that risk, and others too, if he was certain that a negotiated settlement would lead to the creation of a Palestinian state confederated with Jordan on the West Bank and in Gaza. However, all roads which might lead to such an outcome are blocked. The Fes plan unanimously adopted by the Arab states and the PLO, which implicitly makes provision for the recognition of the state of Israel, has been rejected by the Jerusalem government, as has the Reagan plan, although it entrusts King Husayn with the Palestinian people's future. However, the Hashemite king--who is aware of the very special interpretation which the Israeli leaders give to the Camp David agreements--doubts very much whether he would secure the return of the occupied territories, whose absorption by Israeli settlers is, moreover, well under way.

The PLO chairman, for his part, has made an increasing number of appeals since last summer for the convening of an "international peace conference to which all the parties to the conflict would be invited." In that way he hoped to overcome the obstacle posed by the question of the PLO's official and prior recognition of the State of Israel. Although Yasir 'Arafat had some illusions on this subject until recently, he has been convinced since the consolidation of the "strategic alliance" between Jerusalem and Washington 3 weeks ago that he now has no chance of shaking Mr Reagan's determination not to exert pressures on Mr Shamir, the latter being hostile to the very principle of negotiations with the PLO even if it were to unilaterally declare its recognition of Israel.

The situation obviously prevents Yasir 'Arafat from adopting the course of negotiation. Nor can he adopt the course of blind terrorism--as many middle-ranking Fatah cadres are urging him to do--without the risk of damaging his international reputation.

Confronted by stagnation, he will try to create an illusion by indulging in diplomacy, and possibly also military posturing while awaiting better days.

SAUDI ARABIA

COOPERATION PROTOCOL SIGNED WITH SOUTH KOREA

LD281449 Riyadh SPA in English 1200 GMT 28 Dec 83

[Jidda, 28 Dec SPA--The Saudi-South Korean Joint Commission held its concluding session here last night co-chaired by Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic and Cultural Affairs 'Abdullah 'Ali Reda and South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister No Chae-won.

During last night's session, the two sides have signed a protocol on cooperation between the two countries in the field of trade, technology, culture, health, railways, air transport and higher education.

After the session, Reda told a press conference the two countries have agreed to increase the volume of trade exchange between them.

He said the kingdom has asked the Korean side to allow Saudi products specially those of the Saudi Arabian basic industries corporation to sell on the Korean market without any custom obstacles.

Meanwhile, the Korean deputy foreign minister briefed the conference on issues discussed during the session and what agreements they had reached.

He said both countries had expressed strong desire to boost cooperation between them and that the kingdom had made arrangements to make use of Korean technology.

Regarding the South Korean manpower in the kingdom, he said they did not conclude an agreement on the issue because there was no need for adding that the kingdom could meet its needs from the Korean labourers whenever it wished [sentence as received].

The Korean official disclosed that the Korean exports to the kingdom had totaled 1,400 million U.S. dollars while its imports from the kingdom amounted to 3,000 million dollars.

Referring to his country's stand on the Palestinian issue, the Korean official said his country respects the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. Meanwhile, No Chae-won arrived earlier today from Jidda after attending the commission meeting in the port city and immediately called on Saudi Communication Minister Husayn al-Mansuri and discussed with him ways of enhancing cooperation in the field of road and transportation.

CSO: 4409/113

KINGDOM REITERATES SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS

LD252336 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 25 Dec 83

[Husayn al-'Askari commentary]

[Text] The Saudi Arabian Kingdom has affirmed that its position toward the Palestine question essentially stems from the will of the Palestinian people and is compatible with all of what their leadership represented by the PLO deems fit.

The rights of nations are not governed by trial and error, but are based on sacrifice as the only means for the retrieval of these rights. This is the fact which the Palestinian people have acting accordingly and continue to act through their resistance against their enemy who occupies their lands, irrespective of the variables that could be controlled and which have not and will not affect the basic policy laid down by the Palestinian people for their move both militarily and politically, which constitute the two bases of the Palestinian strategy. Hence, the Palestinian struggle with all its legitimacy which enjoys the support and conviction of the international community will remain the living symbol of the existence of a nation which is defending its rights and trying to retrieve them by all available means. This is because those responsible for the struggle and those believing in it are deeply confident in its inevitable success after the enormous sacrifices the Palestinian man has offered and continues to offer. Thus, the trial and error process has no place in regard to this case, because what is at stake is the cause of a people who have been driven out of their land so that foreigners may occupy it by force of arms and with the support of some world powers.

For all these considerations, it behooves those who continue to oppose the Palestinian struggle and try to link it to unrealistic factors with the aim of impeding this struggle without putting forward serious alternatives headed by the pressuring of the usurper to address himself to the facts represented in the inevitable retrieval by the Palestinian people of their right and the establishment of their independent state over their national soil.

The Palestinian people have given the international community a 35-year opportunity without achieving any decisive results--indeed, there are some international powers who continue to believe that the passage of time will make the Palestinians forget and accept a fait accompli.

In view of this, it is the fight of the Palestinian people to resort to all legitimate means to defend their rights and themselves after all the sufferings they have endured. They must continue to endure from the severe destitution in various parts of the world, because of the disregard by the powers capable of influencing the international decisionmaking of their humanitarian responsibility and their refusal to deal with the cause of the Palestine people from the point of view of its two dimensions--the political and the humanitarian, particularly as this is the essence of the problem which cannot be solved without taking into consideration the legitimate rights and demands of the Palestine people.

Hence, the kingdom's reiteration of its firm and well-known stands, which stem as always from the will of the Palestinian people and are in line with what is deemed fit by the Palestinian leadership represented by the PLO, their sole legitimate representative--this reiteration comes as further consecration of the right of these people to retrieve their legitimate rights.

CSO: 4400/113

ALARMING SCHOOL DROPOUT RATE EXAMINED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 778, 23 Nov 83 pp 3-11

[Article: "Young People: a Force for the Homeland"]

[Text] Turki ibn Khalid al-Sudayri: "The number of employees who completed their studies or their training abroad is 6,642; most of them are still going on with their studies."

In the past 5 years more than 80,000 civil servants and 36,900 employees have been hired.

Dr Muhammad Kashmiri: "The loss is compounded because of students dropping out. This loss is manifested in financial loss, in missing the opportunity for development and in forfeiting an education and a social life."

Education is the largest industry in any society; its budget comes second after that of defense. The kingdom's education budget for 1403 [A.H.] amounted to 27.790 billion riyals.

Dr Sa'ud al-Jamaz: "We must admit that students are dropping out of school as early as the first elementary grade and as late as the end of the secondary stage. This is a normal phenomenon that is the result of the horizontal expansion in education."

Dr 'Abdallah al-Nafi': "The psychological reasons for dropping out of school are a student's propensity, his ability, his motivation and his emotional nature. In addition, there is another factor that has nothing to do with psychology. That factor is the economic incentive."

'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sadhan: "It is not fair to pin a charge of professional disloyalty on petty employees. It is enough that people call those holding such jobs petty employees."

Dr 'Abd-al-Wahab 'Attar: "It cannot be said that there is a lack of interest in technical and vocational work. The interest is there, but that interest does not amount to having ambitions and aspirations in that field."

The outlook on technical and vocational work improved with industrial and technological development.

In the last 10 years the total number of graduates from technical education facilities and vocational training centers amounted to 53,407 or an average of 5,340 students each year.

Last year alone 10,155 students graduated from the technical institutes and schools and the training centers that are subordinate to the organization.

In 10 years 4,770 students graduated from industrial schools; 7,847 graduated from business schools; 14,246 graduated from morning classes at vocational training centers; and 21,605 graduated from evening classes at vocational training centers.

This question began with an accusation and ended with a fact, or as philosophers would put it, it began with doubt and ended with certainty. The accusation brings no shame; it is actually an honor. The doubt in this question began when evidence and figures were compiled about the fact that the dropout rate in the various stages of education in our country was high. Some magazines and official books published alarming figures about this rate. We know that dropping out of school is a normal phenomenon and that it has its reasons and also its remedy. But what is disturbing in the matter is that the ambitious development plans in our country cannot withstand any kind of "human loss." The challenge that we are facing makes it incumbent upon us to make the best use of our human resources so that citizens of this country can build the foundations of civilization by themselves. It seemed to us, however, that those who dropped out of public education did not go into another direction, such as technical education and vocational training. After leaving school or failing in school for one reason or another, they stayed unemployed. They became a burden on society, or they turned to petty government positions that are almost a kind of hidden unemployment. We reject both outcomes. We reject [the notion that] a person live without work, and we reject [the notion that] a person would have a job that is the closest thing to being unemployed. This is the question: we started with a controversy and ended up with a report, as dialecticians would say.

From this standpoint the question consists of two parts. The first part has to do with dropping out and the second part has to do with the future of those who drop out.

These are the questions that have to be asked:

--Is the dropout rate in public education normal or high?

--What are the reasons for dropping out?

--Are there social reasons for dropping out?

--Are there educational reasons for that phenomenon?

--What do the figures say about this point?

--Do these figures overstate or understate the case?

--What are officials in the Ministry of Education and educators saying about this phenomenon?

A more important question after that is this: What are the effects of this phenomenon on individuals and on society?

All [these considerations] constitute the first part of this question.

The second part consists of [the following] considerations:

--Where do those who drop out of school go?

--Do they continue to be merely "a waste of manpower," without work?

--Do they change direction and turn to technical education or vocational training?

--Do they get small positions in government administrations and departments?

These positions, which are actually ineffectual, are no more than a form of hidden unemployment.

This is our problem. When we began [examining this problem], we had a specific opinion. By the time we completed [our examination of] that problem, after meeting with officials and specialists, we had adopted a completely different opinion.

In the first place we do not wish to go into details about the dropout phenomenon. We do not wish to discuss this matter with students, teachers and parents because we've already done that in issue number 716 of the magazine in an article entitled, "They Are Leaving School!" That issue came out on 13 Dhi al-Qi'dah 1402 A.H.

The Strategy of the Fourth Plan

The importance of this question now lies in the fact that the state has completed formulating a strategy for the fourth 5-Year Plan. The only thing that is left is to have the plan confirmed by his highness the king. This strategy rests on two main points.

The first has to do with relying primarily on local, national labor to implement the aspects of this plan or the better part of it and to reduce reliance on foreign labor to a point where such reliance is as little as possible.

In practical terms this means that we need every iota of effort [we can muster]. It means that this country is under no condition prepared to lose any of its manpower resources.

The second point is that it is the strategy of this plan to devote considerable attention to technical education and vocational training in a manner that would realize the objectives of planners with regard to using Saudi workers for the requirements of the next stage.

This next stage, which is almost here, is the stage of maintenance and operations. In other words, it is the stage of technocrats or industrial technicians in all areas.

Such a stage requires effective cadres who would carry out in the next stage the task of building [everything that has to be built] as it should be built.

The nature of the constructive effort which the country is going through on the one hand, and the historical moment we are experiencing, on the other hand, as we build our civilization dictate that we utilize all efforts and direct all energies in the direction we wish.

It is for this reason that we are raising this question today about dropping out of school and about the future of those who drop out of school.

Students Are Dropping Out

The fact that must now be acknowledged is that students are dropping out of school. This fact was confirmed by Dr Sa'ud al-Jamaz, undersecretary of the Ministry of Education, in an interview with AL-YAMAMAH.

Dr al-Jamaz said, "We must acknowledge that students are dropping out of school starting from the first grade in primary school to the end of the secondary stage of education. But we must also admit that dropping out of school is a normal phenomenon or an inevitable outcome of the major horizontal expansion in education that occurred throughout the kingdom.

"This is the primary reason behind this phenomenon. After that there are numerous factors. Some of them are attributable to the Ministry of Education and others are attributable to purely social reasons."

We asked, "With which should we begin?"

He said, "Let us begin with the set of social and environmental factors that may be the reason for this problem. And here I would like to limit myself to a set of points as follows:

--"First, the Ministry of Education cannot require a student to attend school, nor can it require parents to make their children attend school. This means that there is no binding law which the Ministry of Education can use to force a person to attend school.

"In view of the absence of such legislation the Ministry of Education has material and moral resources, which I do not believe are available to any other country. It is these resources that are enabling the ministry to expand its educational services and to accept all students who are old enough to learn.

--"Second, there were areas in the kingdom where primary education was not available, at least not in the past few years. This year the number of primary schools came to 4,178. This large number of schools was not built all at once or in 1 year. These schools were built over a period of 30 years. This means that in past years there were areas that had no schools, and that means there were children who were not getting an education."

More than One Reason for Dropping Out of School

--"Third, when a school is located in a remote area in a village or in a settlement, it is not only 4-year old children who attend the school. Rather everyone from the age of 4 to 12 or more who wants to learn can attend. This means that some of the people who enroll in school are older people who may stay in school 1, 2 or 3 years. They stay in school until they can read and write or until they are no longer illiterate, and they are satisfied with that. After they turn into young men of 15, they leave school and they go to work in the army, in the police or in a factory. Or they will do any other work that requires no more than a familiarity with reading and writing. Such people are counted in statistical records as students who dropped out of school or as students lost in the system.

--"Fourth, for years Saudi society has been in a state of flux. There are numerous forms of migration from one place to another, particularly to capitals and large cities. These migrations are no easy matters. Thousands of students migrated with their parents from one place to another. As soon as a student stops going to school, he is thought to have dropped out or to be missing even though he may have stopped attending one school and is attending another school elsewhere.

"We have some statistics which prove that those who attended a middle school in some areas or in some years outnumbered those who graduated from primary schools in that area.

--"Fifth, there is also a high percentage of non-Saudi students. Non-Saudis make up at least 10 percent of all students. Those non-Saudi students are the children of contractors who go back to their countries with their parents. [When they leave school], these students are counted as dropouts even though they did not drop out, and they are counted [in calculating] the general dropout rate for the entire educational process."

Educational Reasons

We asked, "These are the social reasons behind this phenomenon. What are the reasons within the ministry itself that would explain this phenomenon? I mean, what are these reasons within the educational process itself and the circumstances around it that may be directly responsible for this phenomenon?"

Dr al-Jamazi said, "These circumstances constitute a set of organizational or educational conditions that may make a child fail and then to stop going to school altogether. I can also detail these circumstances in a set of principal factors.

"If you were to look into the educational system, you would find that there is a set of details which has to do with the educational process itself. These details may cause a student to fail, to stop coming to school or to drop out. This dropping out or failure may come about in a variety of forms: a student may fail in one grade for more than 2 years, or he may stop in primary school twice as long as the normal 6 years, but the result is always the same: the student does not complete his education in this or in subsequent stages."

he asked, "What do you mean by the educational system as the structure of the school and the relationship of that to dropping out of school?"

He replied, "Examinations and examination rules can be regarded as another factor, school regulations may be another reason for students' failure. The curriculum may be the third reason for failure, and teachers may find no good reason even though they are not the last."

"All these reasons constitute an integrated series of reasons that continuously affect and influence each other. They all have something to do with the question of dropping out of school."

This is the opinion held at the Ministry of Education about the question of dropping out of school. The ministry is fortified by the said opinions:

What does Psychology say?

A second opinion articulated by Dr. 'Abdullah al-Naji', professor of psychology and chairman of the Psychology department at the College of Education at Yarmouk University analyzes the same phenomenon:

Dr al-Naji said, "The phenomenon of dropping out of school at various stages of education is one that can be found in all societies, but the phenomenon differs from one society to another according to prevailing values and according to the social and economic circumstances of each society."

"We can analyze the psychological reasons for dropping out of school, and we can attribute that phenomenon to three factors. These are:

— First, there is the factor of each individual's propensity and aptitude.

Individuals differ regarding the propensity and aptitudes that were given to them at birth. There are those whose intelligence and mental aptitudes are below average. It is difficult for these people to continue going to school after the primary stage. Here it is evident that for such people dropping out of school is normal.

"There are students who can complete primary school but not middle school, and there are those who can complete middle school but not secondary school, and there are those who can complete secondary school but they fail to complete high university education."

"Hence dropping out of school means in a person's natural inclination and his long-given aptitude. People who drop out of school constitute a homogeneous educational type."

"By comparison, there are individuals who finish one or several years' schooling but lack potential and aptitude, but rather because their aptitude is much inferior than what education requires. These are gifted students who usually find more challenges in school than they do not feel large the confrontation and mental challenges that is commensurate with their ability. They usually become disinterested in school and drop out for no reason other than they cannot cope with the school's academic and extracurricular demands."

"Unfortunately, we do not have in the Kingdom programs for high achievers which would satisfy the mental potential of those students and cope with their mental excellence. Such programs as well as special schools for the gifted can be found in many countries, and full care is provided for such students because it is from their midst that scientists, thinkers and inventors will emerge."

Is the Economy the Reason?

—"Second, there is the factor of motivation.

"Motivation is the extent to which a person wishes to complete a certain task. That desire is evident in the interest a student has in studying and the feeling he has that his studies respond to his needs and fulfill his motives.

"In students' motivation is shaped by early education and by the family, the school and society. Accordingly, these factors contribute to students' motivation: they either reinforce it or they weaken it.

"For example, students from families that live in the desert and in villages are less motivated to learn because their idea of education is reading, writing and knowing something about religion.

"But the notion of education as an economic return is not relevant to them because to them the source of economic gain is agriculture, trade or the military. In addition, such families view the period of education from elementary school to university as a very long period of time, and families are not prepared to wait that long.

"Also the climate of the school which a student is attending may strengthen or weaken his motivation. For example, the absence of recreational activities in a school or the quality of teachers may weaken a student's motivation. In addition, our school system lacks what is called an integrated climate which makes a school an attractive place that meets a student's social and recreational needs.

"This is one of the significant factors in the dropping out of school phenomenon because when a student is afraid or bored, he will look for ways outside school where he and a group of his friends can do what they wish.

—"Third, there is the emotional nature of a student.

"This has to do with a student's disposition. A student may hate school because of a certain teacher or a certain subject, that would make him run away from school. Also problems at home or his parents' neglect may have the same result.

"In addition to the three integrating factors there is another reason why students drop out of school. That reason, which is of no less importance than the others, has to do with the rapid economic progress which the Kingdom is experiencing. The economic transition for education has been mysterious, and it does not play a big part in a student's life. Although it is not non-existent, the economic incentive for education is very weak since a student may ask himself, "And how much money would I make after 20 years of schooling?"

The answer to that question is this: a position with a salary of about 3,000 or 4,000 riyals. That student knows that he can earn that much from any job without getting an education. He knows that he can earn many times that amount if he were to open a real estate office, for example.

"Although I do not have adequate statistics, it seems to me that the dropout rate among the poor is higher than it is among the rich. It is known that it is the middle class that places a material value on education. For the wealthy class, however, education does not constitute an economic need, but it is simply valuable.

"In addition, a wealthy father may unintentionally destroy any inner motivation to learn which his son may have. He can do that by giving his son a car, an apartment, an allowance and all the means for a comfortable life. The son will then feel that he has no economic need for an education."

These were two explanations for the dropout phenomenon. One explanation came from the point of view of the Ministry of Education, and another explanation came from the point of view of psychology. Both explanations complement each other.

Human Loss

What matters after that is not the dropout phenomenon in and of itself, but rather its effects on society.

Dr Muhammad Kashmiri, chairman of the Education Department at the College of Education of King Saud University said, "Dropping out of school is one of the most significant aspects of waste and loss in the field of education. It is what educators have agreed to call "human loss." Numerous complications result from this waste or loss."

[Question] How?

[Answer] There are four kinds of loss that result from this phenomenon: financial loss, opportunities for development are lost, and education and a normal life are forfeited.

[Question] Can you be more specific about these four points? What about the financial loss that results from the phenomenon of dropping out of school?

[Answer] It is known now that education is regarded as the largest industry in any society. In many countries the education budget has grown and has become the second largest budget after the defense budget. In the Kingdom the education budget for 1403-1404 A.H. amounted to 27.79 billion riyals. This is a large budget; its allocations come a very close second after those for defense. These funds are supposed to turn into expertise, skills and opportunities that can enrich the various areas of life with the mature thoughts and distinguished citizens that are contributed.

Education is based on the belief that a student is promoted from one grade to the next at the beginning of each school year. This process goes on up to a point where the student completes his education and graduates from school according to a set

schedule. Unfortunately, however, the flow of students in the educational system does not take place according to this principle because this flow is thwarted when students fail or drop out of school.

This increases the cost of education and causes undue increases in the cost of educating an individual. Many of the expenses and efforts that are made are wasted when students drop out of school. After a student spends 1 year or more in school and after the state makes plans for the educational services that will be offered to him—and this is a costly service as has previously been said—that student leaves his place and his school. In many cases the money that was spent on him is lost. In some cases that loss may amount to about 50 percent of what was spent, and that is a considerable loss by all standards for measuring profit and loss in all areas of life.

Just as dropping out is considered one of the major reasons for loss, failure is the second major reason in that area; (together), they increase the amount of loss. This is because students who fail occupy seats in a classroom which should be occupied by new students. But the matter is not simply one of occupying seats. This matter has its economic significance which is manifested in spending funds for something more than once, and that increases the waste and the loss. Figures indicate that in many instances loss is doubled as a result of these two factors: failure and dropping out of school. If the theoretical cost of education per student throughout six years of primary education—6 years—amounts to 403 dollars for primary school students in Algeria, compared with 736 dollars in Bahrain and 1,470 dollars in Qatar, the actual figures indicate that the real cost of getting one student through primary school in Algeria is 805 dollars, compared with 1,261 dollars in Bahrain and 3,201 dollars in Qatar.

The difference between the actual cost and theoretical cost constitutes a loss that in some cases exceeds 30 percent of the total actual cost.

As far as the Kingdom is concerned, a study has affirmed that the rate of effectiveness among male students is 57 percent and that a student needs 11.34 years instead of 6 years to complete his primary education. The study indicated that for female students the rate of effectiveness for the same stage of education is 69 percent. The average number of years that are necessary for a female student to complete primary education is 4.6 school years.

Compound Loss

[Question] What about the second loss, (the loss of opportunities) for development?

[Answer] The effect of losses incurred in the field of education does not stop with finances as is the case when a merchant sustains a loss in one item. Losses in education have an impact on the various areas of development: they affect various kinds of farms, factories and service institutions. All these areas have been waiting for new forces to stimulate business, to pass it forward and to achieve more productivity by putting into action the new ideas they acquired and the skills they learned in the various educational institutions. However, development institutions will be waiting a long time for these forces because students are failing and are dropping out of school, and after waiting for a long time

these institutions do not get the trained manpower they need. And if they get the numbers they wanted, they do not get the qualifications they want.

[Question:] The third loss that is incurred is educational. What are the particulars of that?

[Answer:] Studies conducted by us and by others have affirmed that the future of those who drop out of school before finishing the fourth grade in primary school is well-known. The communication skills they had gained and the basic arithmetic they had learned are soon forgotten, and such students revert to illiteracy, thereby increasing the numbers of the illiterate and, consequently, increasing the dangers of illiteracy. We have no hope of wiping out this chronic disease of illiteracy as the numbers of illiterate people grow because not all our children are going to primary schools and because some of those who go to primary schools are dropping out and are leaving school without achieving the goals of primary education. I am saying we have no hope of wiping out illiteracy unless we put an end to the causes of illiteracy by putting an end to the phenomenon of students dropping out of school and by enrolling all our children in schools.

[Question:] The fourth and the final loss is a social one.

[Answer:] There is no doubt that a person who drops out of school and leaves school without achieving the goals of education is less mature socially. Accordingly, he is less able to adjust to his surroundings, and he is more likely to fail and to become corrupted.

That was the first part of [our report on] this week's question, which had to do with [the phenomenon of students] dropping out of school.

The second part [of our report] asks about the future of those [students] who dropped out.

There are numerous answers to that question. Some of these answers are pessimistic and unscientific, stating that the thousands of students who dropped out of school are living on the fringes of society.

Other answers, however, indicate by facts and figures that the reality is otherwise.

We maintain that education is not the be-all and end-all. One may fail in school for one reason or another and still succeed in professional life when he finds for himself another route.

The question that we are asking now is this:

Is it true that those people who dropped out of school are leading a non-productive life? Is it true that they do not turn to technical education and vocational training, for example? Is it true that they are the ones who make up the hidden unemployment in the country, holding down small jobs in government institutions?

The Facts Speak

These were the poignant questions that we took to officials. The answers we got to those questions led us to a kind of certainty.

We posed these questions first to His Excellence Mr Turki Ibn Khalid al-Sudayri, Director of the Civil Service Office. Mr al-Sudayri was kind enough to answer each question with facts and figures.

We asked, "It is being said that a large number of students who drop out of school at the various stages of education take any job in government offices. How many of the people who work in ministries and government offices have not completed their education?"

Mr al-Sudayri said, "It is not easy to be specific about the number of those who work in ministries and government offices and who did not complete their education. Information that would be given in that regard will not be precise for several reasons. However, I would like to call attention to the following points:

--"The general rule is that no one is hired in any government job unless he meets the conditions for filling that job. The minimum [requirements] for entry level positions have been set (as follows): a primary school certificate for vocational positions and a certificate of competence from a middle school for clerical positions. There are a few simple exceptions to that rule.

--"Many people who join the civil service corps continue their education while they are employed by the civil service. This is reflected in the fact that improvements in the level of their positions continue. It would be appropriate to indicate here that civil service systems give an employee the opportunity to continue his education while he is employed. [An employee who elects to continue his education may be sent abroad for graduate studies or he may receive specialized training in the kingdom or abroad with attractive financial benefits. The number of employees who completed their education or their training abroad amounted to 5,600. Most of those employees are still continuing their education.

--"The following statistics show that no more than 19.14 percent of the total number of employees are in lower grade level positions on the professional scale--grades 1, 2 and 3--which require an employee to have a degree that is less than a secondary school certificate. Along with that one concedes that it is not necessary that all employees who are in grade levels higher than the third grade level have certificates higher than a primary school certificate or a certificate of competence. The fact that these people advanced gradually in the civil service system has given many of them experiences that qualified them to hold jobs at professionally higher grade levels. Those people have proven themselves competent to hold these positions. We suggest that you contact universities, the Ministry of Education and the Directorate for the Education of Girls to find out the number of such people who are continuing their education by attending evening classes. We believe that most of these people are basically civil servants who are trying to raise the standard of their educational achievement in accordance with available conditions."

A Survey of Positions Held by Saudi Nationals from Grade 15 to Grade 1

The Grade	The Number	Percentage
15	230	0.15 percent
14	219	0.14 percent
13	303	0.19 percent
12	356	0.35 percent
11	413	0.58 percent
10	2,153	1.36 percent
9	3,767	2.37 percent
8	6,688	4.21 percent
7	19,743	12.43 percent
6	22,743	14.32 percent
5	51,519	31.83 percent
4	20,554	12.94 percent
Total for grades 1, 2 and 3	30,398	19.14 percent
Overall total	158,786	100 percent

We asked, "Does this group constitute a burden on ministries and on government offices? Does this group benefit [government] operations and society as it should?"

Mr al-Sudayri said, "It would be difficult to accept that premise. How can we accept as the norm the notion that those groups of students which dropped out of school constitute a burden on the ministries and contribute to them little to speak of? It is known that civil service jobs are ranked on a professional scale in accordance with the duties and responsibilities of each job. Jobs differ from each other with regard to level of competence, qualifications and experience. Some positions require specialized training and others do not. In accordance with this position civil service jobs are filled according to the conditions that are set for filling each job. The general rule is that a job exists because there is a need for it. Accordingly, a search [is launched] to find someone to fill that job. A job may be filled by a Saudi citizen or, if it is determined that a Saudi citizen cannot be found for the job, someone from abroad may be hired on a contractual basis. It is known that the first grades on the professional scale cannot be filled on a contractual basis."

80,000 employees

We asked, "So far we do not yet have the Saudi manpower that is qualified enough to meet the needs of development. Why is that?"

Al-Sudayri replied, "It is also no secret that in the past decade the kingdom has seen unusual conditions which led to a tremendous expansion in development and changes in all areas. To stay in step with these ambitions, we had to provide the manpower with which the required development can be achieved. Because education in the kingdom is in its infancy, particularly higher and technical education, it has not been possible to provide the necessary numbers and levels of native workers in all areas. This made it necessary that we seek the assistance of non-Saudi workers and experts. God willing, this will undoubtedly be for a limited period of time."

We asked, "A study that was presented at the Institute of Public Management

stated that the failure to set public education and training on the right course and the absence of careful manpower planning have led to this considerable loss of human resources. Is this true in your opinion?"

He said, "We've observed from the experience and the responsibility we in the Civil Service Office have had in hiring workers for the civil service that there is an abundant supply of workers in some disciplines and a scarce supply in others. The office has submitted its point of view and its observations on the matter to agencies responsible for directing educational policy. A manpower council has recently been set up as an independent body. Its function will be to formulate the public policy for manpower development, to set manpower utilization on the right course and to direct manpower development in accordance with the needs of the country."

We said, "Large figures were mentioned in a seminar on Saudi labor about the percentage of those who started their careers without continuing their education. That figure was in the tens of thousands, for example. What is your reaction to such matters?"

Al-mudayri said, "The civil service sector has been able to take in large numbers of employees. From 1397 A.H. to 1402 A.H. more than 80,000 civil servants were hired. In addition, about 30,000 employees were also hired. This is a total of 110,000 civil servants and employees. These figures may be taken as a standard to indicate that the vast majority of the number you alluded to, which is 424,000, did not join the civil service corps. This is because the civil service is not the only area for employment. There are other areas for employment such as the military and the private sector. In addition, a large number of citizens go into private business."

"At any rate we suggest that you pose this question to those agencies that are responsible for directing education and manpower development policies on a national scale."

We asked, "Does the presence of a large number of civil servants who did not complete their education cause confusion in the social makeup of Saudi society?"

He said, "This question is not clear. Does the presence of uneducated classes or classes of people who did not have the opportunity to earn a higher education necessarily mean having confusion in the social environment of Saudi society? I do not believe so. One cannot imagine a society with all its classes and standards having a specific standard of education or a specific standard for anything else. But one may come out with the impression that as long as the kingdom has an urgent need for highly qualified workers—qualified educationally or technically—it is our duty to concentrate on improving the efficiency of Saudis so that we can do without having to hire many workers, particularly those who come from outside the kingdom. This is important, and this is what the state is trying to achieve, particularly after the establishment of the Manpower Council and the Institute for Technical Education and Vocational Training."

The term, a petty official, is a poor one.

That last question was the one with which we began a second interview with

someone, who is also on the Civil Service Board. That interview was with Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sabhan, the secretary general of the board.

He answered the same question by saying, "First of all, it would be fair to disallow the tone of affirmation in the question which does overstate the case. The answer would thus come closer to being a correct answer."

"We state philosophically that the phenomenon of students dropping out of public education is a normal phenomenon, provided it remains under a certain ceiling that is deemed acceptable. If it goes beyond that ceiling and dropout rates rise, there is then cause to doubt the soundness of the entire educational system."

"In practical terms I concede that I am not an educator with a handle on all the controversy that is going on about this subject. I have not familiarized myself with reliable statistics that determine the magnitude of the dropout phenomenon from educational institutions. Nevertheless, I do believe as a fair observer of the situation that the phenomenon of students dropping out of educational institutions is a matter governed by standards of relative judgment, measurement and evaluation. Consequently, any independent judgment about this matter must be subject in my opinion to this equation to avoid the suspicion of being unfounded and not based on evidence."

"Since we've acknowledged from the outset that making a judgment on the matter of students dropping out of school is subject to relative standards, it follows that its effect on the social makeup will necessarily depend, on the one hand, on the numerical frequency of that phenomenon and, on the other hand, on the availability of alternatives for those who drop out of school to go into other activities that yield an appropriate return for the country and for society. It may be said that it is self-evident that since alternative means are not available to those who drop out of school so they can put [their efforts] to profitable use to benefit society, the more people drop out of school in society, the worse will be the consequences for that society. We can picture after that the reaction zones that would result from such a phenomenon. First, the energies of these potential workers would be hampered, and their contributions to society would consequently be denied. Finally, that would entail various kinds of psychological aberrations and deviant behavior as well."

Regarding another question about the phenomenon of professional loyalty and whether or not that phenomenon had anything to do with those who hold lower grade positions, Mr al-Sabhan says, "Petty officials do not have a monopoly over having little professional loyalty as may be inferred from the question. The problem of having little professional loyalty is one that many people who work for the state have. These people are widely scattered over the professional scale. They are on the top, at the bottom and in the middle of that scale. Therefore, it would not be fair to single out petty officials and accuse them alone of professional disloyalty. It is enough that people call them petty officials regardless of their zeal, their contribution and their predictable performance. The fact that must not be ignored is that there are many 'petty officials' who can solve problems despite the insignificance of their professional standing. This may be the result of a rationality inherent in real officials' needs because of the trust it has in them, and it may be the result of a flaw in the existing administrative organization. I don't know."

"But it is important here to realize that the term, petty official, is no more than a figurative expression in both an actual and a judgmental sense.

"Yes, having little loyalty, no matter what that loyalty is and whoever it is who has little loyalty, is a poor phenomenon that indicates in the least terms a decline in morals, a failure of leadership and supervision and a decline in values and ambition."

Al-Sadhan's idea of a solution is this: "The solution, if there is one, is as complicated as the flaw itself. In my judgment there is no easy prescription for remedying the situation.

"Nevertheless, let us assume that we have the ability to come up with one or more solutions to the flaw. What is to be said in that regard?

"In administration [one may say]: prescribe more firmness to deter the wanton and discipline the negligent. Be a good model in following the path of goodness and avoiding the pitfalls of error.

"From a humanitarian standpoint [one may say]: look for the reasons that make a civil servant frustrated and cause him to violate his loyalty to his job occasionally. He becomes disloyal and indolent [even though] he was hired by the state originally to contribute and to be honest.

"Organizationally and professionally [one may say]: develop a more effective tool for rewarding those who do good and punishing those who offend."

The last question we asked Mr al-Sadhan was about the declining level of competence. We asked him whether or not that was due to the fact that employees did not complete their education.

Mr al-Sadhan said, "I believe that the answer to that question is part of the answer to the second question since the decline in the level of competence is an extension if not a manifestation of a weak [sense of] loyalty.

"On the other hand, a civil servant's poor performance may sometimes be due to his educational shortcomings. This may be remedied by education and by training. Opportunities for that are still available, and anyone who has the determination to do so can avail himself of these opportunities."

The Figures Do Not Lie at All

After this group of interviews we come to the heart of this question, which is the fact that students who drop out of school do not change the course of their lives: when they leave public education where they had failed, they do not turn to technical education and vocational training.

Why is it that in particular those students who drop out of school and young adults in general are not interested in this kind of education?

About this Idrise had an interview with Mr 'Abd-al-Wahab 'Attar, superintendent of the Public Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training. In

that interview the man dotted all the i's and crossed all the t's. He offered us a set of figures and facts that turned the doubts we had on this question when we started out [on this report] into certainty. The man was unequivocal, scientific and candid. Therefore, the interview [we had with him] put the finishing touches on the problem that was posed by this question.

[Question] Why is it that young Saudis who did not go on with their education have no interest in technical and vocational work?

[Answer] First of all, it cannot be said that there is no interest in technical and vocational work. Interest is somewhat limited, and it falls short of being an ambition or an aspiration [that drives people into] that field of work. This cannot be attributed to one reason [alone]; it is rather the product of several innumerable reasons. However, reference can be made to some of the significant reasons [for this situation]. Among them is the existence of erroneous notions about technical education and vocational training. Some erroneous social tendencies have a [negative] effect on people who are inclined to turn to technical and vocational work. Citizens are not aware of the opportunities that are provided by technical education and vocational training. There are also lucrative work opportunities that attract large numbers of young people who can be trained.

There is an observable phenomenon at the present time that is worth noting: there is a growing trend [among students] to enroll in technical education and vocational training. In the wake of the major economic, social and cultural development that the kingdom is witnessing young people have had opportunities on a broad scale to acquire new skills and have access to new directions that would be compatible with the industrial and technical development and with the spread of technical and vocational institutes, schools and centers throughout the kingdom. Advanced programs and curricula have been set up; modern vocational disciplines have been introduced; prospects for technical and vocational education have been developed; and the view toward technical and vocational work has been improved. There is no doubt that the growing rates at which students are enrolling in technical institutes and schools and training centers reflects the positive indications in this regard.

The Error of Inherited Beliefs

[Question] Is there a special social view of technical and vocational work that makes young people turn away from this kind of work? What is the role of the Public Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training in changing this view?

[Answer] Some studies indicate that interest in technical education and vocational training programs is largely affected by the presence of a negative view in society toward vocational work. The reason for that negative view lies in inherited, erroneous beliefs. These studies portray this view as one that is pervasive and absolute. I believe that this view is exaggerated. It ignores the changing reality and the emergence of new ideas which interacted with the circumstances of the comprehensive and rapid development that society is going through and the broad, economic and industrial development that is taking place in the kingdom. It is this development that provided people with numerous and lucrative opportunities in technical and vocational areas. It also provided a suitable

social and financial climate that produced positive tendencies in many of these technical and vocational areas. On the other hand, the Public Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training is preparing advanced curricula and programs that would stay in step with industrial progress in the country and bring about the change that is required in prevailing notions. The organization has introduced modern educational courses in technical education curricula, and it has developed existing curricula. Besides, it has instituted new professions in existing disciplines at vocational training centers. The organization has also furnished vocational institutes and centers with the most modern tools and advanced technical equipment.

With regard to [making the public aware] through the media the organization has taken several steps to invite young people to enroll in its institutes and its technical and vocational centers. This has been done through information campaigns in newspapers and magazines. It was also done with the cooperation of Saudi television which produced and showed some television segments [about technical education and vocational training]. In addition, the organization has taken part in radio and television programs that included segments about technical education and vocational training. At the present time three short documentaries are being prepared about agricultural education, industrial education and vocational apprenticeship. Last year the organization opened seven summer centers to give young people information and access to technical and vocational skills. There are also programs in which university and school students visit vocational institutes and centers to find out about their activities and their programs.

It is worth noting in this regard that operations to inform people about going into technical and vocational areas require that all forces join together in the effort. It requires in particular the participation of the media--the press, radio and television. The media can inform young people and enlighten society, and they can make people realize [the facts about] technical education and vocational training so as to attract the targeted groups and encourage the largest number of citizens to go into this field.

Talking in Facts

[Question] Published statistics state that the total number of graduates from vocational schools and training facilities from 1380 to 1400 A.H., that is in 20 years, amounted to 10,485 graduates. This is an average of 524 graduates a year. Does this number ensure that the needs of development for technical manpower in the government sector alone will be met, not to mention the needs of the private sector?

[Answer] First of all, the figures mentioned in the question are inaccurate. In the past 10, not 20 years, the total number of graduates from the organization's technical education facilities and vocational training centers amounted to 53,407. Accordingly, the annual average is 5,340 graduates and not 524. However, the annual average of graduates for 10 years is an incorrect indicator [of the situation]. It is known that the number of students who enrolled in technical and vocational schools in the past was small and that that number began growing [since then]. At the present time there is also a network of technical and vocational facilities covering the kingdom. It is worth noting that last year only--1402-1403 A.H.--the number of graduates from the organization's technical

institutes, schools and training centers amounted to 10,155. This number of graduates in 1 year is close to the figure you mentioned in your question as the [total] figure for 20 years. It is known that as the number of technical and vocational centers and schools increases and as the number of students and trainees grows, the number of yearly graduates, God willing, will also grow from one year to the next.

There is a crucial and an important observation to be made. These figures are figures from the schools, institutes and centers that at the present time are subordinate to the organization. There are numerous technical and vocational centers and institutes that are subordinate to other government agencies. There are, for example, the Telecommunications Institute, the health institutes and the training centers for Saudi Airways. These schools also take in large numbers of young Saudis. They produce technical workers who make a contribution to meeting the needs of the sector with which they are affiliated. It is also worth noting that military sectors take in large numbers of young people who enroll in the military's technical institutes and centers. Private sector companies and organizations are also taking in increasing numbers of young people for employment or training.

Benefits, Benefits

[Question] Many people think that the lack of incentives as well as material, professional and social inducements is one of the reasons that led to the fact that those who did not continue with their education did not turn to technical and vocational centers.

[Answer] Such a statement actually steers clear of the truth. The state, represented by the Public Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training has offered and is offering moral as well as lucrative material incentives. Some of these incentives, for example, are:

--Lucrative monthly bonuses of 675 riyals a month [for students] in technical schools and between 600 and 800 riyals a month [for students] in vocational training centers.

--Means of transportation are provided.

--Furnished, comfortable housing is provided with all the amenities.

--A 50 percent reduction in passenger fares is given when a student wishes to travel. The same reduction in fares applies to students in higher education.

--Bonuses are given to encourage those who earn excellent grades.

--Bonuses are given to those who practice the profession.

--Graduates of vocational institutes and schools are appointed after graduation in grades higher than those to which they would have been appointed had they graduated from the same stage in a public school.

--Available vocational loans can be put to use if a graduate wishes to open his own workshop. The maximum loan is 200,000 riyals.

--If the graduate of a technical or vocational school wishes to go on with his education, there are intermediate technical colleges which he can join to advance to a higher scientific and technical level.

--A graduate of a technical or vocational school may be sent abroad on a scholarship if he meets the required conditions.

In addition, different cultural and athletic activities are available at technical training and education facilities.

[Question] It is being said that figures do not lie at all. Therefore, we hope you will furnish us and the readers with figures about the number of graduates from technical and vocational centers in the past 10 years.

[Answer] From 1393-1394 A.H. to 1402-1403 A.H., that is, about 10 years, the number of graduates from the institutes and schools of industrial education amounted to about 4,770 graduates.

The number of graduates from institutes and schools of business education from 1393-1394 to 1402-1403 A.H. amounted to 7,847 graduates.

The number of graduates from the Model Agricultural Institute in Baridah from 1300-1400 A.H. to 1402-1403 A.H. amounted to 327 graduates.

The number of graduates from morning [classes] at vocational training centers from 1393-1394 A.H. to 1402-1403 A.H. amounted to 14,246 graduates.

The number of graduates from evening [classes] at vocational training centers since the first class of 1 Rabi' al-Awwal 1397 A.H. amounted to 21,605.

Also the total number of graduates from vocational apprenticeship centers since 1394-1395 A.H. until the end of 1402-1403 A.H. amounted to 4,612.

The total number of graduates from the Apprentice Trainers' Institute since the first class [which began] on 17 Rabi' al-Awwal 1395 A.H. until the end of the class which ended on 24 Sha'ban 1403 A.H. amounted to 414.

The number of trainees who benefited from on-the-job training programs since 1397-1398 A.H. until 1402-1403 A.H. amounted to 311 graduates.

Now then, this is the case on the phenomenon of students dropping out of school and on the future of those school dropouts. The facts and figures have indicated that the number of dropouts as given by some [officials] in their lectures and seminars is not correct. Also the figures that are being mentioned about those who are enrolled in [programs for] technical education and vocational training are immeasurably less than they really are.

These are facts that refute any rhetorical statements made by calumniators. There are, however, students who do drop out of school, and we must do everything we can to check this phenomenon and to curtail it as much as possible if not wipe it out altogether.

By comparison, and despite everything indicated by the figures, technical education and vocational training programs need tens of thousands of young people.

What is not required at all are the hundreds or thousands of petty officials who work in jobs that are closer to being hidden unemployment. What is required, however, are thousands of trained people, craftsmen and technicians. In this way we can eliminate two problems at the same time: we can eliminate the problem of having too many dropouts, and we can eliminate the problem of not having enough trained people.

Will we do [what has to be done]?

8592

CSO: 4404/203

BRIEFS

OIL PURCHASE CREDIT--Jidda, 17 Dec (SPA)--The Islamic Development Bank has granted Pakistan 20 million U.S. dollars in credit for the purchase of crude oil from the kingdom. The loan agreement was signed by IDB President Dr Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali, Sa'id Mohammad, the director of the Pakistani National Refinery Limited, and Javed Ahmed, chairman of the board of directors of the Pakistani Petrochemical Company. Meanwhile, the bank has also approved 150,000 dollars for the finance of Niger's CIHE company. The agreement was signed by Dr 'Ali and Niger's ambassador to the kingdom. [Text] [LD180315 Riyadh SPA in English 1901 GMT 17 Dec 83]

MOROCCAN OIL AGREEMENT--Jidda--An agreement, according to which the Islamic Bank for Development is to finance a foreign trade deal for the import of crude oil for the benefit of the Kingdom of Morocco valued at \$20 million, was signed this afternoon at the bank's headquarters. The agreement was signed on behalf of the bank by its president, Dr Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali, and on behalf of Morocco by its ambassador to the kingdom. [Text] [LD050520 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1122 GMT 4 Jan 84]

CSO: 4400/113

COMMENTARY CLAIMS U.S. POLICY WILL FAIL IN 1984

JN301538 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 30 Dec 83

[Station commentary]

[Text] As the new year approaches, efforts are being activated and political moves are continuing on more than one level in order to revitalize the political solutions represented by the Camp David accords and Reagan's initiative that stemmed from them. The past year witnessed military and political events that have made the region stand on the brink of war. The U.S. military interference was the most prominent event in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, because it gave the conflict an international dimension, especially after the U.S.-Israeli agreement was signed. Despite all of the United States' threats and steps to use its naval and air weapons, Washington was not able to impose its policy on the Arabs, particularly on Syria. It wanted to impose that policy on Lebanon through the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, and on the Arabs through the Reagan initiative, which only differs from the Camp David accords in formulation and name.

We are not boasting when we say that Syria's firm position foiled all the plans and solutions that were intended to be imposed by force. We in Syria are not against peace based on justice that recognizes the Arabs' complete rights as stipulated in UN resolutions and international legitimacy. However, we are against peace based on usurping Arab rights and turning the Arab region into protectorates and zones of influence for world imperialism and Zionism. The United States has used several political and military means to subjugate Syria. It has also used its media and those like them to distort Syria's reputation and to depict it as a radical country that is against peace. However, this did not change the reality of things. The French paper LE POINT's reply that 1983 is Syria's year might be the most correct one.

As we greet a new year, we believe that the new year will witness intensified activity in the military and political arenas. According to U.S. plans and some Arab parties, the peaceful or capitulatory solution will coincide with the military solution. The United States and Israel do not want to put down their arms. On the contrary, military action will be escalated and increased so that matters will reach the brink of a comprehensive war, with Syria as its target. George Shultz recently said that Syria is a country with dignity, and we have to destroy that dignity even if we use all of our forces. This talk is well understood and needs no further explanation. It also should be understood that Syria's [word indistinct] supported by the Arab masses is stronger than all of the U.S. fleets and warships.

Just as surely as it views 'Arafat and some other Arab regimes as an Arab cover for its policy in the region, the United States will discover that that cover is weak and that 'Arafat represents only himself after he lost Palestinian legitimacy because of his deviation from the course of the Palestinian revolution and his departure from the PNC resolutions. The Arab regimes that are supporting him are not in any better condition.

We are aware of the ferocity of the American and Israeli enemies, and we are also aware of the force they possess--a force that is being used. But this will not soften us or force us to surrender to gunboat diplomacy. Despite using its military forces and political power, the United States will find itself faced with the fact that force will fail to defeat the will of the people who struggle to achieve their rights, sovereignty, and independence, and that the winds in the Middle East will not blow as the United States wants them to. Syria will continue to reject all the solutions that are inconsistent with the Arab line. Just as it failed in 1983, the policy of force will be disappointed and will fail next year too.

CSO: 4400/111

SYRIAN REGIME HOSTS IRANIAN OFFICIALS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 313, 21 Nov 83 p 30

[Article: "Has the Syrian Defense Minister Received Commissions?"]

[Text] It seems that Damascus, which the Iranian poet Shaykh Muslih al-Din Sa'di al-Shirazi dreamed of seeing centuries ago, has become a second home to hundreds of mullahs and high officials of the Islamic Republic regime.

The short distance between Tehran and Damascus and Syria's support for the Iranian regime in the war are not enough to explain the interest which the mullahs and Iranian officials take in the Syrian capital. Rather, many facilitations are being offered by the regime of President Hafiz al-Asad to the visitors. The Central Bank of Syria has put secret financial facilities at the disposal of some mullahs and officials of the Islamic Republic. One of the most important examples of these facilities is the fact that the bank pays interest rates equal to those paid by Swiss and British banks. But there is one difference. It is possible to uncover the identity of the owner of an account in a European bank. But in Damascus, in accordance with governments controls, no one knows who the owner of a given account is except the Syrian government and the owner himself.

There are other kinds of favors, including giving officials and mullahs property rights in Syria. That is, they may buy real estate and houses in Damascus and the Syrian summer resorts. One example of this is offered by a luxurious villa in the al-Azbakiyah quarter. It was bought by Hujjat al-Islami Mahtashmi, al-Khomeyni's ambassador in Damascus, for the sum of 6 million Syrian pounds last April. Al-Khomeyni's family and relatives own luxurious villas in Damascus and al-Ladhiqiyah.

Since the rulers in Tehran know better than anyone else that they must fall sooner or later, they have found in Damascus the garden which has been promised them, for the city is as eastern as it is western. In it, one can find anything from spiritual pleasure to sensual pleasure.

Moreover, the city of Damascus has come to play the role of intermediary for the Iranian government in its relations with the outside. The high officials of the Syrian regime play a prominent role in the military and industrial agreements which link the Iranian regime to other parties, be they governments,

corporations or individuals. The sums which some top people in the Syrian regime have received after playing the role of middle man between Iran and foreign companies in the past few months are estimated in millions of dollars.

According to the statements of some of those who are close to the Iranian regime, Lt General Mustafa Tlas, the Syrian defense minister, received a commission of about 20 million pounds for the role he played in facilitating the signing of contracts by Iran and two Italian companies for the manufacture of naval boats.

Staff Lt General Tlas is not only an intermediary between Iran and foreign companies, he is among those who are close to the regime in Tehran. Last summer, when Ahmad al-Khomeyni traveled to Damascus, he spent most of his time with Lt General Tlas. They went together to inspect the positions of the Syrian forces in Lebanon. There can be no doubt that Ahmad al-Khomeyni has still not forgotten the sweet Damascene nights he spent in the Syrian capital.

Tlas provided his most recent service to the Tehran regime when he played the role of intermediary between Iran and a Swiss company called the "Pilatus Corporation" last June. After his mediation efforts, the Swiss company agreed to supply Iran with 12 training aircraft of the PC 7 model, which can be turned into attack planes. As a result of this deal, six aircraft have so far been delivered to Iran.

12224

CSO: 4404/197

BRIEFS

STRUGGLE CONTINUES--Comrade Muhammad Zuhayr Mashariqah, assistant secretary general of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party [ASBP] Regional Command, has affirmed that the Syrian masses and party under Comrade Struggler President Hafiz al-Asad will confront the conspiracies and foil all the schemes and that they are working hard to build the solid material base of steadfastness and confrontation and to realize strategic balance with the Zionist enemy. This came in Comrade Mashariqah's conversation with the members of the ASBP branch in al-Hasakah which ended its work today. Comrade Mashariqah also reviewed the plots that are being concocted against our country, considering it is the only fortress of steadfastness and confrontation in the Arab region. He also asserted: We will continue our march on the roads of struggle and liberation under Comrade Leader Hafiz al-Asad until our nation's goals of unity, freedom, and socialism are realized. At the end of the meeting, the participants of the meeting of the ASBP branch in al-Hasakah sent a cable to President Hafiz al-Asad and other cables to the national and regional commands in which they affirmed that they will follow the path of struggle under his brave, historic leadership and until the victory of our Arab nation and its struggling masses is realized. [Text] [JN022032 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 2 Jan 84]

'ARAFAT'S CAIRO VISIT PROTESTED--Damascus, 29 Dec (SANA)--Dar'a today witnessed a Palestinian masses' procession protesting Yasir 'Arafat's visit to Cairo and meeting with the president of the treasonous Arab regime, Husni Mubarak. The procession, which began from the camp, was headed by the commands of the Palestinian revolutions groups and the popular organizations in the governorate. The marchers carried signs emphasizing determination to continue to hold the rifle until Palestine is liberated from the Zionist usurpers. The marchers sent a cable of greetings and appreciation to President Hafiz al-Asad in which they hailed the fateful cohesion between Syria and the Palestinian revolution. They valued the stand of Syria's leader and people and expressed readiness to sacrifice the blood and to confront the Zionist and imperialist challenges until victory and liberation. [Text] [JN291912 Damascus SANA in Arabic 1820 GMT 29 Dec 83]

CSO: CSO: 4400/111

SOVIET EXHIBITION TO OPEN IN AL-SHARIQAH

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 15 Nov 83 p 1

[Text] AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that the first Soviet exhibition in the Gulf region will be held in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during the month of February in the city of al-Shariqah. It will last for 10 days.

A large Soviet delegation led by the president of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry will visit the UAE this month. It will include four commercial officials. The purpose of their visit will be to discuss the circumstances and facilities needed to make the exhibition a success.

It ought to be noted that the first Russian Aeroflot airplane landed at Dubayy airport in the evening 2 days ago. It was a special airplane carrying 18 genuine Arabian horses which were purchased at a public auction of a group of Arabian horses held in Moscow recently.

The individual who made the deal, who is a Gulf resident from Dubayy, said that the purpose of it was to bring genuine Arabian horses from all over the world back to their original homeland in the Arabian Peninsula. The Soviet Union stands out in this regard, since there is a huge breeding farm in the Republic of Asia Minor which received a valuable present from the late Egyptian President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. The present was the "stallion of Aswan," which produced more than 260 pure Arab foals. Most of them were sold at public auctions.

Moreover, the Russian airline Aeroflot will begin regular flights between Dubayy and Moscow at the start of the new year.

It has also been noted that the Soviet delegation attending the exhibition will include about 200 businessmen, sports figures, artists and ballet dancers. A large delegation from the Dubayy Chamber of Commerce and Industry recently visited four countries in the East Bloc: Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. The purpose of the visit was to stimulate relations with these countries in a new direction which is unprecedented for the countries in the region.

12224

CSO: 4404/197

EFFECTS OF UNIFIED TARIFF ON TRADE ANTICIPATED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 20 Nov 83 p 6

[Article: "Now that the Unified Tariff Has Been Applied in the Emirates, Traders, Importers and Consumers Are Awaiting the Appearance of the Results in the Market"]

[Text] Since last March, everyone has been anticipating the decisions of the rulers of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) concerning the application of the new customs tariff in accordance with the unified economic agreement reached by the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It raised the minimum customs charge to 4 percent and the maximum charge to 20 percent last March.

With respect to the customs offices and the ports, this means an increase in revenue of at least 100 percent. The reactions of the traders and importers have ranged between pessimism and optimism. However, imports have been moving more rapidly in order to take advantage of the old, lower rates. Imports for the first half of the year are almost highly exaggerated in terms of volume and velocity.

As for the third party involved (the consumers), all they can do is wait and hope that the new increase will pass them by. The announcement of the new increase came suddenly. It followed the fourth GCC summit meeting, which recently ended in Doha, and the measures taken by the emirates to prepare for issuing the new tariff. The most prominent of these measures was the announcement that a supreme customs council was being created whose members would include the customs directors of the UAE. Among its tasks would be the application of the GCC countries' customs agreement.

With that decision, the emirates became the fifth state to apply the new customs rates. Qatar is the only one of the six GCC countries which has not done so yet.

The trade thermometer in the countries of the region is more sensitive, due to the changes and innovations. These are the views of some officials and businessmen, whose reactions have varied from an attitude of welcome to caution and pessimism. However, all of them are still waiting for the real results and true effects to hit prices and the flow of trade, especially in Dubayy, which depends mainly on the re-export trade. This trade, in turn, is based on a

price factor which owes its existence to the low customs fees and storage costs in the ports, as well as to re-exporting in huge quantities.

A prominent businessman and trader in Dubayy thinks that the new customs rates will cause a comprehensive weakening in the local market, especially in the Emirate of Dubayy, since it depends entirely on the re-export trade. He thinks that wholesale trade will be affected more than retail. He asks himself what will happen after the customs fees go up? He responds by saying that prices in the local market will automatically go up. This will cause a clear decline in the internal, local flow of commerce. There will be direct effects on all those working in this sector, who make up the majority of the citizenry.

He adds that the only positive point is the encouragement that local industries will receive. "All agree on this principle. However, there are other things, factors and obstacles which we will face in the future. Where are the local industries which can meet the entire consumption demand of the local markets? Most of the existing industries are either primitive or are processing industries. We must encourage them. But who will make up for the remaining share of local consumption? The sector which deals in primary food substances, which have been exempted from customs charges, will not be affected by the new rates. But what will happen to prices in the other industries, like the electrical goods industry, the heavy industries, the electronics industry, and the automobile industry? What does protecting them mean?

"The matter can be summed up by saying that goods imported at the start of this year will bring a reasonable profit, but what will happen when the new rates are applied? Naturally, the consumers will compensate the merchants for this loss. Yes, first it will be the local consumer and then the foreign consumer. The re-export trade is based on these foreign consumers. These new rates might cause them to look for another source which is cheaper than the UAE, and certainly cheaper than Dubayy. In past years, Dubayy has enjoyed a great increase in the re-export trade because of its competitive prices, but from now on it will be like other countries in terms of prices. Thus, it will lose a lot of the advantages it enjoyed in the past."

A different opinion is voiced by another businessman. He says that the goal of the tariff, according to article 4 of the unified trade agreement, is to provide protection to local manufactures in the face of competitive foreign products. "There is no doubt that achieving this goal would stimulate existing industry and encourage businessmen and investors in the Gulf countries to invest their capital in new industries, especially since the unified economic agreement assures these industries of a market in the Gulf which is relatively broad in comparison with the local markets of the GCC countries."

Moreover, in his optimistic opinion, unifying the customs tariff imposed on foreign goods might cause some harm to importers, on the one hand, and to consumers, on the other. He admits it would decrease demand for such goods. "However, at any rate, research, studies, and opinion polling of all the parties concerned can be used to harmonize the interests of industrialists and importers, by guiding and admonishing traders to import permissible products from the GCC countries. Further, the success of the economic agreement and of its practical

application, as well as the flourishing of industry in the GCC countries, will all lead to the gradual transformation of commercial capital into industrial capital, because commercial capital will be diverted to the creation of various industries. In the end, this will cause the economies of our countries to develop, grow and flourish. This is the goal of the unified economic agreement. We all hope for it."

One of the officials in charge of the economic sectors says that exempting food-related equipment, goods and commodities is a positive step toward achieving food security for the region. He says food security is not just a matter of importing food. One must also import the requirements of production, machinery and fertilizers. "This step will contribute to the development of agricultural production," he says. "We still have to talk about other goods and commodities which have to be monitored by highly effective and mobile means, so that the prices in the markets can be controlled in the coming days. Most merchants are working to raise their prices in an illogical fashion or by percentages which are far higher than the new customs rates. The customs fees are still very meager. In general, we support the idea of customs taxes. They make the citizens feel that they belong to their country. Moreover, they impose no great expense on the government, at any rate. Of course, this will contribute to supporting the state's budget and the governments in the region. Let me say again that these taxes must not be exploited as a convenient excuse for all the merchants' illogical price increases. Deterrent measures must be taken by an agency charged with overseeing the prices of the goods to which the new tariff rates apply."

Another source says that this is a GCC measure which is meant to apply the unified tariff agreement among the GCC countries. He thinks it will not affect trade and economic life, as long as it is applied in all the GCC countries. He notes that, after all, the rate of 4 percent which has recently begun to be enforced in the UAE is the same rate which has been applied for 2 years. "This will have no effect on anyone," he says. "Then there is the national industries sector, whose problems the concerned agencies are trying hard to solve. One of them is the need for tariff protection. With it, the minimum conditions needed for this sector to develop in the face of many givens can be provided."

12224

CSO: 4404/197

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE ASSAILED--Al-Shariqah, 28 Dec (QNA)--The UAE newspaper AL-KHALIJ today strongly criticized the call made for the establishment of a Palestinian state in exile. Commenting editorially, the newspaper said that any proclamation of a Palestinian state in exile--by the official Palestinian leadership at the later time and within a new strategy of political action--will be a complete ignorance of the genuine Palestinian national action. The paper continued, saying: Through this action, the Palestinian revolution will reverse its principled goals on the Palestinian and Arab levels and consequently provide the U.S.-Israeli alliance with an opportunity to assail whatever the national struggle attained since 1948 until the time this government is proclaimed and for the next stage. Concluding, the paper said that the duty of boiling this inclination is not only the responsibility of the Palestinian factions and personalities but also the duty of the Arab people with their political vocational and social organizations wherever they are. [Text] [GF281201 Doha QNA in Arabic 1100 GMT 28 Dec 83]

IRANIAN BANK BRANCHES REDUCED--Abu Dhabi, 27 Dec (WAKH)--Press reports published here today indicated that Saderat Iran Bank has decided to close down two of its branches in accordance with instructions issued by the UAE Central Bank which demanded the reduction of the number of the functioning foreign banks, so that the number of branches for each bank does not exceed eight. The newspaper AL-ITTIHAD, which carried this report, indicated that it was decided to close down two branches of the bank in the emirates of al-Shariqah and Ra's al-Khaymah as of 31 December 1983. [Text] [GF271358 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0730 GMT 27 Dec 83 GF]

REPORTS ON TAXES REFUTED--Abu Dhabi, 29 Dec (QNA)--UAE Finance and Industry Minister Shaykh Hamdan ibn Rashid al-Maktum has denied reports that the UAE will impose direct or indirect taxes. [Excerpt] [GF291130 Doha QNA in Arabic 0935 GMT 29 Dec 83]

EXPORTS, RE-EXPORTS STATISTICS--Dubai--The total amount of exports and re-exports of goods excluding crude oil from the UAE in the first nine months of 1983 totalled 5,291,141,000 UAE dirhams according to official statistics. Industrialized goods topped the list of re-exports with cars and transport equipment ranking second, machines and industrial equipment third, livestock fourth and finally lubricant oils and petroleum by-products. [Text] [GF030542 Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 3 Jan 84 p 11 GF]

RESIDENCE VIOLATORS ARRESTED--In surprise raids carried out yesterday, the Al-'Ayn arrested 250 violators of residence and work regulations. Some of those arrested were found to be wanted by the law for various offenses including criminal acts; others for being in the country illegally; some for working for employers other than their sponsors; and others for remaining in the country after their residence permits had expired. [Excerpt] [GF100700 Ash-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 9 Jan 84 p 1 GF]

CSO: 4400/111

DEFECTING AFGHANS TELL OF SOVIET CULTURE ASSAULTS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 20 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] PEKING, (Dispatches)--China marked the fourth anniversary of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan by affirming that the action had led to "an impasse."

"The USSR has not been able to crush the Afghan guerillas," said the Peoples Daily, China's largest-circulation newspaper.

"The military situation is characterized by an impasse," the paper continued. "Yet, the Soviet Union has no intention of leaving this quagmire."

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan is one of three official obstacles cited by China to normalization of relations with the Soviet Union.

The two others are Soviet support of Vietnam's presence in Cambodia and the Soviet Armed Forces massed at the border with China.

An IRNA report meanwhile said four senior officials of Afghanistan Radio and Television fled to India due to pressures the Soviets imposed on them for the propaganda of communism.

'The New Delhi-based weekly "Organizer", releasing the report in its latest issue, noted that two of the four, who refrained from embarking on such acts first fled to Pakistan and then to India.

Farideh Anwari, head of the Arts and Culture Department of Kabul Radio, who left her country some nine months ago and is here now, said that Kabul Radio would only broadcast news which would be transmitted through satellite, from Moscow to Kabul.

Main part of news reports, she added, was on Eastern bloc and meetings of the Soviet Communist Party.

Stressing that Soviet music and poetry was replacing Afghan culture, she noted that the Soviet Union was determined to turn Kabul Radio and television into a loudspeaker of its Communist part.

She emphasised that international mass media had failed in paying due attention to the Soviet encroachment upon Afghan culture.

The report added, measures were underway to abolish religious teachings from school programmes with a provision of teaching Russian language in government organizations. Children are being taken in groups to the Soviet Union to visit that country, the report said. An earlier report said aggressive planes of the Soviet Forces, Thursday, bombarded two villages near the city of Kandahar, in Afghanistan, and martyred 48 civilians, mostly women and children.

Radio Dubai, reported that in this attack heavy damages were inflicted upon the people of the villages.

The Mujahideen the report further said, in a retaliatory operation made an attack against the occupying forces and killed six Soviet troops.

CSO: 4600/229

MUJAHIDIN REPORTEDLY INFLICT HEAVY LOSSES ON JOINT FORCES

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 14 Dec 83 pp 1, 2

[Text] MASHHAD, Dec. 13 (Dispatches)--Afghan Mujahideen in their struggle against occupying forces killed 211 joint Russian and government forces during the current month, it was reported Monday.

The report said, during clashes the Mujahideen inflicted heavy losses on the occupying forces.

The Mujahideen destroyed four police stations, one tank, four vehicles and also shot down two helicopters of the occupying forces, the report said.

The Mujahideen, the report added, also seized 560 various types of arms and 30,000 cartridges from the joint Russian-Afghan forces who are occupying Afghanistan.

Another report said that nine Mujahideen and fifty-two defenseless civilians were martyred when the occupying forces bombarded the civilian areas.

Mujahideen Abduct 30 Ruling People's Democratic Party Members; All but Four Executed

Meanwhile reports from Islamabad (Pakistan) said about 30 party officials from Kabul were captured alive and all but four were later executed when Mujahideen stormed a provincial party office in Afghanistan's remote Herat Province late last month, a western diplomatic source here said Tuesday.

The kidnappings, executions, and other recent incidents were seen as evidence of strong resistance presence throughout Afghanistan as the government prepares to celebrate the fourth anniversary of Russian military intervention.

In other incidents, there were reports of bloody battles in the Ghazni Province and an attempt on the life of the head of the secret police in Kabul. The abducted officials, members of the ruling People's Democratic Party, were captured while on a visit to Herat to ascertain why authorities there had failed to quell resistance activities in the area, the source said.

The group reportedly was taken alive from the party headquarters in Herat city and 26 of them were later put to death, the source added. There was no

explanation why four were spared, nor was there any word on their present whereabouts.

Herat, located near the border with Iran, has been a constant trouble spot for the regime since a military offensive in the spring destroyed much of the city and caused hundreds of civilian casualties.

In a report from New Delhi, a western diplomatic source said there had been a series of battles between Afghan Mujahideen and Russian troops in the Ghazni Province.

The diplomatic source, who requested not be identified by name or country, said at least seven battles flared in November and early December in Ghazni, resulting in the deaths of more than 59 Mujahideen civilians, Russian and government troops.

The warfare began in early November, when freedom fighters attacked a joint Russian and Afghan convoy in the small town of Giru, killing seven Afghan soldiers. Russian artillery soon retaliated by bombing Giru, destroying a mosque and several houses, the report said.

Afghan Mujahideen followed up with a second attack on Nov. 9 in the Gudul Washi town, killing 30 to 35 Russian soldiers and 19 civilian officials of the Babrak Karmal government, it said.

The report added that Russian troops the next day martyred five Mujahideen and five villagers in reprisal.

There also were reports that in Kabul an attempt to assassinate secret police chief Dr. Najibullah was foiled when security forces discovered a bomb in his office in the prime ministry building, according to the source in Islamabad.

As a result a "substantial number" of his staff were arrested for conniving with Mujahideen said the source, adding that reports of the number detained ranged from 50 to 83.

On Nov. 29 the chief of staff of the 18th division in Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan's third largest city in Northern Balkh Province bordering the Soviet Union, was attacked and killed along with five enlisted men, the source said. The Afghan army general was not identified.

Also, in Kandahar, the country's second biggest city located south of Kabul, the deputy head of the National Fatherland Front was assassinated while on a visit from the capital. The date of his death was not given.

In another incident on Dec. 5, 14 Russian soldiers were reported killed and six Afghan government troopers captured during a skirmish with freedom fighters inside the city.

Meanwhile, a separate diplomatic source said an Afghan army general was killed near Kandahar around Dec. 1. According to the unconfirmed report Maj. Gen. Uloomi, commander of the 2nd corps, was killed when his helicopter was shot down by resistance gunfire. No further details were available.

FIGHTING BETWEEN MUJAHIDIN, JOINT FORCES REPORTED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 15 Dec 83 p 1

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Dec. 14 (Dispatches) — Western diplomats Wednesday reported fighting between Afghan Mujahideen and Russian-Afghan forces in at least four provincial cities while the capital of Kabul remained calm in the run-up to the fourth anniversary of the Soviet intervention.

The diplomatic reports from the embassies in Kabul said they had reports of clashes in Mazar-e-Sharif, Ghazni, Kanadahar and Herat.

Extra-tight security measures in Kabul have kept the capital calm, they added, but rumors have started to circulate that another Mujahideen attack on December 27 marking the fourth anniversary of Moscow's move into Kabul to prop up a crumbling Communist government there, was imminent.

Muslim freedom fighters staged a series of attacks on Kabul last week, cutting out electricity supplies and hitting several official buildings. Resistance leaders in Peshawar say they plan something but will give no details.

The diplomats said their embassies reported the chief of staff of the Afghan army's 18th division was killed along

with five enlisted men on November 29 in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif.

Meanwhile in Central Afghanistan, on December 1, said a Ghazni-Kabul traveller that he saw a number of burned out trucks, tanks and armored personal carriers along with road, by a recent attack of Mujahideen on Russian and Afghan army convoys.

About 20 Russian-Afghan soldiers were killed in fighting in the southern city of Kandahar.

Mujahideen Kill Six, Capture 20 Russian Soldiers

Meanwhile, the Afghan Muslim Mujahideen fighting the Russian backed regime of Afghanistan, in an ambush attack last week on concentration areas of the occupying Russian forces in a village in Shindand district of the Herat Province, killed six of the occupation forces.

Furthermore in this attack the Mujahideen captured another twenty of the Russian forces. Informed Afghan sources in Zahedan, capital of the southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan, said that in this attack the Mujahideen seized twenty light weapons, one Russian personnel carrier and a large amount of ammunition.

SWEDISH AID OFFICIAL ON CLINICS FOR GUERRILLA-CONTROLLED AREA

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Dec 83 p 13

[Article by Peter Bratt: "Afghanistan--Swedish Money to Clinics"]

[Text] "We now have 10 clinics in Afghanistan. By summer we hope to have 20," said Anders Fange who, from Peshawar in Pakistan, is organizing humanitarian help to the guerrilla controlled area. Most of it is paid for by SIDA [The Swedish International Development Authority] and is administered by the Swedish Afghanistan Committee.

Anders Fange is temporarily visiting Stockholm, and tells about the situation in Afghanistan. After the new year he will return to Peshawar to continue the work of organizing medical clinics in Afghanistan.

The Swedish Afghanistan Committee has received a grant from SIDA for 3 million kronor from the catastrophe fund for this fiscal year. The committee has furthermore collected one-half million on its own, and hopes to get that much more.

"We are recruiting qualified Afghan doctors who are refugees in Pakistan, and those who are willing to return we send in with rather extensive medical supplies. It costs about 150,000 kronor to set up a clinic," he said.

"The Russians control the cities and the opposition movement controls the countryside. The best organized opposition is north of Kabul. In one valley 'The Lion' Massoud has succeeded in negotiating an agreement for a cease-fire with the Russians.

"The population groups are deeply divided, as are the guerrillas, and that is primarily the case south of Kabul. We find it very difficult to keep track of how the clinics are doing their work. We have a clinic in western Afghanistan, and it often takes 4 months before we receive replies to letters we send there.

"Most of the care goes to civilians for tuberculosis, malaria, typhoid, stomach and intestinal ailments which are spreading uncontrolled because of the war. One-third of the care goes for war wounds."

INTERVIEW WITH IRANIAN KURDISH LEADER QASEMLU

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 28 Nov 83 pp 26-8

[Report on interview with Dr 'Abdol-Rahman Qasemlu by Charles der Leeuw: "We Kurds Do Not Demand Autonomy, that We Already Have. The Resistance of Abdul Qasemlu"; date and place not given; captions in boldface; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Safety measures surround Dr 'Abdol Rahman Qasemlu during his visit to The Netherlands, and also threatening telephone calls from alleged Khomeyni supporters have not been lacking. But far away from here, according to the leader of the Kurdish resistance movement Pesh Merga, autonomy is as good as a fact. A new state for the Kurds? "We are fighting for an Iran where all people can live in freedom and equality."

If there is one thing in /'Abdol-Rahman Qasemlu/ that has not been affected by the fight of many years, it is his sense of humor. Two days late, he arrives at Schiphol for a lecture at a congress of Kurdish resistance movements, organized by the /Institute for Oppressed Peoples/ of the Free University in Amsterdam. Later, in the lounge of his hotel: "They did not want to give me a visa at first, because they were afraid that I might report myself as a political refugee! While I have a regular guerilla army of more than 10,000 men at home. By the way, if you know of weapons for sale somewhere..."

Some Kurdish history: Qasemlu comes from the region where during the Second World War, the only Kurdish republic was situated which the world has known in the 2,500 year old Kurdish history (the Kurds claim to be descendants of the Medes, who conquered Nineveh in 612 before Christ, and who 60 years later were driven away again from there by the Persians). This so-called Mahabad republic, called after the most prominent city, was overrun after the war by the armies of the then shah.

At the moment, the Kurds are distributed mainly over Turkey, Iraq and Iran, aside from small Kurdish minorities in Syria, the Soviet Union and Lebanon. Everywhere, they are being oppressed physically and culturally, also in Iraq where they officially have received a limited form of autonomy under the Treaty of Algiers, which was concluded with Baghdad in 1975 after a bloody civil war. Everywhere, except in a strip of land the size of the Benelux **[Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxemburg]** with 3 million inhabitants, in West

Iran (about half of Iranian Kurdistan) where the Kurdish Democratic Party of Qasemlu holds sway.

First Schoolbook

Qasemlu: "In liberated territory, every village has its own council, just like every district. Both are elected directly by the population--with suffrage for everyone, men and women. Shortly, there will come a statute for a national council, which, once installed, will appoint a kind of federal government. Village and district councils decide about their own social and economic measures, and the national council will pursue the policy for the region as a whole.

We have our own courts of law with their own rules of law. We have our own schools, where lessons are taught in Kurdish. In the beginning of this year, the first schoolbook in Kurdish was published, and still many more are being prepared. We have a national newspaper and a national radio station, and numerous regional publications--in Kurdish, of course. There is a new distribution system of arable land, which definitely puts an end to traditional large landownership. We even have our own jails. /In fact, the federal state of Kurdistan as an independent entity within Iran has already as good as been completed."/

Hunger Strike

From 8 August to 9 September of this year, an official representative of the /Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme/ [International Human Rights Federation, FIDH], established in Paris, paid a visit to Kurdistan, and inspected among other things the situation in Kurdish prisons. In his report, he mentions a hunger strike of an Iranian officer, who had been taken prisoner by Qasemlu's army, the Pesh Merga, and who had been put in the resistance-controlled prison. Together with a number of others he protested ... /against his release/. Of course, some fear was in this, because whoever would apply again to Khomeyni's troops, once released by the Kurds, is suspicious in principle, and what happens in Iran to people, who are suspicious in principle, is known all over the world.

But the FIDH also mentions imprisoned Iranians whose eyes are opened when they start to compare the treatment they receive from Qasemlu's people with the way in which the Iranian army treats Kurdish soldiers. For also about that subject, the FIDH report makes things public, and the testimonies from the--Iranian controlled--state prison in Mahabad are a monotonous recital of filthiness, neglect, torture and murder.

Qasemlu: "Three months ago, during a large-scale razzia in Mahabad, 500 people were picked up by the army. As an answer to protests, in one single day 59 young people were shot to death. We called on the population to go on strike, a call which was heeded on a large scale. The result: even more arrests, more executions."

Danger to Civilians

Is the second Mahabad (federal) state going under the same way as the first? Qasemlu: "Absolutely not. The only reason why we do not keep large cities occupied is the danger to the civilian population which supports us, but which we want to expose as little as possible to the bombardments of the Iranian air force."

In the last couple of years, because of those bombardments, nevertheless thousands of people have died, 90 percent of them civilians. Qasemlu: "In liberated territory, there are more than 25,000 refugees; most of them come from the big cities. Sometimes they are heavily wounded. We have only two hospitals: one of ourselves and one under the management of the French Médicale Internationale, plus some 10 first aid stations, and that on three million people. But all that does not alter the fact that the population keeps supporting us morally and materially. Khomeyni can not possibly win, and according to me, they realize that darn well in Tehran. Three months ago, /Rafsanjani/, one of Khomeyni's top people, sent in a roundabout way a negotiation delegation to Kurdistan. We said: what is there to negotiate about? The only thing we want is to be left alone, Khomeyni has got nothing to offer to us. Our autonomy we already have, and that he will not take away from us with his bombardments, his arrests and his executions. We do not demand autonomy, that we already have, and we want to keep it."

/Don't they realize that in particular, in Tehran?/

"Look, if you attempt to fathom the regime in Tehran, you should never do that according to logical principles. With Khomeyni one can not negotiate the way you and I would in such a case. He thinks one is not allowed to listen to the voice of one's reason. He thinks he hears heavenly voices, and if he imagines that he is allowed to cheat and murder, concepts like sense and nonsense never enter his head any longer."

Cannon Fodder

"I'll give you an example. This year, in Kurdistan no less than 6,500 Iranian soldiers died during a military offensive, an offensive which resulted in nothing and which served no purpose, either. Plain cannon fodder. By comparison: when the USSR, during an attack on a strategic position in Afghanistan had lost 500 men, they retreated, it just got to be too much to the army command. It's not that I want to say anything good about the Russian invasion in Afghanistan, but it illustrates how Khomeyni thinks about his fellow men. He once said: /economics is for the animals.../"

For Democracy

Qasemlu has been claiming for years that he practically indefinitely can hold his own, and that his federal regime will survive the one of Khomeyni: "That regime can not last, even if Khomeyni himself would be around for more than ten years, and that could very well be. Did you know that the average age in Khomeyni's family is 100 years? But the monarchy will not return

either, because there are people in Iran who are now saying: under the shah it was better, but if it comes down to it, the majority will choose for democracy. We will fight the monarchy, in any case, the way we fight Khomeyni."

Qasemlu's party is a member of the so-called National Resistance Council of Iran, to which also groups belonging like the Mojahedin-e Khalq and the one around the ousted prime minister Bani Sadr. Qasemlu: "Both under the shah and under the ayatollahs, all power is in the hands of the Persian /minority/ in Iran. Iran consists of several nations. We are fighting for an Iran where all those nations can live in freedom and equality. We are not separatists."

No Buffer State

/ -- Still, there have been reports that you would proclaim the independent state of Kurdistan at a given moment. Is a buffer state between Iraq and Iran not an attractive idea?/

"Nothing of the sort. In the first place, a federal Iran, the way I just described to you, is an ideal for which we fight. We do not fight just for our own interest, but for the sake of democratic and humanitarian values in general. We fight for culture; Khomeyni represents barbarism, anti-culture. Moreover, you are now talking about politics, and in that respect, next to that ideal comes some realism. However high the conflict between Iran and Iraq may run, about one thing they will remain in whole-hearted agreement: there should never ever come an independent Kurdistan."

/What would be the consequence if you were to proclaim the independent republic right now? A country stuck in between two enemies, who moreover also are at loggerheads with one another./

"Precisely. And of course the economic blockade from which we now already suffer. We do not have a road to the sea, we would not be able to export and nothing could get to us. We would be isolated, and very shortly famished. It is to, our ideal interest, but also to our political and economic interest that Iran does not disintegrate."

/In the meantime, in Iranian Kurdistan billions worth of minerals are buried in the soil. What happens to these?/

"Nothing at the moment. It is a bit awkward to invite investors when the bullets and grenades are flying around your ears. I myself am originally an economist, and am specialized in long-term planning. But imagine our daily life: sleep by day, at night execute military operations on the main roads and in the cities. There, the Iranian army rules, so you have to make sure to be gone by sunrise. It's not that I do not have plans at the back of my head, but in practice we are rather too busy fighting to start such a thing as an investment policy. The material need is great, a Pesh Merga has no higher income than 35 guilders per month; the same goes, by the way, for a schoolteacher in liberated territory. In between everything else, I am

looking for military and food aid, for paper to print newspapers and books, and most of all for cheap winter clothing. Where we live, in the winter it can freeze more than 30 degrees."

Political Lobby

Next to searching for material aid, Qasemlu keeps himself occupied in Europe with establishing a political lobby. Last week, there has been a talk between a number of members of the Dutch House of Representatives and a Kurdish delegation. The result? Qasemlu: "We know that we have the sympathy of public opinion in a number of countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain. But what good does that do you, if there's no direct aid being offered? Everything we have achieved in Kurdistan, we have purely ourselves to thank for. In any country, wherever in the world, where a couple of thousand or more refugees have come together, extensive aid programs are started. We have to take care of 25,000 refugees, and what happens? Nothing!"

Perhaps it would not have been all that bad, but in practice, it appears that the Kurds inhabit just about the most unfortunate place in the world, where foreign aid is concerned. The Middle East is a keg of gunpowder, it already was so in the last century and for the time being it will remain that way. And in one respect East and West can shake hands: in world politics, everybody is always ready to help another, unless there is the risk of having to go through with rather some scratches. Qasemlu: "I understand very well, these are purely political interests. But let them--for example and to begin with, in The Hague--then finally admit that!"

12568

CSO: 3614/18

VISITING REPORTER COMMENTS ON KHOMEYNI'S 'AUTHORITY'

Melbourne THE AGE in English 9 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by Paul Eedle]

[Text] TEHERAN, 8 Dec.--From a house and a mosque on the edge of Teheran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeiny rules revolutionary Iran by guiding and scolding the collection of power centres marking up the Islamic Republic.

The republic's four-year-old Constitution gives the Ayatollah wide powers, including the right to declare war, make peace and appoint top military commanders and judges.

He makes many important decisions and no policy suggested by a lesser figure carries weight until he has endorsed it.

The Ayatollah is often involved in minor matters and the narrow lanes leading to his house are crowded with visitors ranging from powerful politicians to junior bureaucrats and families of people killed in the war with Iraq.

Large groups see him in a mosque next door to his house.

The mosque's grey concrete walls are bare, except for a few revolutionary posters, while the carpets are cheap and simple.

Visitors trickle in and sit cross-legged on the floor. Minor officials, workers, and even a handful of children mingle with army commanders, Ministers and turbaned religious leaders.

On one wall, a concrete balcony with a low railing juts out at head height. Two hours after the first visitors arrive in the mosque, the Ayatollah appears through a sliding metal door.

Wearing a black turban and black cloak over a grey robe, the bearded Ayatollah walks slowly, hand raised in greeting, as the people below roar slogans and wave fists in salute.

He sits down in an armchair covered with a blue cloth and an aide puts a stand with microphones in front of him. After hearing a few words from a spokesman for his visitors, he speaks.

He lectures without notes, starting in a hoarse voice that betrays his 82 or so years.

But he gathers strength as he warms to his theme, perhaps berating foreign powers for supporting Iraq in the Persian Gulf war or urging different groups of clergy to stop squabbling before the parliamentary elections.

When the Ayatollah stops speaking, the crowd bursts into chants again. He stands up without help from his aides--at least at one recent audience attended by foreign reporters--and vanishes through the sliding door.

In law and in fact, the Ayatollah is the only person in Iran with authority over both the Government and the various revolutionary organisations spawned by the social, political and economic tumult that accompanied the Shah's overthrow.

He has the power to appoint the commander of the most important revolutionary organisation, the Revolutionary Guards, a force which emerged as a parallel to the regular army.

Khomeiny also has special representatives in all key Government and revolutionary bodies such as the armed forces, the Construction Crusade which runs rural building projects, and the four daily newspapers.

He has the final word in the appointment of leaders of the communal Friday prayers in towns and villages, a job through which Government policy is conveyed to ordinary people.

No other figure in Iran controls such a network. The President, for example, has authority only over Government Ministries and is only one member of a committee that sets policy for the war against Iraq.

Khomeiny sometimes finds the need to issue decrees or make speeches urging restraint on some revolutionary bodies.

The Constitution provides for an elected assembly to choose a successor or a council of successors to replace the Ayatollah when he dies.

But much of his power comes from personal authority he built up before and during the 1979 revolution, rather than from the letter of the Constitution. It is open to question whether any one person will be able to rule in the same way.

CSO: 4600/225

PAPER COMMENTS ON SIGNIFICANCE OF 'WEEK OF UNITY' FOR MUSLIMS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 18 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] Islam is the religion of unity. Quran is the book of unity and Prophet Muhammad (SAW) was a man who created unity among the people of Arabia. As long as the Muslims were united and walked hand in hand, they were powerful and credible. The first divine slogan of the messenger of Allah was a call to unity: the oneness and uniqueness of Allah. The famous Ayat in Quran which calls the Muslims to "grasp the divine cord and beware from dispersion" is very well known to all Muslims. The famous policy practiced by the colonialists was to break the unity of Muslims in order to be able to dominate them. And finally, one of the secrets of the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran was unity. The imperial regime did its best to rupture the unity of the Iranian people by all means it could imagine, but it failed.

In the rich and sweet Persian poetry there is a story which certainly exists in other languages elsewhere. An old man, with several children, is to die. As his last advice to his progenies he asks them to bring a few branches. When the branches are firmly tied together into a bundle, he asks each of his sons to break the bundle. No one is able to do so. Then the ailing old man unties the bundle and breaks each branch separately. Then, before he dies, he tells his sons to remain united after his death, otherwise they will be broken up.

The Islamic Republic, according to special significance to unity among Muslims, has always taken the initiative to encourage the Muslims all over the world to tend to unity. One of these goodwill acts is the declaration of a week called the Unity Week by Ayatollah-Uzma Montazeri. The Ayatollah has chosen the week in which the Prophet of Islam was born. Last year on this occasion the conference of the Friday and daily prayer leaders of Muslim countries was held in Tehran. On this occasion also, the Iranian Muslim students studying in other countries had meetings with their Muslim brothers and sisters. In several Muslim countries or in countries where Muslims form a considerable minority, seminars were held in which Sunni and Shi'a Muslims worked together, ate together and discussed the problems of the Islamic world together. In Iran itself, gatherings of Muslims (Sunni and Shi'a) were held. A simple look at the important events which took place on the occasion of the Unity Week tells us how successfully this week has been cherished.

The Unity Week this year started on Saturday morning, is being celebrated in and outside of Iran. Following the Friday prayer sermon delivered by President Ali Khamenei yesterday in which the president spoke in detail about this week, numerous seminars on this occasion have been inaugurated since this morning. This year the week in which Prophet Muhammad (SAW) was born has a very special character. At the moment Muslims celebrate the birthday anniversary of their Prophet; in many of the Islamic countries innocent men and women are being killed. In Lebanon, in the occupied Palestine and in Sahara, because of the lack of unity, Muslims are being devoured.

Iran started this week and the Iranian people are going to celebrate the Unity Week with hearts full of hope for the unity, solidarity and togetherness of Muslims all over the world. When we celebrate the Week of Unity, we have not forgotten that, as many Muslim leaders have sold out the Islamic aspirations of their people, the once very powerful Islamic Ummat is tyrannically oppressed. When we respond to the call of Ayatollah Montazeri we mourn our martyrs who have been killed due to Iraqi missile attacks of civilian targets. Now that Muslims in the Islamic Iran are happy to cherish the birth anniversary of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) let's hope that in the Week of Unity once again Muslims come together.

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